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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation assesses the pneumatological implications of Kevin Vanhoozer’s canonical-linguistic 
approach to Christian theology, in the context of the wider issue of recent interest in reconceiving the 
cultural-linguistic approach to theology through a description of Christian practice in directly 
pneumatological terms.  I seek to welcome Vanhoozer’s communicative-act description of the authority and 
identity of Scripture as God’s written Word, and the way in which this description affirms the key insights 
of the linguistic turn to practice whilst maintaining the normativity of Scripture (as divine communicative 
action) to Christian practice (participation in that action).  My concern is that Vanhoozer constructs his 
proposal around a Triune model of divine communicative action that I believe has pneumatological 
shortcomings.  In particular, I think that the importance of God’s personal presence by the Holy Spirit is 
hard to convey within Vanhoozer’s canonical-linguistic theology.  I argue that this matters because answers 
to the epistemological and hermeneutical questions that Vanhoozer is seeking to address require a fully 
Trinitarian theology that draws upon the significance of God’s indwelling presence by his Spirit.  Such 
pneumatology is vital to the description of both the ontological distinction between God and creation and 
the divine-human relation in the economy of salvation centred upon the life, death and resurrection of Jesus 
Christ.  It should be part of a fully Trinitarian theology that enables us to address questions of epistemology, 
hermeneutics and agency without making those concerns appear to determine the nature of salvation or the 
being of God.  In making this argument, I draw in particular upon Colin Gunton’s discussion of Karl Barth’s 
triune model of divine self-revelation and Gordon Fee’s exegesis of Paul’s teaching on the Holy Spirit.     
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
I, Peter Bellenger hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately forty thousand words in length, has been 
written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous 
application for a higher degree. 
 
I was admitted as a research student in September 2007 and as a candidate for the degree of MPhil in Divinity 
in September 2007; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St Andrews 
between 2007 and 2008. 
 
Date:     signature of candidate: 
 
I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate for the 
degree of MPhil in Divinity in the University of St Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in 
application for that degree. 
 
Date:     signature of supervisor: 
 
In submitting this thesis to the University of St Andrews we understand that we are giving permission for it to be 
made available for use in accordance with the regulations of the University Library for the time being in force, subject 
to any copyright vested in the work not being affected thereby. We also understand that the title and the abstract will 
be published, and that a copy of the work may be made and supplied to any bona fide library or research worker, that 
my thesis will be electronically accessible for personal or research use unless exempt by award of an embargo as 
requested below, and that the library has the right to migrate my thesis into new electronic forms as required to ensure 
continued access to the thesis. We have obtained any third party copyright permissions that may be required in order 
to allow such access and migration, or have requested the appropriate embargo below. 
 
The following is an agreed request by candidate and supervisor regarding the electronic publication of this thesis: 
 
Access to printed copy and electronic publication of thesis through the University of St Andrews. 
 
Date:   signature of candidate:    signature of supervisor:
  
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
I would like to acknowledge my great gratitude to Rev’d. Dr. Steve Holmes for his insightful supervision 
and friendship during my studies.  I would also like to thank the wonderful community of fellow students 
whose hospitality and witness made the year at St Andrews such a blessing.  I also want to thank Walter, 
David, Alan and Richard for the help, perspective and encouragement they gave me so generously.  I would 
like to thank the Bible Society for the grant that helped make this study possible.  The work of the Bible 
Society across the world is so transformative, and I felt it a great privilege to receive this support. 
 
This work is dedicated to Mum, Harry and Nicky with love and thanks for your love and for being there in 
every way throughout.  I also want to thank Tomi and Jenn, Ben, and Mark and Cassandra so much for their 
steadfast encouragement and support and prayers.   Without you all this dissertation would not have come to 
be.   
 
   
 
                                      CONTENTS  
Introduction 
 
 1 
Chapter One: Pneumatology and Mediation  7 
 Introduction 7 
 A.  Revelation and Pneumatology: Colin Gunton’s Theology of Mediation and 
his Critique of Barth’s Triune Model of Divine Self-Revelation 
8 
 B.  Triune Communicative Action: The Use of Speech- Act Conceptuality to 
Integrate the ‘Scripture Principle’ with Karl Barth’s Triune Model of Divine Self-
Revelation 
12 
 B.1.  Application of Colin Gunton’s argument to Vanhoozer’s model 14 
 B.2.  The epistemological issues related to the pneumatological weakness 
in Vanhoozer’s model, and the wider issue of the Creator-creation relation 
18 
 C.  God’s Personal Presence by the Holy Spirit  20 
 Conclusion 
 
 
24 
Chapter 2: Pneumatology and Communicative Action   26 
 Introduction 26 
 A.  The ‘Canonical-Linguistic’ Approach to Theology: Kevin Vanhoozer’s Thesis 
in The Drama Of Doctrine  
27 
 B.  Participation in Triune Communicative Action  29 
 B.1.  Vanhoozer’s integration of authorial-discourse and performance 
interpretation  
29 
 B.2.  Authority and identity in the Scripture-tradition relation and the public 
witness of the Church 
37 
  C.  Assessment of the Pneumatological Dimension of Vanhoozer’s Thesis 43 
 C.1.  Pneumatology and the linguistic turn to practice 43 
 C.2.  Vanhoozer’s use of Spirit Christology 46 
 C.3.  The ‘commingling of language and life’:  The significance of Spirit 
Christology to Vanhoozer’s hermeneutic theology, drawing upon the work 
of Paul Ricoeur and Hans-Georg Gadamer 
50 
 C.4.  The Holy Spirit as Person: Why the New Testament emphasis upon 
the Holy Spirit as God’s personal presence is so important to theology 
55 
 D.  Trajectories 60 
 Conclusion 
 
 
61 
Chapter 3: Pneumatology and Understanding  63 
 Introduction 63 
 A.  The Epistemological Problem Carried Within Vanhoozer’s Model 64 
 A.1. The introduction of an intentional ambiguity  64 
 A.2.  The pneumatological implications of the asymmetry of the illocution-
perlocution relation in speech act theory upon Vanhoozer’s conception of 
‘illumination’ and ‘understanding’ 
64 
 B.  The Pneumatological Issues in Vanhoozer’s Characterisation of Faith, 
Reason and the Relationship Between Divine and Human Agency 
68 
 B.1.  Faith seeking understanding 69 
 B.2.  Sin and human agency in relation to divine communicative action   72 
 B.3.  Vanhoozer’s Three-fold Epistemology 74 
 
  C.  The Justification of Vanhoozer’s Canonical-Linguistic Approach Using the 
Concept of the Canon as ‘Christotope’ 
75 
 D.  Vanhoozer’s Recent Development of His Model:  The ‘Miracle’ of 
Understanding and the ‘Matter’ of Scripture 
77 
 Conclusion 
 
 
83 
Chapter 4: Pneumatology and Life in Christ  84 
 Introduction 84 
 A.  Vanhoozer’s Canonical-Linguistic Description of the Atonement and 
Christian Identity 
85 
 A.1.  The Cross of Christ and Theo-dramatic Performance  85 
 A.2.  Human agency and identity in relation to the judgement and grace of 
the cross of Christ 
86 
 A.3.  Atonement and Mimesis: Vanhoozer’s ecclesiology and account of 
participation in Christ 
89 
 B.  The Holy Spirit and the Christian Life 95 
 B.1.  Life ‘according to the Spirit’ in the New Testament letters of Paul 95 
 B.2.  Application to the concerns of this study 98 
 B.3.  The Spirit and power in weakness: Prayer as a paradigmatic 
‘practice’ of life in the Spirit, and how it exceeds a linguistic framework 
102
 C.  Trajectories 107
 Conclusion 107
Concluding Summary  109
Bibliography   111
  
 
 
 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
DD Kevin J. Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical-Linguistic Approach to Christian 
Theology (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005) 
 
FT Kevin J. Vanhoozer, First Theology: God, Scripture & Hermeneutics (Leicester: Apollos, 
2002) 
 
IM Kevin J. Vanhoozer,  Is there a meaning in this text? (Leicester: Apollos, 1998) 
 
GEP Gordon D. Fee,  God’s Empowering Presence: The Holy Spirit in the Letters of Paul 
(Peabody: Hendrickson, 1994) 
 
PSPG Gordon D. Fee, Paul, the Spirit, and the People of God (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1996. 
Reprinted in Great Britain by Hodder and Stoughton, London: 1997) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
Introduction 
 
My basic thesis is that God’s personal presence by his Spirit is perhaps insufficiently 
accounted for by theology structured by the ‘linguistic turn to practice,’ even if this is 
conceived in distinctly Christological-pneumatological terms.  I will argue this in 
conversation with Kevin Vanhoozer’s canonical-linguistic theology.1   
 
I have chosen Vanhoozer’s work because he accepts Lindbeck’s postliberal emphasis 
upon practice (the basic point of ‘meaning is use’), whilst wanting to correct the 
problem that, in structuring doctrine around ecclesial practice, theology can become 
anthropologically determined.  Vanhoozer’s concern is for how Scripture uniquely 
normalises ecclesial practice and is our means of covenantal participation in divine 
practice.  Hence, Vanhoozer’s correction to the cultural-linguistic is one that emerges 
from the doctrine of Scripture (as Vanhoozer’s term canonical-linguistic suggests).  I 
am interested in the pneumatological implications of Vanhoozer’s model.  His 
correction of the cultural-linguistic approach is also a pneumatological one because 
canonical practice is ‘Spirited practice’.  The two aspects go hand-in-hand because, 
similarly to Karl Barth’s integration of the doctrine of revelation into the doctrine of 
God, Vanhoozer integrates the doctrine of Scripture into the doctrine of God in a triune 
account of divine communicative action.  This establishes an interesting comparison to 
the work of Reinhard Hütter who identifies the same problem with the cultural-
linguistic but seeks to defend it by describing ecclesial practice as divine practice in 
directly pneumatological terms.2         
 
Vanhoozer’s canonical-linguistic approach represents an extension of his work on 
biblical interpretation into an account of the overall nature of Christian theology and 
practice.  It involves a triune model of divine self-communicative action that Vanhoozer 
has developed throughout his recent books.  Vital to this development is Vanhoozer’s 
                                                 
1 Kevin Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical-Linguistic Approach to Christian Theology 
(Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2005), hereafter abbreviated DD. 
2 Reinhard Hütter, Suffering Divine Things: Theology as Church Practice (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2000) 
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appropriation of ‘speech-act’ philosophy within a theological framework.  The basic 
thesis of speech-act philosophy is that saying is a form of doing.3  Speech-acts are 
typically characterised using the terms locution, illocution and perlocution.  Richard 
Briggs describes these as the act “‘of saying’ (locution), ‘in saying’ (illocution), and ‘by 
saying’ (perlocution).”4  In Is there a meaning in this text?5, Vanhoozer employed 
speech-act theory to show how the authorial meaning of a text is determinate and yet 
also function of practice.  It is the author’s ‘illocutionary’ action.  For Vanhoozer, to be 
a faithful interpreter is to discern the illocutionary action as we attend to the locutions of 
the text.  Scripture is God’s Word in that God is its ultimate author; the canonical 
illocutions of the locutions of Scripture is divine communicative action covenantally 
relating to us, through just these words, to salvation in Jesus Christ.  Late on in Is there 
a meaning in this text? (and arguably not essential for his basic thesis), Vanhoozer 
introduces the concept that the locutionary, illocutionary, perlocutionary aspects of 
speech-acts can be thought in trinitarian terms.6  He has become convinced that the triad 
of locution, illocution and perlocution is more than an analogy for the triunity of God.7  
In First Theology,8 the trinitarian account of divine communicative action within the 
triune economy of salvation is developed and becomes essential to Vanhoozer’s 
linguistic integration of the doctrine of Scripture into the doctrine of God.  It is this 
theological move – identifying the dynamics of communicative action (of Scripture) 
with the triune economy of salvation – that enables Vanhoozer’s account of ‘triune 
communicative action’ to incorporate the full scope of Christian theology-and-practice.  
This is the canonical-linguistic approach offered in the Drama of Doctrine.  
 
The strength of Vanhoozer’s application of speech-act theory to the doctrine of 
Scripture is that it describes Scripture as God’s written Word in terms that address the 
                                                 
3 The classic works are J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1962) and J. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press,1969).  Vanhoozer’s use of speech-act philosophy is significantly influenced by W. 
Alston, Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,2000) 
4 R. Briggs, ‘Speech Act Theory’ in D.Firth and J.Grant, Words and the Word: Explorations in Biblical 
Interpretation and Literary Theory (Nottingham: Apollos,2008), 88  
5 Vanhoozer, Kevin J.  Is there a meaning in this text? (Leicester; Apollos,1998), hereafter IM. 
6 IM 456-457 
7 Kevin Vanhoozer, First Theology: God, Scripture & Hermeneutics (Leicester: Apollos, 2002), hereafter 
abbreviated FT, 168 
8 See especially FT chapters 5-7. 
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complex post/modern questions of authority and interpretation.  It also has wider 
implications for theology and ecclesiology, giving a fresh perspective upon the 
Scripture-tradition relation.  Whilst wishing to celebrate these insights, I want to assess 
the triune model of communicative action, which is vital to Vanhoozer’s canonical-
linguistic conceptuality, and in particular the way that the person and work of the Holy 
Spirit is described.  I shall begin in chapter 1 by outlining Colin Gunton’s concerns 
about the mediatorial and pneumatological implications of Barth’s triune self-revelation 
model.  In chapter 2, I shall explore how this mediatorial and pneumatological issue is 
present in a modified form in Vanhoozer’s integration of Scripture as divine discourse 
and the linguistic turn to practice.  Issues of normativity in both Nicholas Wolterstorff’s 
theory of divine discourse and George Lindbeck’s cultural-linguistic theory are resolved 
by this integration, as is the concern that Karl Barth’s doctrine of revelation lacks a 
sufficient account of the semantic mediation of revelation through Scripture.  But 
pneumatological problems remain: notably, is literary conceptuality doing theological 
work in place of or parallel to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit?  Vanhoozer’s ‘Spirit 
Christology,’ whilst securing the coherence of his approach, is central to this issue.  
Further, in rightly arguing that Scripture as divine communicative action should norm 
church practice (hence the canonical-linguistic approach), I shall ask if Vanhoozer 
unnecessarily loses hold of the apostolicity of the church as a ‘manifest public’ – a 
pneumatological rather than linguistic reference as such.   
 
In chapter 3, I shall explore how the nature of the illocution – perlocution relation, when 
built into the triune model, leads to epistemological problems that relate to the 
foregoing pneumatological and mediatorial questions.  Specifically, this concerns the 
nature of ‘illumination’ in Vanhoozer’s account of divine self-communicative action. 
This involves the complex relations of faith, reason and will and how these are defined 
in his communicative hermeneutic.  Again, the question is how semantic conceptuality 
relates to the Spirit’s mediation of our relation to God through and in Christ.  
Vanhoozer’s ‘virtue epistemology’ potentially requires a pneumatology that is in 
tension with the triune communicative action model in regard to the illocution-
perlocution relation.  My argument is that these complex epistemological questions 
stem from allowing epistemology to structure the more primary doctrines of salvation 
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and the triunity of God.  The epistemological issues raised in chapter 3 lead towards 
asking how justification, sanctification and identity ‘in Christ’ are conceived in 
Vanhoozer’s approach.  Chapter 4 considers how Vanhoozer conceives Christian 
identity as gifted by the atonement and tasked with ‘performing atonement’, and the 
theological issues that are at stake in regard to the Cross, the Spirit and the Christian life 
of prayer.   
 
My focus, then, is the pneumatology within Vanhoozer’s canonical-linguistic approach 
to theology, and specifically his integration of the doctrine of God and the doctrine of 
Scripture in his account of ‘triune communicative action’.  Good pneumatology should 
never suggest a separate economy of the Holy Spirit from salvation in Jesus Christ.  The 
aim is always to develop a fully trinitarian theology.  As mentioned, Vanhoozer values 
‘Spirit Christology’ in this regard.  Clearly, Christology is permeated by the Holy Spirit 
– any discussion of the person and work of Jesus Christ involves the trinitarian relations 
of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.  Jesus does everything in relation to the Father in and 
through the Spirit.  (And, although ‘Spirit Christology’ could tend towards being 
adoptionistic, this certainly need not be the case.9)  However, certain approaches to 
Spirit Christology seem to be structured in terms of using pneumatology as a kind of 
‘solution’ within a modern framework of Christological issues in relation to agency and 
personhood.  I do not think that this generates a fully trinitarian theology and overlooks 
a key aspect of pneumatology.  I believe it is vital to the faithful and fruitful 
development of trinitarian theology that we attend to the reality of God’s personal 
presence by his Spirit, in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus and in the life of the 
church which exists through and in Christ.  I am indebted to Gordon Fee’s biblical 
exegesis of Paul’s experience and understanding of the Holy Spirit, and to Lesslie 
Newbigin’s discussion of the Holy Spirit in his ecclesiological and missiological work, 
in my exploration of this topic.         
 
                                                 
9 Spirit Christology is well discussed by Ralphe Del Colle, Christ and the Spirit: Spirit-Christology in 
Trinitarian Perspective, (New York: Oxford University Press,1994).  Del Colle distinguishes ‘classical’ 
and ‘revisionary’ trinitarian Spirit Christology in ‘Schleiermacher and Spirit Christology: Unexplored 
Horizons of The Christian Faith’, IJST 1(1999) 292-293. 
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Gordon Fee writes that Paul’s epistles describe the Holy Spirit “as an experienced, 
empowering reality”.  He argues that historically, if this perspective has been lost, the 
church has often been brought back to it through movements of the Spirit.  The risk is 
that these movements are misunderstood resulting in “individualistic spirituality [in 
which] the reality of the Spirit is sometimes merely experienced in the experience.”10  
For Fee, describing the Holy Spirit as an experienced and empowering reality, requires 
that we attend to two further matters that “lie at the very heart of faith” for Paul: 
First, the Spirit as person, the promised return of God’s own personal presence with his people; 
second, the Spirit as eschatological fulfilment…who both reconstitutes God’s people anew and 
empowers us to live the life of the future in our between-the-times existence – between the time 
of Christ’s first and second coming.11 
Central to this dissertation is my conviction that recent attention to pneumatology, 
particularly in ‘post-Barthian’ theology, especially by those interested in the ‘turn to 
practice’, has often addressed the second of Fee’s pneumatological points (empowering 
agency) but not the first (God’s personal presence).  The result is theology that 
describes the empowering agency of the Spirit – addressing many of the (post)modern 
issues concerning the relation of divine and human agency – whilst demurring from the 
Holy Spirit as personal presence.  However, “for Paul, the Spirit is not some merely 
impersonal ‘force’ or ‘influence’ or ‘power.’  The Spirit is none other than the 
fulfilment of the promise that God himself would once again be present with his 
people.”12  Underwriting practice with pneumatology may address the charge that 
“[m]odern Christians are largely content to be trinitarian in belief but binitarian in 
practice”13, but perhaps not fully address the Scriptural reality of the Holy Spirit as 
God’s personal presence.  Thus, is such theology describing the Christian life fully, and 
is it fully Trinitarian? 
 
                                                 
10 Gordon Fee, Paul, the Spirit, and the People of God (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1997), hereafter 
abbreviated PSPG, xiv 
11 Ibid., xv  
12 Gordon Fee, God’s Empowering Presence: The Holy Spirit in the Letters of Paul (Peabody: 
Hendrickson, 1994), hereafter GEP, 845 
13 C. Pinnock, ‘The Concept of the Spirit in the Epistles of Paul’ (PhD.diss.,Manchester,1963)2. (GEP 
828n2)   
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One of Newbigin’s insights in The Household of God was to see that Catholic-
Protestant ‘tension’ becomes mutually creative in the context of a third perspective – 
“the living presence of the Holy Spirit.”  He writes: 
‘What is the manner of our incorporation in Christ?’…[A]ll three answers which we looked at 
are true; we are made members in Him by hearing and believing the Gospel, by being received 
sacramentally into the visible fellowship of His people, and both of these only through the living 
presence of the Holy Spirit.…The love which is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, 
creating and sustaining faith and hope in us, is but the earnest of our full sharing in the love of 
God with all the saints – of our being perfected into one in the Father and the Son.  But it is a 
real earnest.  There is an actual sphere of redemption, of which the historical centre is Jesus 
Christ incarnate, crucified, risen and ascended.  From that centre the word of salvation goes out 
to all the earth, the nations are baptised, the Lord’s table is spread, a real community is built up – 
all by the living sovereign working of the Holy Spirit.14  
Vanhoozer’s canonical-linguistic approach and Hütter’s ‘evangelical-catholic’ approach 
could be described as an outworking of Newbigin’s thesis.  However, these emerging 
approaches seem to ‘subsume’ the personal presence of the Spirit into the linguistic turn 
to practice in ways which do not sufficiently account for the “real earnest” that is “the 
living presence of the Holy Spirit”.  Vanhoozer’s approach is the focus of my discussion 
because I think his commitment to the normativity of Scripture – the authority and 
identity of Scripture as God’s Word – is vital and should not be lost, but rather 
supported, in what I hope to say concerning the person and work of the Holy Spirit. 
                                                 
14 Lesslie Newbigin, The Household of God (London: SCM Press, 1953) 131 
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Chapter One: Pneumatology and Mediation 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter sets out the pneumatological issue at the heart of my discussion of Kevin 
Vanhoozer’s canonical-linguistic approach to Christian theology – the way that the 
Holy Spirit mediates salvation through and in Jesus Christ.  Vanhoozer’s canonical-
linguistic approach is influenced by Karl Barth’s integration of the doctrine of 
revelation and the doctrine of God, but seeks to replace Barth’s triune account of the 
divine self-revelation of the Word of God with an account of ‘triune communicative 
action’.  By replacing ‘revelation’ with ‘communicative action’, Vanhoozer’s 
theological framework incorporates more fundamentally the way the actual words of 
Scripture are essential to God’s self-revelation through and in Jesus Christ.  By looking 
at the way Colin Gunton has highlighted a pneumatological limitation of Barth’s 
theological model, I shall ask if Vanhoozer’s account carries forward the same 
pneumatological issue, and perhaps turns it into a more significant problem.   
 
In outlining what we need to attend to in writing good pneumatology, I shall expound 
the emphases of Gordon Fee in his exegetical work on the apostle Paul’s teaching on the 
Holy Spirit, and refer to Lesslie Newbigin’s exposition of the importance of the Holy 
Spirit to theology and ecclesiology.  I am interested in the importance that Fee and 
Newbigin place upon the Holy Spirit as God’s personal presence, which I think is vital 
to the question of whether theology can be fully structured by linguistic turn to practice, 
even with the advances of Vanhoozer’s canonical-linguistic approach. 
 
 8
A.  Revelation and Pneumatology: Colin Gunton’s Theology of Mediation 
and his Critique of Barth’s Triune Model of Divine Self-Revelation 
 
In his Warfield Lectures, Colin Gunton outlines how epistemic issues should be related 
derivatively rather than immediately with God’s saving action as we describe 
theologically how we come to know God through Jesus Christ.  He argues that Barth’s 
profound emphasis that God reveals God, may not fully describe the incarnational and 
pneumatological mediation of revelation.15  It is basic to the Christian faith that “God 
the Father reveals himself personally through his Son and Spirit”, but the crucial point is 
that this revelation is not an “unmediated experience.”16  Such immediacy stems from 
revelation becoming a ‘first-order’ concern – “a way of speaking of divine saving 
action” or at the very least assimilating that action within it.17  This risks Jesus’ 
humanity and, in turn, the words of Scripture appearing to be only the occasion for, 
rather than mediating, revelation.  In love, the Creator God became flesh and dwelt 
among us for our salvation.  Jesus Christ is the mediator of a new covenant – the gift of 
a personal relation with God through Christ and in the Spirit.  This mediation is made 
through Jesus’ life, death and resurrection, ascension and the gift of the Holy Spirit.  
The apostolic witnesses hand on this mystery, and, worded propositions, though not the 
relation itself, are vital to our coming into this relation.  Gunton’s concern is not to 
detract from “the priority revelation plays in our knowledge of God but to delimit such 
considerations from other central systematic topics, particularly perhaps soteriology.”18  
This allows him to i) recover the importance of words, and specifically propositions, 
because ii) he has made revelation second-order to salvation.  Taking the points in turn: 
i) “Propositions may not be revelation, but they may in a derivative sense be 
revelatory”: “We address God as ‘thou’, through Christ and in the Spirit” but as we 
communicate our faith propositionally – for example, ‘Jesus died for our sins’ – others 
find “something revelatory of the fact that he indeed did, and lives to make intercession 
for us.”  In this sense, “revelation is a form of personal relation conveyed by forms of 
                                                 
15 Colin Gunton,  A Brief Theology of Revelation (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 5 
16 Ibid., 16 
17 Ibid., 18 
18 Ibid., 17-18   
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words.”19  ii) The incarnational and pneumatological mediation that creates and gifts 
this personal relation is soteriological, and consequently epistemological.  Since, “our 
primary relation to God is one of faith or trust, we are not speaking so much of 
revelation as of a form of present personal relationship, of a saving relationship.”20   
 
Gunton argues that the approach exemplified by Ronald Thiemann of integrating 
revelation as a part of the doctrine of God,21 influenced by Karl Barth’s work in Church 
Dogmatics,22 avoids foundationalism by equating divine self-identification with divine 
saving action, but depends upon a category of narrative that maintains an aspect of 
‘immediacy’.     
Without a doubt, a doctrine of revelation centring on salvation does also centre on a narratively 
identified God.  But if salvation is the redemption of the creation, the centre cannot be divorced 
from that which circles around it.23   
Gunton argues that to properly avoid foundationalism we need to delimit revelation to 
take in the economy of creation (soteriologically established), because revelation 
“requires a trinitarian construction if it is to be satisfactorily understood”.24  This 
approach to revelation enables Gunton say that the knowledge of God “is both a 
personal relation and something that can be conveyed through words.”25  This does not 
collapse the personal relation into semantic communication whilst affirming the 
necessity of the latter.  This is vital, and depends upon a fully trinitarian account of 
mediation.  This brings us to the pneumatological aspect of the doctrine of revelation.  
In his concluding lecture, Gunton explores the centre of God’s revelation – the life, 
death and resurrection of Jesus – and the way the testimony of the gospels function.26  
Revelation is an eschatological category (God grants us to know in the midst of the 
‘now’ a knowledge that will only be complete in the future), and yet the gospels are 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 105-106 
20 Ibid., 110 
21 “A doctrine of revelation is an account of God’s identifiability.”  Ronald Thiemann, Revelation and 
Theology (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame,1985) 110-111 
22 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, trans. ed. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1956-1975) 
23 Gunton, Brief Theology of Revelation, 112 
24 Ibid., 111  
25 Ibid., 119 
26 Ibid., 109 
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revelatory in that they mediate a personal relation between the past and the present.27  
This brings the mediatory office of the Spirit to the fore.  Gunton makes his point by 
comparing the Synoptic Gospels with John’s Gospel.  He argues that there is “no basic 
theological difference” between their approaches to revelation – both concern the 
mediation of eschatological glory, the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ, but in 
John’s Gospel the role of the Spirit is explicit while in the Synoptics it is implicit.28  In 
John’s Gospel the focus, as with the Synoptics, is upon the divine economy of salvation, 
and the knowledge of God in Christ is conveyed by narrative means, but, “in being 
centred on revelation from the point of view of the continuing church,” it gives us a 
deeper pneumatological insight that points to the way in which “revelation is treated 
relationally rather than merely narratively.”29   
 
Gunton expounds his argument in relation to Barth’s influential account of God’s self-
revelation: the Father is Revealer, the Son is Revelation, and the Spirit is the efficacy of 
Revelation.30  Gunton agrees this is a primary emphasis of the Synoptics – the Father 
reveals, makes known, the Son.  But he argues we also need to say that the Son reveals 
the Father and this highlights an understating of the role of the Spirit in Barth’s 
theology.31    
Barth’s tendency to underplay the significance of the humanity of Jesus…is accompanied by an 
equivalent failure to give due place and function to the Holy Spirit.  For Barth, the Spirit is ‘the 
subjective side in the event of revelation,’…[and this tends] to limit the Spirit’s activity to the 
application to the believer of the benefits of Christ.32 
Attending to this pneumatological deficit also suggests a better conception of mediation 
because revelation is an eschatological concept.  Revelation is a gift of the Spirit, the 
agent of eschatological completeness and the one who perfects the creation.  The Spirit 
enables an anticipation to take place, mediating revelation so that we may know God in 
the midst of time.33  In John’s gospel,  
                                                 
27 Ibid., 112-114   
28 Ibid., 122   
29 Ibid., 117 (my italics)  i.e. what is true most obviously of John’s Gospel is true of all the Gospels. 
30 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics 1/1 448f.   
31 Matthew 11.27 is an Synoptic instance of Jesus’ telling his disciples that Son reveals the Father. 
32 Gunton, Brief Theology of Revelation, 119-120  
33 Ibid., 120 
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the author writes from the point of view of those who live after the giving of the Spirit….The 
synoptic Gospels show narratively that the disciples fail to understand what is before their eyes; 
there is revelation but not adequate apprehension.  John explains the reason, the Spirit was not 
yet given, but now the Paraclete is with them (Jn. 7.39, cf. 12.16).34 
Thus, John is able to show the glory of Christ at every moment in his life.  The 
Paraclete leads the church into all truth (John 16:13).  When we read ‘truth’ in John’s 
Gospel, we are reading about Jesus Christ – to be led into all truth means to be led to 
Jesus.  But Gunton argues that this does not disqualify “a more universal meaning for 
the claim”: that is, that the Spirit is the mediator of revelation.  The Spirit is revealed as 
one from whom rather than to whom we look; revealed as the “mediator of relation to 
God through Christ and consequently as the mediator of revelation.”35  This means 
wherever there is revelation it is the gift of the creator and redeemer Spirit.  But John’s 
primary concern remains that “revelation means glory, in the present, and it means 
Jesus.”  The glory is centred upon the ‘lifting up’ of Jesus, the Son reveals the Father in 
self-giving love.  Hence, the “trinitarian structure of revelation” is perhaps “better 
preserved in some such expression as the Son reveals the Father in and through the Holy 
Spirit.”   
Such things certainly appear in Barth, but there is a tendency working against them suggesting 
that the Son reveals himself, with the result that the nature of the relation between Son and 
Father is obscured, and the work of the Spirit too closely located in the believer’s subjective 
appropriation of revelation.36    
 
To sum up: Gunton’s concern, in outlining the trinitarian conception of mediation given 
by the biblical witness, is that ‘immediacy’ results from placing the doctrine of 
revelation in the same ‘order’ as the doctrine of God.  However, is it possible address 
the semantic aspect of this ‘immediacy’ whilst leaving the basic ‘Barthian’ framework 
in place?  This is what Vanhoozer’s triune communicative action model involves, and I 
think it structuralises a pneumatological limitation present (but perhaps not irretrievably 
so) in Barth’s theology.  
 
 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 120-121 
36 Ibid., 122 
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B.  Triune Communicative Action: The Use of Speech- Act Conceptuality 
to Integrate the ‘Scripture Principle’ with Karl Barth’s Triune Model of 
Divine Self-Revelation 
 
In his essay ‘God’s Mighty Speech Acts’,37 Kevin Vanhoozer reconceptualises the 
‘Scripture Principle’ using speech-act conceptuality based upon God’s Triunity and the 
covenantal nature of the economy of salvation.  (This thinking is vital to The Drama of 
Doctrine.38)  This is both a departure from, and continuation of, Karl Barth’s theological 
approach.  He describes the ‘Scripture Principle’ as the orthodox view that the Bible is 
to be identified with the Word of God,39 and suggests that difficulties with the ‘identity 
thesis’ arose in modernity, not for exegetical or historical reasons, but a theological 
misunderstanding that it necessarily “equates the human with the divine…identifying 
God with what is not God.” 40  He argues that whilst Barth’s Christocentric dialectical 
approach offers an ‘indirect identity’ thesis, it “is not clear how, or even whether, Barth 
accounts for the properly semantic moment of God’s self-disclosure.”41 Vanhoozer 
addresses this by speaking of God’s self-revelation in terms of divine communicative 
action, whilst maintaining the triune structure of Barth’s doctrine of revelation.  Thus, 
Vanhoozer integrates the doctrine of Scripture into the doctrine of God in a similar way 
to that in which Barth integrated the doctrine of revelation with the doctrine of God.  
It is, of course, important not to lose sight of the personal reference of the Word of God to Jesus 
Christ.  No one claims that the Bible is a part of the Godhead.  What is being claimed is that the 
Bible is a “work” of God.  While Christ is a fully human and fully divine agent, all we are 
claiming for Scripture is that it is a fully human and divine act. [Footnote] Moreover, God’s 
mighty speech acts work through and with the human speech acts of Scripture.42   
 
Vanhoozer argues this accords with classical theism, because at the heart of speech-act 
philosophy is a concept that is theological in the first instance – covenant. 
                                                 
37 FT 127-158 
38 DD 63-71 
39 FT 127-128.  The key aspects of this principle are propositional revelation, verbal inspiration, infallible 
authority.(FT 133-134)   
40 FT 139  
41 FT 148   
42 FT 153 
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[A] number of theologians, prompted largely by Barth, see biblical authority in functional terms, 
as instrumental in leading us to Christ.  Truth would on this view be a matter of faith and 
practice.  The focus on God’s mighty speech acts is a bit broader…covenantal efficacy is the 
more comprehensive term to cover all the things that God does with and in and through the 
Scriptures.43 
Barth would perhaps baulk at some of Vanhoozer phrasing – for example, “As Austin 
put it: ‘Our word is our bond.’  God too, therefore, is ‘tied’ to these texts” – but 
Vanhoozer does not believe his approach limits divine freedom, but rather expresses the 
gracious freedom of God made known in covenantal action. 
God is the agent who is true to his Word. “I will be your God and you will be my people” – such 
is the fundamental covenant promise.  It is by keeping his word that God reveals himself to be 
who he is.44 
 
Vanhoozer aims to “show how God’s being in speech act is trinitarian” in a comparative 
way to how “Barth arrived at the doctrine of the Trinity by analysing God’s self-
revelation with the schema revealer-revelation-revealedness.”45   
The Father’s activity is locution.  God the Father is the utterer, the begetter, the sustainer of 
words.  He is the agent who locutus est per prophetas in former times, and who now speaks 
through the Son (Heb 1:1-2). ...  
The Logos corresponds to the speaker’s act or illocution, to what one does in saying.  The 
illocution has content (reference and predication) and a particular intent (a force) that shows how 
the proposition is to be taken.  It is illocutionary force that makes a speech act count as, say, a 
promise.  What illocutionary act is performed is determined by the speaker; its meaning is 
therefore objective. 
The third aspect of a speech act is the perlocutionary.  This refers to the effect an illocutionary 
act has on the actions or beliefs of the hearer.…The great benefit of this analysis is that it enables 
us clearly to relate the Spirit’s relation to the Word of God.46 
Thus, there is continuity with Barth.  For Vanhoozer, Barth’s “emphasis upon the self-
revelation of God is faulty only in its neglect of the semantic means by which disclosure 
takes place.”47  Thus, does this adoption of Barth’s triune self-revelation model lead to a 
pneumatological weakness in Vanhoozer’s canonical-linguistic approach, along the 
                                                 
43 FT 132 
44 FT 154 
45 FT 154 
46 FT 154-155 
47 FT 157.  This does not mean that theology for Barth was anything other than biblical exegesis: “Barth 
expected the Spirit to use just these words to disclose Jesus Christ.”(DD 5) 
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lines of Gunton’s argument?  By replacing Barth’s dialectical framework with 
communicative-act conceptuality and semantic mediation, yet retaining his triune self-
revelation (now triune communication action) model, Vanhoozer perhaps structuralises 
a pneumatological weakness, with the effect that semantic dynamics and literary 
conceptuality do the work of pneumatology.  This may undermine the trinitarian 
description of the Creator-creature distinction and relation in Christ.   
 
B.1.  Application of Colin Gunton’s argument to Vanhoozer’s model 
 
In describing revelation in terms of the personal relationship established by the 
incarnate self-communication of God in Jesus Christ, mediated through the apostolic 
tradition of the Scriptures by the Holy Spirit, Gunton describes an intrinsic relation 
between the divine action in Jesus and the words of Scripture.48  Inspiration and 
revelation are thus related.  The words of Scripture are inspired by the Spirit “not only 
because they record revelation, but because their words are in some way revelation.”49  
The Spirit not only inspires the authors but enables “their words to be the indispensable 
mediators of revelation” (c.f. 1 Cor. 2:13).50  Hence, the Scriptures do not only become 
the written word of God in the moment of subjective appropriation by the reader.  
Revelation is “a personal relationship taking form at a particular time in human 
history”51 through the incarnate life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, known by 
the apostles, and the Scriptures are indispensable for the mediation by the Spirit of this 
relationship to God through Christ.  In this, Gunton affirms with a qualification T.F. 
Torrance’s statement that “the objective and living Reality of Christ himself and his 
saving acts as they took the field in the form of the Word of Truth of the 
gospel…continuously begets the Church in history as the Body of Christ in the world.”  
As it points to the intrinsic relation of the revelation that is Jesus Christ – the Truth – 
and the propositions in which the Christian faith is expressed – the truth of the faith – 
                                                 
48 Gunton, Brief Theology of Revelation, 98-99   
49 Ibid., 78n22  
50 Ibid., 77-78 
51 Ibid., 98 
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Gunton agrees.52  His qualification concerns the ‘immediacy’ that could be implied if 
we do not specify that “the Word of Truth is mediated in the present by the Spirit of 
Truth.  The one who realises – mediates – the truth of the gospel is the Spirit who 
enables Jesus to be known for who he is, the crucified, risen and ascended mediator of 
reconciliation with God.”  Avoiding the problem of ‘immediacy’ requires two 
concomitant affirmations: the intrinsic relation between “the divine action in Jesus and 
the words in which scripture articulates it”; and the essential “place of the Spirit in 
mediating revelation”.53  Because Gunton places the doctrine of revelation as ‘second 
order’ to divine saving action, he is enabled to speak of this intrinsic relation, delimiting 
revelation, and do so on the basis of stronger pneumatology.  I think Vanhoozer’s model 
fulfils the first affirmation but is weak on the second.  It is pneumatologically 
limited/deficient. 
 
Vanhoozer’s account of Scripture as divine communicative action offers a 
groundbreaking way of articulating the aforementioned intrinsic relation between the 
words of Scripture and divine saving action.  In speaking of divine ‘communicative 
action’ rather than ‘revelation’, Vanhoozer (like Gunton) is concerned that Barth’s 
doctrine of revelation neglects the semantic nature of the mediation of revelation 
through Scripture.  However, maintaining Barth’s paradigm of divine self-revelation 
(albeit in terms of communicative action) would seem to raise two problems based on 
Gunton’s argument: 
i) Revelation, as communicative action, remains in first-order relation to divine saving 
action. 
ii) The Spirit is limited to the ‘subjective appropriation’ (efficacy) of divine 
communicative action and is not sufficiently the mediator of the personal relation 
established by God’s saving action through Jesus Christ.  
Vanhoozer would argue that divine saving action is necessarily communicative, and 
personal relation necessarily involves communication.  This is true.  My question 
regards how communicative dynamics become operative in this triune model.  Is 
speech-act conceptuality (‘semantic potential’ as such), rather than the personal 
                                                 
52 Ibid., 99 
53 Ibid., 99,123 
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presence of God by his Spirit, carrying most theological weight in describing our 
knowledge of God in Jesus Christ, through the words of Scripture within the apostolic 
Church?  Vanhoozer’s communicative approach may suggest that the content of the 
illocutions of Scripture can be known ‘immediately’ in that the Spirit is only the 
efficacy of divine discourse, and the semantic potential of Scripture is the mediator of 
revelation (in the recognition of the illocution prior to perlocution).  I shall outline how 
these issues might emerge based upon Gunton’s argument.   
 
Vanhoozer’s approach shares Gunton’s concern that revelation is mediated.  
Divine communicative action is a Trinitarian event, but (contra Barth) this does not mean that 
God communicates only himself.  In short, God is doing more in Scripture than simply 
‘revealing.’  God’s communicative acts include both deed-words like the cross and speech-acts 
like the canon….This is a key insight for rethinking the Scripture principle in a way that 
preserves Barth’s basic insight yet at the same time goes beyond it.54    
Vanhoozer’s account of the textuality of action, and the action of textual speech, 
therefore allows him to theologically integrate the Incarnation and the canon as triune 
communicative action.  “God’s Word, incarnate and inscripturate, is God in 
communicative action.”55  Since ‘triune communicative action’ describes both divine 
saving action and its mediation through Scripture, Gunton’s argument for the ‘second-
order’ nature of revelation in relation to salvation would be hard for Vanhoozer’s 
account to accommodate.  For Gunton, revelation is the mediation of the personal 
relation established in the incarnate life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.  This 
mediation indispensably involves propositional forms of words, but the primacy of this 
personal relation ensures that divine saving action and revelation are not of the same 
order.  If communion refers to the personal relation established by the divine saving 
action, and communication to the mediation of that relation, we could say communion 
and communication are not simply identified.56  
 
Vanhoozer’s theological underpinning of covenant is central to his thesis – his basis for 
describing God as a ‘communicative agent’ and the divine-human relation in 
                                                 
54 DD 66 
55 FT 157. “We can even go so far as to posit an analogia missio…between the incarnation of the Son and 
the inscripturation of the biblical texts.”(DD 70) 
56 I think this is consistent with Gunton’s argument (e.g. Brief Theology of Revelation, 109).  
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communicative terms.  The biblical and theological importance of ‘covenant’ enables 
Vanhoozer to integrate communion and communication.   
the divine promissio generates the subsequent divine missio of Son and Spirit.  Scripture is 
similarly ‘missional’ to the extent that it is caught up in God’s triune communicative action.57 
In describing ‘divine communicative action’ as both the divine saving action itself and 
its mediation through the words of Scripture, Vanhoozer is describing a covenantal 
word-act dynamic: divine action (Creation and Salvation through Jesus Christ) fulfilling 
and being divine word; divine word (Scripture) being and fulfilling divine action.  Thus, 
Scripture communicates the reality of the new covenant. 
When we speak of God on the basis of the Scriptures…we are engaging God in communicative 
action.  And behind all the particular things God says and does in Scripture lies one overarching 
purpose: to communicate the terms, and the reality, of the new covenant.  Scripture summons the 
church to be God’s covenant partner; Scripture communicates a share in the triune life.58 
Undoubtedly, life through and in Christ, gifted by the Spirit, is one of new covenant, 
instituted by Christ – a life that accords to the Scriptures, which communicate the 
covenantal rationality of this life (e.g. Gal 3:29 and the letter as a whole).  The thinking 
together of speech-act theory and the biblical account of covenant is fruitful.  A problem 
arises, however, in Vanhoozer’s characterisation of the overarching nature of God’s 
covenant in terms of the Triune communicative action model.  I think it is important 
theologically that communion is not ‘ordered’ by communication (as “Scripture 
communicates a share in the triune life” might imply) for similar reasons to Gunton’s 
argument that revelation is a ‘second-order’ doctrine to creation and salvation.  The 
reality of the new covenant is first of all a personal relation gifted by God – “the grace 
of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the fellowship of the Holy Spirit” (2 
Cor. 13:14).  Without God’s words, which are intrinsically related to God’s saving 
action through and in Jesus Christ, we cannot enter into (by hearing), understand or 
experience (in practice), this personal relation (c.f. Rom 10:13-17).  Scripture is our 
essential rationality.  But pneumatological difficulties emerge from identifying the 
dynamics of communicative action with God’s triunity.  I shall continue this argument 
in chapter 2.   
                                                 
57 DD 71.  This approach to covenant as the overarching term is perhaps consistent with Barth’s 
overarching doctrine of election. 
58 DD 67 
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Next, I shall introduce the epistemological implications of these pneumatological 
concerns (which are the subject of chapter 3).  Finally, I will begin exploring the 
significance of this pneumatology to the wider question of the soteriologically 
established Creator-creation relation (which is the subject of chapter 4).   
 
B.2.  The epistemological issues related to the pneumatological weakness 
in Vanhoozer’s model, and the wider issue of the Creator-creation relation 
 
There are epistemological issues raised by the integration of divine communication 
action and the triune economy of salvation.  For Barth, the Bible “becomes” God’s 
Word in the event of revelation, “its being is in this becoming.”59  As discussed, 
Vanhoozer replaces Barth’s dialectical approach, which describes Scripture as God’s 
Word in terms of the analogia fidei, with a divine communicative action approach that 
describes Scripture as God’s Word in an illocutionary sense.  His aim is for the 
communicative act conceptuality to give “better purchase on Barth’s Trinitarian 
explication of divine revelation.”  This discontinuity and continuity with Barth has 
implications for Vanhoozer’s treatment of the doctrine of Scripture and the doctrine of 
God – in particular, his pneumatology.  
[T]he Bible is divine-human communicative action: its locutions and illocutions are the result of 
double agency…God’s word is really written.  However, whereas human discourse relies on 
rhetoric to achieve the intended perlocutionary effects, Scripture’s perlocutionary effects depend 
on the Spirit’s agency.   
Is the Bible a divine communicative act, then, if a reader fails to respond to its illocutions?  This 
is a subtle query.…The answer…depends on whether one includes the reader’s response (the 
perlocutionary effect) in the definition of “communicative act.”…Perhaps the solution is to 
affirm both that the Scripture is the Word of God (in the sense of divine locution and illocution) 
and that Scripture may become the Word of God (in the sense of achieving its intended 
perlocutionary effects).60 
This solution is necessary for Vanhoozer to retain the Barthian framework whilst 
reconceiving it in communicative terms.  I think this ambiguity is indicative of 
                                                 
59  Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, 1/1, 110 
60 FT 155-156 
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problems he faces in retaining Barth’s triune model.  However, Vanhoozer sees the 
ambiguity as proper and helpful.  
Barth divides his discussion of revelation into two parts: the first – the ‘objective reality of 
revelation’ – focuses on Jesus the Word; the second – ‘subjective reality of revelation’ – treats 
the Holy Spirit….The notion of a divine communication…is ambiguous; it could mean ‘act’ or 
‘effect’.  For Barth, revelation always includes both components.  Yet, given the distinction 
between illocutions and perlocutions, there is no reason why one could not speak of divine 
discourse simpliciter to refer to what God is doing in speaking (illocutions), whether or not it is 
received and understood (perlocutions).  [Footnote]  To use the traditional terminology, one can 
affirm the inspiration of the Bible by emphasizing the Spirit’s ‘objective’ work in guiding the 
human authors.  Illumination would then refer to the Spirit’s work in bringing about the intended 
perlocutionary effects.61   
There seem to be two pneumatological issues.  Firstly, there appears to be a suggestion 
that “divine discourse simpliciter” (what God is doing in speaking) can be a present 
reference without the Spirit; the Spirit’s agency is in the past (inspiration) and in the 
future (illumination) but not in the present.  Thus, Vanhoozer’s account of how 
Scripture is the Word of God (in illocutionary terms) seems to require a stronger 
pneumatology to say how this is so.  Secondly, in describing how Scripture becomes the 
Word of God (in perlocutionary terms), Vanhoozer seems to make the Spirit simply the 
efficacy of the Word.  Here, as I have already argued, Vanhoozer is perhaps susceptible 
to Gunton’s critique of Barthian ‘narrative theology’ – that it carries an immediacy that 
stems from an inadequate pneumatology.  Thus, the ambiguity that Vanhoozer sees as 
helpful may actually indicate a pneumatological problem.  The ambiguity between 
Scripture being and becoming God’s Word within Vanhoozer’s model may result in the 
potentiality of language as such rather than the Holy Spirit carrying most theological 
weight in describing how we come to know God in Jesus Christ, through the words of 
Scripture and in the apostolic Church.  I think replacing Barth’s dialectics with 
communicative-act conceptuality and semantic mediation, yet retaining Barth’s triune 
self-revelation model, risks undermining the Creator-creature relation and distinction.  
In chapters 3 and 4, I will consider the pneumatological aspects of this issue further. 
 
 
                                                 
61 DD 66&n31 
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C.  God’s Personal Presence by the Holy Spirit  
 
To build upon the themes introduced so far, we need to consider the scriptural emphases 
that call for a fully trinitarian theology.  I think the significance in Scripture of the Holy 
Spirit as God’s personal presence highlights a pneumatological deficiency present in 
Vanhoozer’s model.  Vanhoozer has a sophisticated pneumatology, but (as I shall argue 
in chapter 2) he uses a kind of ‘Spirit Christology’ that is problematic.  The interest in 
Spirit Christology is growing, and some argue it is the way to establish a fully trinitarian 
theology that is truly pneumatological as well as Christological.62  I cannot look here at 
the potential and possibilities for Spirit Christology.  However, I want to argue that a 
Spirit Christology will be deficient if it undermines the biblical emphasis upon the Holy 
Spirit as God’s personal presence, which is key to fully trinitarian theology and 
ecclesiology.      
 
Gordon Fee’s work shows how the emphasis in Scripture and the experience of the 
church upon the Holy Spirit as God’s personal presence is central to Paul’s 
understanding in his NT epistles.  Fee argues that Paul, drawing upon OT Scriptures, 
understood the outpouring of the Spirit at Pentecost as fulfilling three related 
expectations: (1) the association of the Spirit with the new covenant; (2) the language of 
‘indwelling’; and (3) the association of the Spirit with the imagery of the temple. 63  In 
these ways, God is present to his people by the Holy Spirit.  So firstly, the Spirit’s role 
in the new covenant.  In his death, Jesus Christ made a new covenant between God and 
his people, which he had instituted in the Lord’s Supper (1 Cor. 11:23-26).  The gift of 
the Spirit fulfils three dimensions of the promise of this new covenant reality:   
(a) that God would give his people a “new heart”…(Jer 31:31-33) – made possible because he 
would also give them “a new spirit” (Ezek 36:26).  In Paul, this motif finds expression in 2 Cor 
3:1-6, where the Corinthians are understood to be the recipients of the new covenant in that they 
are “inscribed” by “the Spirit of the living God” on “tablets of human hearts” (v.3)…(b) This 
“new spirit” in turn is none other than God’s Spirit, who will enable his people to follow his 
decrees (Ezek 36:27). [In]…Rom 8:3-4 and Gal 6:16-25, the Spirit’s fulfilment of this motif is 
                                                 
62 R. Del Colle, Christ and the Spirit: Spirit-Christology in Trinitarian Perspective, (New York: Oxford 
University Press,1994) 
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Paul’s answer to the question of “what happens to righteousness” if one does away with Torah 
observance. (c) God’s Spirit in turn means the presence of God himself, in that by putting “my 
Spirit in you…you will live” (Ezek 37:14).  Again, Paul picks up this motif in 2 Cor 3:5-
6…“The Spirit,” Paul says in the context of the new covenant, “gives life.”64 
Fee argues that vitally related to this new covenant reality is Paul’s description of the 
Spirit as ‘dwelling’ in or among the people of God.  In 1 Cor. 14:24-25 and 2 Cor. 6:16, 
Paul cites OT texts “that speak of God’s dwelling in the midst of his people, which Paul 
now attributes to the presence of the Spirit.”65   
 
Paul’s language of ‘indwelling’ draws upon temple imagery.  In Ephesians 2 the church 
is described as the “household of God, built upon the foundation of the apostles and 
prophets, Christ Jesus himself being the cornerstone, in whom the whole structure is 
joined together and grows into a holy temple in the Lord; in whom you are also built 
into a dwelling place of God in the Spirit” (v19b-22,RSV).  Fee notes that Paul also 
uses the temple imagery of the individual believer (1 Cor 6:19-20): the church, 
corporately and individually, is the place of God’s own personal presence by the Spirit.  
This is distinctive of the God’s people (cf. Exodus 33:15-16), and key to Paul’s 
consternation over the behaviour in the church in Corinth.66   Fee’s overall conclusion is 
that, for Paul: 
the Spirit is not some merely impersonal ‘force’ or ‘influence’ or ‘power.’  The Spirit is none 
other than the fulfilment of the promise that God himself would once again be present with his 
people….The Spirit is God’s own personal presence in our lives and in our midst, who leads us 
into paths of righteousness for his own name sake.67 
The danger in the emphasis upon presence is that one appears to be leaning upon 
‘manifestations’ of the Holy Spirit in terms that risk returning, in a different form, the 
very ‘immediacy’ that we are seeking to avoid.  This is where Fee’s emphasis upon 
Paul’s understanding of the Spirit as God’s personal presence is vital.  It is the 
personhood of the Holy Spirit (rather than impersonal ‘agency’), which ensures that 
when we speak of God’s ‘presence’ by his Spirit we do not make the theological and 
epistemological mistakes of such ‘immediacy.’ 
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66 Gordon Fee, To What End Exegesis? (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,2001) 275 
67 GEP 845 
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Fee is well known for his view that Paul’s Christology and pneumatology indicate not 
only a ‘functional’ but something very close to ‘ontological’ trinitarianism.68  He argues 
this is not anachronistic, and links the reticence within recent NT scholarship towards 
this view to a failure to recognise that Paul believed in the ‘pre-existence’ of Christ and 
the Holy Spirit as the ‘personal presence’ of God made possible by the mediation of 
Jesus Christ our Saviour.  In regard to the Spirit, the problem emerged in a two-fold 
way: firstly, the argument that, because Paul most frequently speaks of the Spirit in 
terms of agency, we should not presume personhood; secondly, the argument towards 
‘Spirit Christology’.  On the first point, Fee’s argues that while the Spirit is frequently 
described in terms of agency, “the Spirit is the subject of verbs that presuppose 
personhood,”69 and further, for Paul the gift of the Spirit is the gift of God’s indwelling 
presence.  Some of Paul’s most profound words about the Spirit come in the context of 
his understanding of prayer in the Spirit.  Fee writes of Romans 8:26-27 that Paul 
understands the Spirit as “both personal (the Spirit intercedes; God knows the Spirit’s 
mind) and ‘distinct from’ God the Father.”70  This brings us to the second argument.  
Later in Romans 8 Paul speaks of the present intercessory activity of Christ on our 
behalf (v34), and Fee argues that this settles any notion that Paul identified the risen 
Christ with the gift of the Spirit; while the Spirit intercedes from ‘within us’ (see 
8:9,15), Christ in his exaltation intercedes for us ‘at the right hand of God’.71  Further, 
the “remarkable grace-benediction of 2 Cor. 13:14” should “shut down all possibilities 
that Paul ever identified the risen Christ with the Spirit.”72  Fee is critiquing the kind of 
‘Spirit Christology’ that builds upon the argument “that Paul’s understanding of the 
Spirit is best viewed in terms of identification with the Risen Christ.” 
If by this one means that the Spirit is how the risen Christ is continually present with his people, 
there are no objections to be raised.…But the language in the literature suggests far more than 
that, moving very close to full identification, so that ‘distinct from’ is almost totally lost in the 
rhetoric of identification.73 
                                                 
68 Gordon Fee, To What End Exegesis? 349   
69 Ibid., 347.   
70 Fee, To What End Exegesis? 344 
71 Ibid., 345 
72 Ibid., 334n12  See also Ibid.,218-239 
73 Fee, To What End Exegesis? 342 
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The carefulness of his argument requires noting.   
The Spirit of God is also the Spirit of Christ (Gal 4:6; Rom 8:9; Phil 1:19), who carries on the 
work of Christ following his resurrection and subsequent assumption of the place of authority at 
God’s right hand.  But some have pressed this relationship further…Based chiefly on three texts 
(1 Cor 6:17; 15:45; 2 Cor 3:17-18), Paul is understood to speak of the risen Lord in such a way 
as to identify him with the Spirit.74  
Fee expounds the most striking of these references – ‘the Lord is the Spirit’ in 2 Cor 
3:17-18 – in pneumatological rather than Christological terms.  But this is not to the 
detriment of Christology; ‘high Pneumatology’ here supports the ‘high Christology’ of 
the passage as a whole.75  As noted, Fee sees Romans 8 as a significant text pointing 
away from ‘Spirit Christology’: although one could argue for “identification in 
function” between Christ and the Spirit, Paul’s references are actually distinguishing the 
role of Christ and the Spirit in salvation: the Spirit indwells believers in order to help 
them in the weakness of their ‘already/not yet’ existence, interceding on their behalf; the 
risen Christ is ‘at the right hand of God, making intercession for us.’  This negates the 
idea that Paul identified the Spirit with the risen Christ, either ontologically or 
functionally.76  Whilst rejecting ‘Spirit Christology’, Fee is clear that Paul assumes the 
same kind of close relationship between the Spirit and Christ as between the Spirit and 
the Father.  
[Paul] moves easily from the mention of one to the other, especially when using the language of 
‘indwelling’ (e.g. Rom 8:9-10, from “have the Spirit of Christ” to “Christ is in you”; c.f. Eph 
3:16-17).  Thus when Paul in Gal 2:20…speaks of Christ as living in him, he almost certainly 
means “Christ lives in me by His Spirit,” referring to the ongoing work of Christ in his life that is 
being carried out by the indwelling Spirit.77 
The crucial point at which ‘Spirit Christology’ errs, then, is in eclipsing the Spirit as 
person.  To emphasise Paul’s understanding of the Spirit as God’s personal presence is 
in no way to carve out a separate ‘economy’ of the Holy Spirit.  The Spirit is revealed as 
one from whom rather than to whom we look, the mediator of relation to God through 
                                                 
74 PSPG 31-32 
75 GEP 311.  In Pauline Christology: An Exegetical-Theological Study (Peabody: Hendrickson 
Publishers,2007), Fee revises his exegesis of 2 Cor. 3:17-18, but this does not change his argument with 
respect to the kind of ‘Spirit Christology’ he critiques (4,116-8,588).   
76 GEP 838 
77 GEP 838 
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Christ and consequently as the mediator of revelation.78  Thus, this pneumatological 
point is vital to the unique incarnate presence of God in Jesus Christ; God’s personal 
presence by his Spirit does not to compete with this foundational truth, but calls for a 
fully trinitarian account of salvation in Christ Jesus.79   
 
Conclusion 
 
The question raised by this chapter is whether Vanhoozer’s ‘triune communicative 
action’ model, whilst addressing some of the issues with Barth’s triune self-revelation 
model in regard to mediation (specifically, the essential role of the words of Scripture 
and the unique significance of the Bible in mediating salvation in Christ), leaves in 
place and perhaps solidifies a potential pneumatological weakness in Barth’s triune 
model.  My argument is that attention to the Holy Spirit as God’s personal presence is 
vital to addressing this issue.  I shall expand on this in the next chapter as I expound the 
details of Vanhoozer’s thesis for canonical-linguistic theology.  In particular, I shall 
consider the crucial role of Spirit Christology in maintaining Vanhoozer’s ‘triune 
communicative action’ model.  By referring to the work of Fee and Newbigin, I have 
attempted to show in this chapter how any kind of Spirit Christology is problematic if it 
is unable to reflect the personal presence of God in the gift of the Holy Spirit, which is a 
vital part of the biblical witness to salvation in and through Jesus Christ.  A ‘high 
pneumatology’ complements a ‘high Christology’. 
 
As mentioned, there are significant epistemological implications of the pneumatological 
issues raised, and I shall explore these in detail in chapter 3.  At stake in a theology of 
mediation – and a reason why Karl Barth’s profound contribution to theology can be 
critiqued but not dismissed – is the way Christology and pneumatology shape our 
description of the Creator-creature relation.  This relation is founded upon our 
understanding of salvation through the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, his 
ascension and the outpouring of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost.  Hence, chapter 4 will 
conclude this dissertation by considering how pneumatology is essential to the biblical 
                                                 
78 Gunton, Brief Theology of Revelation, 120-121 
79 Jesus Christ is Immanuel.  See PSPG 23n7 
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witness to participation by faith in Christ crucified and risen.  I shall discuss how 
Vanhoozer’s canonical-linguistic approach to the doctrine of atonement as ‘gift and 
task’ describes justification and sanctification, and the Christological and 
pneumatological account of the Creator-creature relation through and in Jesus Christ.  
My aim is to show why the Biblical emphasis upon the Holy Spirit as God’s personal 
presence discussed in this chapter is so important to soteriology and a theology of 
mediation, and consider whether this pneumatology can be fully accommodated within 
a ‘canonical-linguistic’ approach to Christian theology.  
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Chapter 2: Pneumatology and Communicative Action  
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter explores how Vanhoozer’s canonical-linguistic approach reconceives 
‘postliberal’ theology – the approach to theology characterised by Hans Frei’s emphasis 
upon the narrative nature of Christian theology based upon the biblical witness,80 and 
George Lindbeck’s restructuring of theology around the linguistic turn to practice, a 
move inspired by the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein.81  My focus is the 
pneumatology involved in Vanhoozer’s integration of speech-act philosophy and the 
hermeneutical philosophies of Paul Ricoeur and Hans-Georg Gadamer, along with the 
literary theory of Mikhail Bakhtin.  This integration is vital to Vanhoozer’s argument 
for a linguistic approach that yet manages to retain the divine authority and identity of 
Scripture and Christian practice.  I argue that this linguistic and literary conceptuality 
does the work that a stronger pneumatology should, and that the validity of Vanhoozer’s 
use of Spirit Christology is pivotal.  Comparison with the work of Reinhard Hütter 
highlights the issues that are at stake.  Again, the Holy Spirit as God’s personal presence 
is the vital point.  I conclude with an indication of what is required by the biblical 
testimony to, and Christian experience of, life through and in Jesus Christ, in the gift of 
the Holy Spirit – a trinitarian ontology that defines, rather than is defined by, the 
questions of epistemology, hermeneutics and performance involved in describing the 
authority of Scripture and the identity of Christian witness.  The prospect for this has 
been indicated by Thomas Weinandy in The Father’s Spirit of Sonship.82  
 
                                                 
80 H. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, (New Haven: Yale University Press,1974) 
81 G. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox,1984);  L. Wittengenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 3rd 
edn.1958) 
82 T.G. Weinandy, The Father’s Spirit of Sonship: Reconceiving the Trinity (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1995) 
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A.  The ‘Canonical-Linguistic’ Approach to Theology: Kevin Vanhoozer’s 
Thesis in The Drama Of Doctrine  
 
Vanhoozer affirms the ‘linguistic turn’ in philosophy that challenges the “modern 
premise of an autonomous knowing subject” by removing “legitimation for knowledge 
and truth outside language” on the basis that reason and experience are ‘language 
ridden.’  This is allied to “Wittgenstein’s insight that meaning is a function of use, and 
that linguistic usage varies according to the forms of life or practices – cultures – that 
users inhabit.”83  However, Vanhoozer rightly asks: what norms practice?  He sees the 
potential for ‘tradition-based rationality’ to renew the Scripture-tradition relation, but 
argues that postliberal theology leaves ambiguous the question of normativity.  In The 
Nature of Doctrine, Lindbeck outlined the cultural-linguistic approach as an alternative 
to cognitive-propositional and experiential-expressive approaches to theology 
(representing the modern ‘foundations’ of reason and experience.)84  However, 
Lindbeck’s complete embrace of the maxim ‘meaning is use,’85 arguably generates a 
circular epistemology.86  For Vanhoozer, the source of the problem is that Lindbeck’s 
critique of cognitive-propositional approach is valid but oversteps the mark, and what is 
required is a careful ‘rehabilitation’ of the propositional nature of Scripture, from which 
flows a norm for church practice.87  Vanhoozer traces the impact of Lindbeck upon Frei 
(whose narrative theology, influenced by Karl Barth, in many ways establishes the 
context for postliberalism).  Frei’s “instincts were to let the biblical narrative mean and 
claim truth on its own terms,” but his later work took on a cultural-linguistic correction 
such that the literal sense of text was determined by ecclesial use.88  Hence, although 
postliberalism appears to “swing the pendulum of authority back to the biblical text,” 
the cultural-linguistic approach “relocates authority in the church.”89   
 
                                                 
83 DD 9-10 
84 Lindbeck,  The Nature of Doctrine  
85 Most famously in his discussion of the crusader uttering ‘Jesus is Lord’ to “authorize cleaving the head 
of the infidel”(Ibid., 64).   
86 Kathryn Tanner,  Theories of Culture (Minneapolis: Fortress,1997) 141-143&73-74.  Without the 
normativity of Scripture we are left with a “vicious circularity”.(DD 188-191,174) 
87 This shares Gunton’s concern that Lindbeck oversteps his critique of propositions.  
88 DD 10-11 
89 DD 10      
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Vanhoozer’s canonical-linguistic approach retains the linguistic emphasis upon practice 
whilst not “conflating biblical authority with its ecclesial use.”90  This involves locating 
authority in Scripture as divine authorial discourse rather than in the use of Scripture by 
the believing community.91  In the previous chapter, I outlined how Vanhoozer’s triune 
communicative action model opens up the scope for such a ‘canonical-linguistic’ 
theology.  For Vanhoozer, “it is not the church’s use but the triune God’s use of 
Scripture that makes it canon…Canonicity is the criterion of catholicity, not vice 
versa.”92  Thus, Vanhoozer’s approach shares Lindbeck’s emphasis upon practice,93 but 
offers a canonical reconception of practice as divine (triune communicative action).  
This marks the distinction and departure of canonical-linguistic approach from the 
cultural-linguistic approach.94  Ecclesial practice is not normative as such but is 
scripturally directed participation in divine communicative action.  
 
Vanhoozer’s canonical-linguistic approach therefore represents an integration of 
authorial discourse interpretation and performance interpretation.  Vanhoozer 
proposes a ‘theodramatic’ incorporation of hermeneutics into soteriology, which 
encompasses this integration of authorial discourse and performance interpretation.   In 
The Drama of Doctrine, he shows how divine communicative action calls for a 
‘dramatic’ theory of doctrine based on the ‘theo-dramatic’ nature of salvation.  Drama 
“offers an integrative perspective within which to relate propositions, experience, and 
narrative.”95  Vanhoozer defines doctrine as “direction for the fitting participation of 
individuals and communities in the drama of redemption.”96   The dogmatic dimension 
depends upon the recovery of the propositional aspect: 
To view doctrine as dramatic direction is to rethink the task of theology in terms of performing 
Christian wisdom.  At the same time, this emphasis upon the performative aspect of theology 
does not forsake the proposition.97 
                                                 
90 His critique of David Kelsey.(DD 12) 
91 DD 11 This resonates with Nicholas Wolterstorff’s thesis that interpreting ‘authorial discourse’ requires 
the engaged discernment of what the author intends in the act of discourse.  N. Wolterstorff, Divine 
Discourse (Cambridge: CUP,1995), especially chapters 8&14. 
92 DD 150 
93 DD xiii 
94 DD 150 
95 DD 100,101 
96 DD 102 
97 DD 103-4   
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Thus he defends his proposal against simple pragmatism: 
Though doctrine’s aim is pastoral – directing the church on what it means here and now to be a 
faithful disciple of Jesus Christ – this pastoral aim is grounded in a norm: the history of Jesus 
Christ, a history with a determinate propositional content (e.g. “He is risen”).  Accordingly, the 
dramatic view of doctrine understands truth both in terms of “doing” and in terms of 
“corresponding”: doctrinal truth is a matter of theo-dramatic correspondence, of speaking and 
doing things that continue the action in fitting ways.98 
Vanhoozer’s point is that the drama and the script are divine communicative action and 
thus the action belongs to God.  Our participation is pneumatological: “Doctrine is a 
guide for the church’s scripted yet spirited gospel performances”99.  Ecclesiology is 
shaped by a pneumatological ‘creative faithfulness’ to the Word of God.  Vanhoozer’s 
divine communicative action account of Scripture not only secures the propositional 
dimension but, because this is a triune account linking incarnation and inscripturation, it 
integrates the interpretation of Scripture into our incorporation into, and participation in, 
the body of Christ.  The way Vanhoozer’s describes canonical practice as the practice of 
Jesus, and the canon as ‘Spirited practice,’ is at the centre of this theology.  It involves a 
covenantal and canonical communicative identification of Spirit and practice, and is 
supported by a certain kind of ‘Spirit Christology’.  To assess Vanhoozer’s thesis, I 
shall first look at the hermeneutical concerns that drive this model, before turning to the 
pneumatology that is integral to it. 
 
B.  Participation in Triune Communicative Action  
B.1.  Vanhoozer’s integration of authorial-discourse and performance 
interpretation  
 
Vanhoozer sets the canonical-linguistic approach apart from other approaches referring 
to practice (even if pneumatologically conceived) by defining a distinction between 
Performance I and Performance II interpretation.  Paralleling Heiko Obermann’s 
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nomenclature of Tradition I and II,100  Vanhoozer distinguishes Performance I 
interpretation (Scripture is integral to the divine ‘performance’ of the theo-drama, and 
the ‘script’ of the church’s participative performance) and Performance II interpretation 
(‘performance’ refers to church’s act of interpretation, integrating Scripture’s meaning 
and authority with church practice).  This allows him to affirm the turn to practice 
whilst critiquing the vast majority of ecclesial approaches to the interpretation of 
Scripture.  The delineating factor is authorial-discourse interpretation, which he argues 
has always been problematic to postliberalism.101  Performance I interpretation refers to 
interpreting for the divine communicative action of Scripture – what God is doing 
(illocution) in its communicative acts.  Such interpretation, is faithful (fitting) 
participation in canonical practice; it constitutes an integration of authorial discourse 
interpretation and the linguistic turn to practice.  Vanhoozer’s proposal represents a 
mediation of the work of Nicholas Wolterstorff and Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutic 
philosophy.  This is notable because Wolterstorff set his thesis in contrast to 
Ricoeur’s.102  The issues this raises relate to the concerns regarding pneumatological 
mediation and its relation to the linguistic turn to practice.  
 
Nicholas Wolterstorff argues “there is no such thing as the sense of the text, as Ricoeur 
and those in the general tradition of New Criticism understand that.”103  (In view is Paul 
Ricoeur’s understanding of the ‘semantic autonomy’ of the text.)  For Wolterstorff, that 
leaves two main alternatives: authorial-discourse interpretation or performance 
interpretation.104  He sees Ricoeur’s attempt to assimilate authorial-discourse 
interpretation into his model as unsuccessful,105 and argues that Ricoeur’s use of the 
analogy of seeing the text like a musical score which can be played in multiple ways is 
                                                 
100 Tradition II represents the view that tradition can supplement Scripture – i.e. an “innovative departure 
from the earlier patristic sense” of tradition as the handing on of Scripture.(DD 154) 
101 Vanhoozer argues that Frei never accepted it, and although Lindbeck perhaps has recently, he hasn’t 
explained how this “squares with his earlier proposal concerning the nature of doctrine”(DD 166-167)   
102 N. Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse chapters 8&10.  It should be noted that Wolterstorff is writing prior 
to Ricoeur’s Oneself as Another (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1995), which some argue is vital 
to understanding Ricoeur’s work from a Christian perspective.  Vanhoozer’s use (in DD) of Ricoeur’s 
narrative conceptuality of self (ipse-identity) refers to Oneself as Another. 
103 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse 171 
104 In Performance Interpretation: “Rather than trying to discern what the author was promising or asking 
or testifying to, by inscribing these sentences, we just imagine what someone might say with these 
sentences.”(Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse 181) 
105 Ibid., 171 
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indicative of the adoption of performance interpretation.106  Wolterstorff’s proposal 
decouples ‘discourse’ and ‘revelation.’  His logic is that discourse has an “inherently 
normative character” because engaging in discourse involves taking up a “normative 
stance”.107  The interpreter’s concern or otherwise for the author’s ‘stance’ is crucial to 
Wolterstorff’s distinction between authorial-discourse and performance 
interpretation.108 And because Wolterstorff uses the term ‘discourse’ to refer only to 
illocution (and not also locution), he is able to argue for authorial discourse 
interpretation whilst accepting textual indeterminacy.109  Merold Westphal argues that 
Wolterstorff cannot secure the distinction between authorial discourse interpretation and 
performance interpretation in the context of retaining textual indeterminacy.110  
However, Vanhoozer’s approach differs from Wolterstorff’s thesis in that he sees both 
the distinction and the indeterminacy overcome by an integration of authorial discourse 
and performance interpretation (made possible by his triune communicative action 
model).   
 
This represents two significant departures.  Firstly, Vanhoozer agrees with what 
Wolterstorff is critiquing as ‘performance interpretation’ in which we interpret the 
words (‘Performance II interpretation’) rather than seeking to discern what the author 
was doing with those words.  However, Vanhoozer describes authorial discourse in 
performative terms – Scripture is divine communicative action integral to the ‘theo-
drama’ of salvation.  Hence, ‘Performance I interpretation’ is faithful/fitting inspired 
participation in a performance inscripturated by God, centred on the incarnation of God.     
[W]here Wolterstorff works with an either-or distinction between authorial discourse 
interpretation and performance interpretation, the present approach combines them, and this in 
two ways – (1) by seeing the canonical discourse as itself an instance of triune performance, and 
(2) by viewing the canon as a script that requires not merely information processing but ecclesial 
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response.  The canonical-linguistic approach advocates not Performance II, which unhelpfully 
confuses author and reader, but performance I, where interpreters respond to authorial 
direction.111 
[T]he canon is itself a performance – an act of discourse – before being a script (a design for 
further performance)….Scripture may be self-interpreting, but it does not perform itself.112 
Secondly, he affirms Wolterstorff critique of the ‘sense of the text’,113 however, while 
for Wolterstorff this implies textual indeterminancy, in Vanhoozer’s canonical-
linguistic approach the covenantal nature of discourse itself (perhaps implicit in 
Wolterstorff’s notion of ‘normative stance’) becomes of structural significance to the 
relations between locution and illocution.  Vanhoozer’s understanding of Scripture as 
both a document of God’s covenantal action and part of that action itself, and the 
Christology and pneumatology involved, are central to his whole thesis.  In both these 
modifications of Wolterstorff’s thesis Vanhoozer draws upon the work of Paul Ricoeur 
(making it a resource rather than source of concern) and Hans-Georg Gadamer.  The 
biblical-hermeneutical developments they represent are vital to Vanhoozer’s triune 
communicative action model and central to the issue raised in chapter 1 – that 
Vanhoozer addresses semantic ‘immediacy’, but with an insufficiently pneumatological 
account of mediation.   
 
Dan Stiver, like Vanhoozer, questions Wolterstorff’s critique of Ricoeur’s work.  He 
argues that Wolterstorff needlessly sets his work apart from Ricoeur by reading Ricoeur 
as offering an incoherent notion of an ‘authorless text’:     
Despite the complicated and what he calls “playful” relationship of the author to the work, this 
“does not imply the elimination of the author.”  In fact, Ricoeur can speak of fulfilling the intent 
of Friedrich Schleiermacher’s desire to understand authors better than they understood 
themselves.114 
Thus, he thinks Ricoeur’s ‘surplus of meaning’ accords with Wolterstorff overall 
thesis.115  (Rather than the analogy of a text being like a musical score leading to 
“creative artistry”, Stiver argues it points to the “unavoidable fecundity of meaning of a 
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114 D. Stiver, Theology after Ricoeur (Louisville: Westminster John Knox,2001) 133-4 
115 Ibid., 134-135   
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rich text.”116)  However, I think there are issues with utilising Ricoeurian conceptuality.  
The view that Ricoeur can speak of the ‘semantic autonomy’ of the text without 
implying a disconnection from the author relies upon accepting Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutic/narrative philosophy.  Stiver describes Ricoeur’s focus upon the public 
meaning of the text as a dynamic offering continuity to the authored “issue” of the text 
through what Gadamer called a fusion of horizons.   This dynamic is “part of the nature 
of a text from the beginning”117 – the ‘meaning potential’ of the text.  However, in this 
account, our ‘personal relation’ to the author is subsumed into the dynamic of the text’s 
public meaning over time, rather than that ‘personal relation’ being prevenient – i.e. that 
which authorial discourse (and its interpretation) depends upon.  The autonomy of the 
‘critical moment’ is essential to Ricoeur’s account and this renders our relation to the 
author (in the post-critical ‘second naïvety’) an imaginative (cognitive-poetic) reality, 
which does not fully convey the personal nature of this relation.  As we shall see, 
Vanhoozer tempers this by describing the Ricoeurian dynamic in terms of the ministry 
of the Holy Spirit, but my concern is that the conceptuality risks depersonalising the 
Spirit, identifying the mediation of the Spirit with the appropriation of the ‘meaning 
potential’ of the text.           
 
Vanhoozer may not endorse all of Stiver’s affirmations about Ricoeur, but the 
Ricoeurian dynamic discussed above is integral to Vanhoozer’s description of canonical 
practice (Performance I interpretation) as Spirited practice.   I hope to show that a 
stronger emphasis upon the Holy Spirit as God’s personal presence allows us to avoid 
identifying communion and communication and describe how the mediation of the 
Spirit is not simply the appropriation of the ‘meaning potential’ of the text.  Crucially, 
this emphasis upon the personal presence of God by the Holy Spirit does not introduce 
a supplemental rationality to Scripture.  Vanhoozer rightly insists upon Scripture as our 
sole rationality, and I agree that rationality cannot be abstracted from practice.  
However, if the gift of personal relation to God in Christ, mediated by the Spirit, 
becomes identified with the dynamics of communicative practice, that mediation is 
rationalised.  The words of Scripture are indeed in an intrinsic relation to God’s saving 
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action; but in such a way that revelation is ‘second order’ to salvation (and creation).  
My concern is that, by using Ricoeur’s narrative philosophy to underpin his covenantal 
and Trinitarian model, Vanhoozer allows the concept of the ‘meaning potential’ of the 
text to occupy the same place (‘order’) as the ‘personal relation’ mediated by the Spirit, 
upon which I believe that ‘meaning potential’ depends.  To take away that dependence 
and identify the two together leads to a kind of ‘immediacy’.118  We must not adopt an 
approach that bypasses the ‘meaning potential’ of the text with a Gnostic account of 
‘spiritual knowledge’; that would be a result of seeing the mediation of the Spirit and 
rationality as in some kind of competitive tension.  In a fully trinitarian account of 
mediation, the meaning potential of Scripture is mediated by the Spirit such that the 
words of Scripture are intrinsic to divine saving action.  Yet, God’s personal presence 
by his Spirit cannot be cannot be circumscribed by God’s communicative action in and 
through Scripture; communion necessarily involves communication but cannot be fully 
characterised in semantic-linguistic terms.   
 
Interestingly, in distinguishing ‘discourse’ from ‘revelation’ (in that discourse involves 
taking up a normative ‘stance’), Wolterstorff echoes Gunton’s conviction that if 
primacy is given to the doctrine of revelation, epistemology overly structures 
theology.119   The problem in Wolterstorff’s account of divine discourse is that he is 
concerned with only illocution.120  This allows him to describe how God speaks through 
Scripture today, but in a way uncomplicated by the involvement of the human authors 
of the locutions of Scripture in such divine discourse.  Thus, the significance of this 
relation between God and human author to the way God speaks to us today through 
what he has spoken through these prophets and apostles is lost.  Thus, he does describe 
how by the mediation of the Spirit we share a personal relation to God that unites us in 
the Spirit to the relation of apostolic authors to God, whilst yet being dependant upon 
                                                 
118 Thiselton highlights Wolterstorff’s belief that to “replace ‘authorial’ discourse by ‘presentational’ 
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their unique historical relation to the divine saving action and the canonical words 
which they wrote.  Wolterstorff’s focus upon illocution alone allows him to preserve the 
distinction between divine Author and human author, but leaves the human author’s 
relation to the text in much the same status as Ricoeur’s account.121  Gunton’s point is 
that the apostolicity of the human authors is vital to the intrinsic relation between the 
words of Scripture and divine saving action.  In Wolterstorff’s model, God could 
conceivably speak through any text, and this is true, but does not help us in describing 
the essential and unique significance of ‘just these words’ of Scripture in the mediation 
of the personal relation established by the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.  
 
In light of this, we can see why Vanhoozer is right to move beyond Wolterstorff’s 
account, but also how Wolterstorff’s thesis points (albeit imperfectly) to a problem for 
Vanhoozer.  In discussing ‘Has Scripture become a wax nose?’ we see how Wolterstorff 
has conceded too much by focussing on illocution alone, and lacks an account of the 
intrinsic relation between the words of Scripture and divine saving action.  However, 
insofar as his solution to the ‘wax nose anxiety’ relates to his decoupling of discourse 
and revelation, he makes a pertinent point:    
The most important point remains: one minimizes the risk that Scripture is becoming a wax nose 
in one’s hands by coming to know God better….[T]hough our knowledge of human beings 
comes in good measure from interpreting their discourse, it is also a fundamental prerequisite of 
interpreting a human being’s discourse that one already know a good deal about that person.… 
So too for God: to interpret God’s discourse more reliably, we must come to know God better.  
A hermeneutics of divine discourse requires supplementation with discussions of other ways of 
knowing God, and of ways of knowing God better.  And engaging in the practice of interpreting 
texts so as to discern God’s discourse requires engaging simultaneously in whatever practices 
might yield a better knowledge of God.  Those practices will be practices of the heart as well as 
the head, of devotion as well as reflection.122 
It is unclear how Wolterstorff relates the “other ways”/“practices” of knowing God to 
the divine discourse of the text.  Further, describing them as ‘practices’ risks implying a 
supplemental rationality.  I agree with Vanhoozer that there are no practices that are 
‘extra-canonical’.  But excluding extra-canonical practices does not mean that the 
personal relation can be subsumed into communicative practice.  Our life before God in 
                                                 
121 This is what perhaps opens him to Westphal’s critique.   
122 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse 239.   
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prayer, which is at the heart of Wolterstorff’s point, is not about hearing ‘another word’ 
but rather about God graciously being personally present to and amongst us by his 
Spirit as we attend to the Scripture.123  This underpins Wolterstorff’s placement of 
interpreting authorial discourse in the context of personal relationship and relates to his 
conviction that revelation should not be identified with discourse, even though 
discourse enables revelation.  In his terms, the ‘stance’ of discourse cannot be of the 
same order as revelation.  The problem is that Wolterstorff does not say how this 
illocutionary ‘stance’ relates to the historical apostolic particularity of these locutions in 
relation to the words and actions of Jesus Christ crucified and risen. 
 
Vanhoozer does describe this intrinsic relation between the words of Scripture and 
divine saving action.  But while Vanhoozer’s approach avoids the wax nose problem 
through a triune and covenantal link between locution and illocution, one could argue 
that his model may not be fully able to attend to the human author’s relation to God 
‘behind the text’ either, because God ultimately assumes the place of the human author 
in his supervenience model.124  In Vanhoozer’s model, what matters ‘behind the text’ is 
that God, through his saving action, acts covenantally towards his people, and that the 
writers of Scripture write words canonically communicating this covenantal action, 
enabling us to participate in it.  The human author matters in that they are a scriptwriter 
of the theo-drama, but the particularities of their relation to God ‘behind the text’ are 
perhaps eclipsed.  I agree that what matters is what God is saying through the 
Scriptures, but if the relation between God and the human ‘behind the text’ (God’s 
grace in relation to the particularity and the identity of that person) has limited 
significance in meaning-making, the same will be true of its significance to the act of 
interpretation.  This matters for our understanding of Scripture and also our 
understanding of human personhood.  Richard Briggs makes a related point:  
                                                 
123 Wolterstorff quotes Gillian Evans who speaks of “the cultivation of a quiet receptiveness which allows 
the Holy Spirit to speak in a man’s heart as it will, patient reflection upon every detail of expression” 
which were “the features of the ‘holy reading’ (lectio divina) of monastic life.” (Ibid., 239) 
124 Supervenience is a scientific concept regarding how real properties ‘emerge’ at the level of the whole, 
how the whole is greater than the sum of the parts (see FT 106-107).  Vanhoozer uses the concept of 
‘supervenience’ to support his account of God as the ‘generic’ author (at the canonical level) of Scripture.  
See also FT 96-124.   
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[I]t is important not to move too fast with the claim that a divine illocutionary act relocates the 
focus of the interpreter on to a supposed ‘world in front of the text,’ where God deals with the 
theologically envisioned narrative world the text displays.…Anthony Thiselton picks up this 
point…‘to fail to look ‘behind’ the text of 1 Corinthians, or ‘behind’ as well as ‘within’ the 
world of the Gospels would fatally detach text from the extra-textual world of reality’. 125  
Vanhoozer does not detach the text from reality – he is profoundly concerned to 
understand the text in terms of the key to reality: the life, death and resurrection of Jesus 
Christ.  But his triune communicative action model has a certain kind of ‘immediacy’ 
(i.e. pneumatological deficiency), one aspect of which is the lack of mediatorial 
significance given to the witness of the human author, which is a properly theological 
concern because this person lives and writes in relation to God in Christ by the Spirit.  
 
B.2.  Authority and identity in the Scripture-tradition relation and the 
public witness of the Church 
 
I shall now consider how the foregoing argument (that the personal relation to God 
‘behind’ and ‘in front of’ the text is pneumatologically mediated and cannot be 
subsumed into a primarily linguistic dynamic) applies to the ‘authority’ and ‘identity’ of 
Scripture and the Church. 
 
Authority 
The Acts 8 account of the Ethiopian coming to faith is paradigmatic for Vanhoozer in 
answering the question, “Is the church the author of the gospel, or is the gospel the 
author of the church?”  The Ethiopian is reading from Isaiah 53 and Philip proclaims to 
him that Jesus Christ is the fulfilment of this text.  Vanhoozer writes, 
It will be objected that Isaiah 53 did not and could not mean what Philip said it meant.  But why 
not?  Isaiah, like the other prophets, was a spokesperson for God; might he not have said more 
than he could (explicitly) know?  What the divine author intends in Isaiah 53 is seen in the new 
light of the gospel.126 
                                                 
125 Briggs, ‘Speech-Act Theory’ 96.   
126 DD 119 
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I agree.  However, this appeal to the ‘meaning potential’ of Scripture (Isaiah tells more 
than he knows) seems, in Vanhoozer’s account, to risk taking the place of the personal 
relation of human author and human reader to God.  
With regard to Old Testament prophecy, we would do well to amend Michael Polanyi’s account 
of tacit knowledge: it is not so much that the prophets ‘know more than they can tell’ but rather 
that they tell more than they can know.  The prophets’ testimony, when appropriated by the 
Evangelist, is disambiguated.127 
For Polanyi, all personal knowing involves a ‘tacit dimension’ – an a-critical act of 
commitment to a way of relating to reality – that establishes a fiduciary framework 
upon which our critical comprehension and agency functions. For Vanhoozer, canonical 
interpretation involves semantic potentiality (‘tell more than they can know’) that seems 
to be in tension with semantic limit (‘know more than they can tell’).  However, we 
need both points and the tension is only inevitable if we try to identify communion and 
communication.  I agree that prophecy concerns human words through which God 
speaks about the present and the future (and certainly telling more than the prophet can 
know).  But the prophet speaks in the context of a personal relation to a God they 
worship and know (through God’s saving action and presence) as Lord.  They are 
indeed bearers of more than they can know and this is because they know more than 
they can tell – they know God (by which I mean they are in personal relation to God.)128  
This point concerns God’s transcendence of words and the conviction that personal 
identity is not linguistic all the way down.  
 
Vanhoozer could argue it is what God is doing (illocution) in divine communicative 
action that is significant; and, since God’s being is in act, the so-called ‘tacit dimension’ 
is identified with semantic ‘meaning potential’.  However, in Acts 8, we see reference to 
more than the ‘meaning potential’ of Scripture.  We see Philip as a witness, anointed by 
the Holy Spirit.  I am not referring to ecclesial practice but the manifest public of the 
Church – the gathering of God by the presence of the Holy Spirit.  While the practice of 
                                                 
127 FT 305 
128 Hence, the ‘personal relation’ of prophecy is a-critically prevenient to, rather than a competing 
rationality to, the ‘meaning potential’ of God’s words.  To critique Vanhoozer’s communicative-act 
approach as “too restricted to words, and too likely to see drama as a means of transmitting an inherently 
verbal message” (Samuel Wells, Improvisation (London:SPCK,2004) 61) is valid but requires a logic 
such as this to avoid positing a supplemental practice/rationality to the canon. 
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authority is linguistic (rational) – and I agree with Vanhoozer that Scripture is our sole 
rationality – the actuality/existence of the community that participates in this practice of 
authority is prevenient; it is created through Christ by the Spirit in an act of sovereign 
grace.  Those in Jesus Christ are “new creation”.  To identify the gift of the Spirit with 
practice as such, leads to either making church practice authoritative as such (as we 
shall see in Reinhard Hütter’s identification of the Spirit with church practice), or (as in 
Vanhoozer’s canonical-linguistic approach) making the authoritative normativity of the 
Scripture ‘immediate’ rather than involving the creation of a people gathered by God’s 
indwelling personal presence – the Holy Spirit who is the mediator of revelation, the 
One through whom the presence of the kingdom of God in the person and ministry of 
Jesus Christ becomes manifest.   
 
Vanhoozer rightly corrects a ‘cultural-linguistic’ reading of Acts 8 that suggests it is 
Philip’s use of Isaiah 53 (i.e. church practice), rather than God’s use, of Isaiah 53 within 
the canonical context (divine communicative action) that is determinative.  Philip’s 
practice is the extension of Jesus’ practice (e.g. in Luke 24).  This canonical-linguistic 
theology powerfully unites dogmatic and hermeneutical concerns.  I agree it “is the text, 
read in a certain canonical way and in a canonical context, that occasions 
understanding”129. But this communicative dynamic cannot define/circumscribe the 
personal presence of God by the Holy Spirit who mediates the divine saving action of 
God through and in Jesus Christ.  Philip’s practice is participation in the divine 
communicative action of the canon, and the words of Scripture are essential to the 
Ethiopian’s conversion; Scripture is the authoritative norm of Philip’s practice and the 
sole rationality of the proclamation of the gospel.130  However, we must also say that 
this conversion takes place because of God’s personal presence through the Spirit, 
indwelling his people, the church, of whom Philip is one.  The significance of Philip is 
not only in terms of practice (Philip’s faithful practice is canonical – participation in 
what God is saying-doing through these words) but to the indispensability of Philip as a 
witness, one anointed by the Holy Spirit.  This cannot be a simply linguistic reference – 
it is a reference to God’s indwelling personal presence by his Spirit indwelling his 
                                                 
129 DD 118 
130 This would be true even if Scripture wasn’t to hand in any proclamation and reception of the gospel. 
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people that he is gathering.  The Scripture and the canonical practice of Philip mediate 
the truth of Jesus Christ in the power of the Spirit.  What I am highlighting is the 
prevenient aspect of this moment: the personal presence of God by his Spirit, indwelling 
Philip as a member of the Church, the ‘body of Christ’, the ‘temple of the Holy Spirit’ 
and the ‘household of God’ (to use some of the Pauline descriptions).  I shall return 
below (C.4) to the significance of the church as ‘manifest public’ and how it relates to 
this point. 
 
Identity 
For Vanhoozer, the nature of Christian practice as canonical is integral to the Scripture-
tradition relation.  His treatment of tradition is thoroughly missiological: “Christian 
identity is Christian mission, and hence transmission.”131  It is the translatability of the 
Gospel into new cultures, across continents and centuries, which is indicative of its 
ultimate truth, the universal reality of the Incarnation and the gift of redemption in Jesus 
Christ.  This oneness in difference is already present within the canon of Scripture itself: 
“Truth is one, but its unity is pluriform.”132  Vanhoozer rightly describes this reality in 
pneumatological terms – he speaks of the ‘Pentecostal plurality’133 of Scripture, and of 
tradition as canonical performance.  But my concern centres upon the way Vanhoozer 
establishes canonical-linguistic identity by bringing pneumatology together with 
Ricoeur’s narrative conceptuality of the ipse-identity of self.134  The “canonical-
linguistic claim” is that “church tradition and the development of doctrine are examples 
of ipse-identity,” because “the constancy of tradition lies in its being the work of the 
self-constant Spirit who keeps his “Word”.”135  Further, the sense of keeping God’s 
                                                 
131 DD 129 
132 DD 290  
133 IM 415f. 
134 “Idem-identity is sameness, best construed in terms of a ‘what’ (e.g., unchanging substance) rather 
than a ‘who’”, a “‘hard identity,’ where ‘hard’ connotes immutability”.  Ipse-identity is the “‘soft’ 
identity of a self.  This kind of sameness partakes more of narrative than of numeric identity.” (DD 127) 
“Ricoeur acknowledges two kinds of permanence through time that are appropriate to persons (and, as we 
shall see, to doctrines as well).  The first is ‘character’: ‘the set of lasting dispositions by which a person 
is recognized.’  As Ricoeur acknowledges, idem and ipse never come closer to converging than in the 
notion of character: ‘Character is truly the ‘what’ of the ‘who’.’… Ricoeur posits a second aspect of ipse-
identity, another model of permanence through time, besides that of character: ‘It is that of keeping one’s 
word in faithfulness to the word that has been given.’  The continuity of character is one thing, the 
constancy of a reliable self another.”(DD 127-128) 
135 DD 128 and n44 
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Word “is entirely, and especially, compatible with the covenant pattern of promise and 
fulfilment that characterizes the relation of the Old Testament and New Testament, and 
hence the unity of the canon.”136  Thus, Vanhoozer is relating the Ricoeurian concept of 
personal identity with textual interpretation,137 and doing so based on the Spirit being 
the ipse-identity of canonicity.138  The ipse-identity conceptuality gives the divine 
communicative action of Scripture a ‘self-like’ quality that which implies a kind of 
‘immediacy’ because, although Vanhoozer identifies this identity with the Spirit, it is a 
narrative identity linked to the form of the text.  This has implications for our 
understanding of the Spirit in relation to Christian identity, and to the nature of divine 
identity.  Firstly, Christian identity. 
Canonical-linguistic theology shapes Christian identity in new situations by looking to the canon 
as both catalyst and criterion for “creative fidelity” and “ruled spontaneity.”  The directions 
drawn by Scripture’s normative specification of the theo-drama enable the church to improvise, 
as it were, with a script.139 
I agree Scripture is the norm of church practice and understanding, but in Vanhoozer’s 
triune communicative action model the way the Spirit gifts Christian identity is 
rationalised – a matter of participation in the rationality (divine communicative action) 
of the script.  The gift of the Spirit appears to be only perlocutionary and not also 
prevenient.140   
 
Then, divine identity.  Vanhoozer makes a strong argument for the canonical-linguistic 
approach to identity by relating the concept of ‘translation’ to both the Incarnation and 
Scripture.  In this, he offers an account of theism similar to Robert Jenson’s narrative 
Trinitarian theology.  He compares the ipse-identity model to Jenson’s theology, 
arguing that “God’s identity is a function not merely of the aseity of an indeterminate 
entity but of the ipseity of a self” – the story of God’s relations show who God always 
was, is and will be.  He argues this does not undermine divine aseity, or suggest that 
God ‘acquires’ an identity as history develops.141  However, I think Francesca Murphy’s 
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140 “The canon’s power is the power of truth, which in turn is a matter of word (the gospel), imagination, 
and persuasion (the Spirit).”(DD 144) 
141 FT 66&n92 
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concern applies to Vanhoozer’s theodramatic use of Ricoeur’s ipse-identity 
conceptuality: 
Many Christians have come to consider that the fullest and most immediate way of speaking 
about the Triune mystery is, as a brilliant young theologian [David Cunningham] puts it, ‘to tell 
the story of God’.  Narrative theologians are those who do so methodically and systematically.  
This seems to entail that God is a story.  Why should describing the relations between God and 
humanity as ‘story’ implicate one in equating God with a story?  It does so because the driving 
force of narrative theology, the method itself, slides into the place of content or subject matter.142  
She argues that ‘story Barthianism’ and ‘grammatical Thomism’ are readings of Karl 
Barth and Thomas Aquinas in which method becomes the content of their theology,143 
and that they converge paradigmatically in Robert Jenson’s ‘story Thomism’.144   
 
Vanhoozer’s basic point – that the one Spirit makes the one Lord Jesus Christ known 
through the different voices of Scripture and the diverse contextualisations of the gospel 
in the apostolic Church across ages and cultures – is excellent.  Further, the continuity 
between the ‘Pentecostal plenitude’ of Scripture itself and this contextualisation of the 
gospel in mission is profoundly important – regarding both the nature of truth and the 
recognition that the gospel is the ‘prisoner’ and ‘liberator’ of culture (to use Andrew 
Wall’s terms).  However, we need a fully trinitarian account of mediation (of the kind 
offered by Gunton) to describe this significant pneumatological point.  I think 
Vanhoozer’s account risks confusing the potentiality of literary form in his triune 
communicative action model with the personal relation given by the presence of God by 
his Spirit.  We see this in his use of ‘Spirit Christology’ to secure the canonical-
linguistic approach.   
 
                                                 
142 Francesca Murphy, God is Not a Story: Realism Revisited (Oxford: OUP, 2007) 1 
143 Ibid., 5-6 
144 “Exegetes of the contents of Barth’s theology are unlikely to agree on whether Jenson’s ‘storification’ 
of the Triune God is built upon the Church Dogmatics, or, conversely ‘departs from Barth on one crucial 
issue, God’s being in Time’[C. Wells]”(Ibid., 22-23)  Murphy argues that Jenson ‘cinematises’ the 
Trinity, and that what is at stake “is an essentialist or conceptualist idea of the three Persons, rather than 
an excessively historical perspective.”(Ibid.)    
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C.  Assessment of the Pneumatological Dimension of Vanhoozer’s Thesis 
C.1.  Pneumatology and the linguistic turn to practice 
 
Pneumatology has become the focus for some theologians working to appropriate the 
linguistic turn to practice whilst accepting the critique that Lindbeck’s cultural-
linguistic approach risks idealising human agency and making the truth of the gospel a 
human rather than divine reference. 
 
Reinhard Hütter’s work suggests that Lindbeck’s ‘postliberal’ theology was viable but 
lacked a sufficient pneumatology to explain how ecclesial practice can be a reference to 
divine agency.145  For Hütter, the core practices of the church  
must ultimately be interpreted with the aid of the concept of ‘enhypostasis,’ a concept borrowed 
from Christology and applied analogously here.  That is, they subsist enhypostatically in the 
Spirit.  Whereas person and work are certainly to be distinguished in the case of human beings, 
precisely the opposite is the case with regard to the person and work of the Spirit.  The salvific-
economic mission of the Spirit cannot be distinguished from the trinitarian being of the Spirit.  
The poiemata of the Spirit, however, the core church practices, inhere in the salvific-economic 
mission of the Spirit.146    
Reinhard Hütter is an important conversation partner for Vanhoozer.  I hope to show 
how both make important points, and also highlight a problem their approaches share.  
Vanhoozer and Hütter both value the linguistic turn to practice, and also the core 
concerns of Karl Barth’s theology while seeking to go beyond his dialectical approach.  
But Vanhoozer rightly questions Hütter’s identification of church practice with the work 
of the Spirit in regard to normativity:  How do we identify the Spirit’s presence and 
action unless we have a firm hold upon the authority and normativity of Scripture?147  
This firm distinction between the canonical-linguistic and the cultural-linguistic 
approach (even under Hütter’s profound pneumatological reconception) is pivotal to 
                                                 
145 R. Hütter, Suffering Divine Things: Theology as Church Practice (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,2000) and 
Bound to be Free: Evangelical Catholic Engagements in Ecclesiology, Ethics, and Ecumenism (Grand 
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146 Hütter, Suffering Divine Things, 133, 248-250n135. 
147 DD 98-99  
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Vanhoozer’s thesis,148 defining his distinction between ‘Performance I’ and 
‘Performance II’ interpretation.  However, Hütter represents the closest possible 
approach on the other side of the divide Vanhoozer makes.   
 
This is because Hütter and Vanhoozer are both making similar moves 
pneumatologically: that of conceiving practice (ecclesial or canonical respectively) as 
divine, ‘Spirited practice’.  What separates them is that, for Vanhoozer, ecclesial 
practice is Spirited practice when it is canonical practice.149  For Vanhoozer, the sola 
scriptura principle brings the work of the Spirit and church practice together. To affirm 
the practice of sola scriptura is to affirm “the ministry of the Spirit ‘as the primary 
Actor in the church’s actus tradendi, the living transmission and acceptance of the 
apostolic message in the body of Christ.’”150  His concern with Hütter is that 
hermeneutics structured by ecclesial practice, directly identified with the Holy Spirit, 
leads to a hermeneutics of ‘pneumatic reception’.  He quotes Frederick Bauerschmidt’s 
critique of John Milbank’s theology to make this point: 
The Spirit is the supplement at the origin that makes it impossible to conceive of the Word as 
possessed of a stable, given meaning…This leads Milbank to speak of a relationship of 
‘retroactive causality,’ in which the Spirit-enabled response of the church is constitutive of the 
Word/Son.151   
To reinforce the argument and show how his approach avoids this problem, Vanhoozer 
places the point in terms of his communicative act understanding: 
Perlocutions – the effects we produce in our hearers by saying something – necessarily follow 
from illocutions…One cannot define illocutions – what a speaker does in saying something – in 
terms of the effect produced upon the hearer or reader.  There is no place for retroactive 
causality in the analysis of speech-acts.  A promise is a promise whether or not anyone 
recognises it as such…Consequently, the response of faith enabled by the Spirit is constitutive 
neither of the Son nor of the Scriptures.  It is important not to collapse the act of authoring 
(logos) into the church’s act of reception (pathos).152 
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149 Vanhoozer recognises that Hütter speaks of the normativity of the gospel proclaimed and taught, but 
argues that Hütter does not accord supremacy to the canon.(DD 191) 
150 DD 189(Quoting D.H.Williams) 
151 F. Bauerschmidt,‘The Word Made Speculative? John Milbank’s Christological Poetics’, Modern 
Theology 15(1999):417-32.(cited DD 192) 
152 DD 192-193 
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This brings Christology together with Vanhoozer’s normativity point.  “Jesus is both the 
material and the formal principle of the canon: its substance and its hermeneutic.”153  
Faithful church practice is fitting canonical practice, the practice of sola Scriptura.  The 
canon is “Christ’s own Spirit-borne commissioned testimony to himself.”154  This 
Christological-canonical model, central to Vanhoozer’s thesis in The Drama of 
Doctrine, is key to what I am exploring in this chapter.  Whilst Vanhoozer rightly 
conveys the normativity of Scripture in Christological terms, I think the structure of this 
account simply identifies the Spirit with canonical practice, and depends upon a ‘Spirit 
Christology’, establishing the theological relation between the canonical-linguistic turn 
to practice and pneumatology, that is problematic.   
 
Vanhoozer is right to critique the ecclesial hermeneutics of ‘pneumatic reception’ and 
‘retroactive causality’.  The Holy Spirit points us to Jesus Christ; the Holy Spirit is the 
Spirit of Christ.  But I agree with Gunton that we need a fully trinitarian account of 
mediation and do not believe the Spirit should be identified primarily as the efficacy of 
the subjective appropriation of the Word.  Whilst agreeing with Vanhoozer’s critique of 
Hütter’s insufficient attention to the way Scripture norms Church practice, I think 
Hütter’s emphasis upon the Church as distinctive ‘public’ points to a weak aspect 
Vanhoozer’s thesis.  Hütter writes: 
At Pentecost, the Holy Spirit’s activity stands for this overwhelming and transforming 
‘publicity’ of God’s mighty deeds, the effective communication of the gospel.  This 
event…creates and characterises the church as a public in its own right.  Yet while the public 
nature of the church and the Holy Spirit’s publicity are intricately interrelated, they are not 
identical.  The church as public is constituted by the Holy Spirit in and through the mediating 
forms, doctrine and the core practices.  It is through these that the church participates in the Holy 
Spirit’s publicity.155   
Whilst Vanhoozer’s work points to a valid concern with Hütter’s work regarding norms, 
this emphasis of Hütter’s regarding the church as ‘public’ given by God’s presence by 
his Spirit is lacking in Vanhoozer’s account.  I think both Scripture as ‘authoritative 
                                                 
153 DD 195 
154 DD 194 
155 R. Hütter, Bound to be Free 39.  Although Hütter rejects a simple identification of the Spirit with 
ecclesial practice – and thus church doctrine and practice do not ‘manage’ the Spirit (39,231n67) – he is 
prepared to speak of the core practices of the church as ‘enhypostasized’ in the Spirit.  
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norm’ (Vanhoozer’s priority) and Church as ‘manifest public’ (Hütter’s priority) are 
necessary.  These emphases only compete if the person of God’s Spirit is basically 
identified with/by practice (as in Vanhoozer’s canonical practice and Hütter’s ecclesial 
practice).  This creates a kind of ‘immediacy’ in that the personal presence of God by 
his Spirit is simply known in canonical/ecclesial practice.  For Hütter, because knowing 
God through church practice is ‘immediate’ in this sense – his pneumatology describes 
the core church practices as enhypostatic – the importance of Scripture as authoritative 
norm is undermined.  For Vanhoozer, because knowing God through canonical practice 
is also ‘immediate’ in this sense – the Spirit is the efficacy of divine communicative 
action in Christ through Scripture – the importance of the Church as manifest public 
(i.e. the visible gathering of God by the gift of God’s personal presence by his Spirit) is 
undermined.  Comparing Vanhoozer and Hütter reflects the problems of each other’s 
theology because they are both trying roll soteriology and epistemological concerns 
together, and using pneumatology to retain the divine authority and identity of the 
linguistic turn to practice.  If we maintain the distinction that Gunton makes, the 
knowledge of God through practice (canonical and ecclesial) is seen as ‘second-order’ 
and this actually delimits the significance of ‘these words’ and ‘this community’.  The 
Holy Spirit creates knowledge of God through Jesus Christ in the particular words of 
Scripture and the particular gathering of the God’s people, the Church.  To describe this 
we need a fully trinitarian theology.  I shall discuss next why Vanhoozer’s particular use 
of Spirit Christology may not enable this. 
 
C.2.  Vanhoozer’s use of Spirit Christology 
 
We have seen that by integrating authorial discourse and performance interpretation, 
Vanhoozer secures the divine authority of Scripture and its normativity to Christian 
faith and practice; and this involves describing divine communicative action in terms of 
the triunity of God who creates and redeems us through Jesus Christ by the Holy Spirit.  
Vanhoozer’s warrant for linking the divine illocutionary action of Scripture to God’s 
incarnate action in Jesus Christ, and thus speaking of canonical practice as divine 
performance, depends on an ongoing relation of Jesus Christ to the canon.  
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Jesus is not simply the point of origin of a new practice that continues beyond and without him.  
On the contrary: the person and practices of Jesus, together with his words, are what norm 
Christian faith.156 
The point Vanhoozer makes is that its Jesus’ understanding of Scripture rather than the 
church’s that makes it authoritative.157  In theo-dramatic terms the “canonical script” is 
“the transcript of what God has done in Christ” which “becomes, in turn, the ‘script’ for 
what God is now doing in the church.”158  The Spirit is Christ’s presence enabling this 
scripted participation.   
The Son “performs” what God the Father scripted, making God known in human form.  The Son 
is also at the center of the Spirit’s performance in Scripture, for the Spirit’s work is to minister 
Christ.…The Spirit is the active presence of Christ, enabling and empowering performances that 
participate in the prior performance of the Word made flesh.159 
Vanhoozer affirms Vladimir Lossky’s belief that the church is founded upon a twofold 
economy of Christ and the Holy Spirit,160 and he pre-empts the critique that he is 
subordinating the Spirit to the Word by referring to ‘Spirit Christology’.  He cites 
Heribert Mühlen’s account of the work of the Spirit in the church as the continuation of 
the salvation-historical anointing of Jesus with the Spirit,161 to argue that “from the 
perspective of such Spirit Christology, we must say not only that Jesus enables the 
Spirit’s coming but that the Spirit enabled Jesus to be who he was and to do what he 
did.”162  This point seems good.  Yet there follows an odd logic at a crucial point in 
Vanhoozer’s thesis: in defending his ‘Spirit Christology’ against the critique that it 
subordinates the Spirit,163  Vanhoozer describes a temporal juxtaposition between the 
Spirit’s ministry of Christ (post-Pentecost) and the Spirit’s ministry to Jesus prior to his 
resurrection.  Arguably this risks implying the Trinitarian relations were different before 
and after Jesus’ ascension.   
The Spirit ministered to the incarnate Son; the Spirit ministers the risen Word.  The riddle of the 
New Testament is not simply a matter of the proclaimer becoming the proclaimed, as Bultmann 
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thought.  It is rather a matter of how the one ministered to by the Spirit during his earthly 
ministry becomes, in his exalted state, the one whom the Spirit ministers.  It is the same Jesus 
who is conceived by and anointed with the Spirit who also sends the Spirit to the church after the 
resurrection.164 
To interpret the New Testament witness in this way raises some complex trinitarian 
questions, and leads as we will see to a Spirit Christology of the kind critiqued by 
Gordon Fee – confusing (post-Pentecost) the person and presence of the Spirit with the 
presence of the risen Christ.165  But it allows Vanhoozer to describe the Spirit’s ministry 
of the risen Word to the church in terms of the prophetic office of Jesus as Messiah: 
Jesus’ conception by the Spirit equips him for his messianic task; the later anointing of Jesus by 
the Spirit is a public confirmation of this fact.…Calvin views Jesus’ saving activity in terms of 
the three-fold office of prophet, priest and king.  It is the prophetic office that is of special 
interest here.  According to Calvin, Christ is anointed prophet by the Spirit in order to preach and 
teach the gospel: ‘When [the Messiah] comes, he will proclaim all things to us’ (John 4:25).166 
Vanhoozer thus uses Spirit Christology to describe the canon as Christ’s own Spirit-
borne commissioned testimony to himself:  Jesus is the material and formal principle of 
the canon – its substance and its hermeneutic.167 
 
A Christocentric approach to theology is vital insofar as it refers to there being one 
economy of salvation, centred on the person and work of Jesus Christ.  The Holy Spirit 
is the Spirit of Christ.  Arguably, however, Vanhoozer’s ‘Spirit Christology’ conflates 
the presence of the Risen Christ with the Holy Spirit.  Vanhoozer’s canonical-linguistic 
model seems to require this conflation in order that the Spirit is the efficacy of Scripture 
– the agent of the ‘meaning potential’ of the text.  This seems a reduction of the Spirit as 
God’s personal presence – the One who mediates revelation, involving indispensably 
the communicative action of Scripture (and thereby not agent of Performance II 
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interpretation)168.  Fee argues that Paul’s understanding of the Holy Spirit as God’s 
personal presence problematises ‘Spirit Christology’, yet Vanhoozer seems to suggest 
such a Spirit Christology is Pauline: 
Perhaps the key pneumatological issue concerns the extent to which the Spirit is his own person. 
… Paul sees the Spirit as the earthly presence of the exalted Lord.  In one sense, then, the Holy 
Spirit is not his own person… The Spirit is his own person because he is a fully divine agent 
who makes an essential contribution to God’s work.  Calvin suggests the following division of 
Trinitarian labor: the Father is the source of all action; the Son is the wisdom of God, arranging 
all action wisely; the Spirit is the power, that is, the source of the efficacy of this action.  The 
Spirit is the ‘hand of God’ who leads believers to the truth, enables believers to walk the way, 
and bestows on believers the gift of life.169 
Arguably, Calvin’s description of the Spirit as the giver of life is more than the limited 
Barthian concept of the efficacy of the Son’s action, which Vanhoozer’s triune 
communicative action model adopts.  In any event, this account suggests not only that 
our discernment of the Spirit is regulated by Scripture (which is true) but also that the 
divine person of the Spirit is regulated by Scripture. 
The Spirit’s role is to not go beyond Scripture… The Spirit is the efficacy of canonical 
discourse, the indispensible means through which the triune communicative action achieves its 
goal in the lives of believers: right relatedness to God. … The canon is the Spirit’s chosen means 
to mediate the covenant and foster the communion that obtains between Christ and the church. 
… The Spirit’s special role is to make Christ’s communicative action – in particular, the 
commissioned canonical testimony of the apostles – efficacious, transforming communication 
into a species of communion.170 
The problem (with parallels to Gunton’s argument) is that describing communication as 
a species of communion risks making communion a form of communication – not 
necessarily, but because Vanhoozer describes communicative action in triune terms.  
The identification of communication and communion seems to be embedded in 
Vanhoozer’s Spirit Christology.  He describes the Spirit as  
mediating the personal presence of Christ through the words that testify to him to bring about 
union with Christ.  The Spirit thus brings about a mutual indwelling of canonical script and 
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performing community, incorporating us not only into the drama of redemption but into the actor 
who stands at its very heart.171 
I agree the Spirit makes Christ known through the Scriptures and is the giver of life 
through the gift of communion.  But I disagree with the way that divine communicative 
action and divine presence (the indwelling personal presence of God by his Spirit) seem 
to be identified.  The personal presence of the Holy Spirit – who identifies us with 
Christ our Lord and Saviour (so that we can know God as Father) and gives us a life 
that indeed cannot be heard about or known/experienced without God’s written Word – 
seems to become ‘textual-personal’.  Vanhoozer’s Spirit Christology underwrites this.  
It seems to be the outcome of rightly making the semantic mediation of Scripture 
essential to salvation but assuming that this can be correlated with Barth’s Trinitarian 
structuring of revelation (using the triad of locution, illocution and perlocution such that 
the Spirit is the efficacy of triune communicative action).  Without a strong sense of 
God’s personal presence by the Holy Spirit, Vanhoozer’s dramatic model risks 
confusing God’s presence and God’s communication within the conceptuality of canon.  
Next, I argue that Vanhoozer utilises hermeneutic philosophy and literary theory 
profoundly, but in a way that sustains this deficit and issue. 
 
C.3.  The ‘commingling of language and life’:  The significance of Spirit 
Christology to Vanhoozer’s hermeneutic theology, drawing upon the work 
of Paul Ricoeur and Hans-Georg Gadamer 
 
Jesus said, “It is written man does not live on bread alone but on every word that comes 
from the mouth of God” (Matt. 4:4).  Vanhoozer’s canonical-linguistic approach 
excellently describes how God communicates through the written Word and how we 
live through the written Word.  The question is the degree to which semantics and 
ontology are being identified when we describe the Bible (rightly) as God’s living Word 
in relation to Christ, the divine Logos.  How we relate divine communicate action to the 
Triune economy is therefore key, and I think much depends on the theological 
significance of the Holy Spirit as God’s personal presence.  For this, we need the 
biblical account of the Holy Spirit in the life of Jesus and in the New Testament church, 
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fulfilling the Old Testament promises.  For Vanhoozer, God’s life giving presence – the 
Spirit of Christ – comes to us primarily in and through the communicative form of the 
written Word.  He agrees that Christians learn of God by participating in the Christian 
community, but he rightly makes the point that we should not confuse the ecclesial 
‘logic of discovery’ and the canonical ‘logic of justification.’172  This is a good critique 
of the cultural-linguistic, but is his canonical-linguistic in danger of doing something 
similar in integrating communication and the divine-human relation (in creation and 
salvation)?   
 
Vanhoozer writes, “God’s speech, and God’s speech only, is literally creative and 
vivifying: God spoke, and there were forms of life”173.  He refers to Mikhail Bakhtin to 
speak of a “commingling language and life”.174 This perhaps confuses, within a 
communicative dynamic, the gift of life (creation, and new creation, ‘ex nihilo’) and 
living of life (the rationality of creation and new creation).  The linguistic turn is hugely 
significant in linking rationality and practice.  But I think this should not necessitate the 
personal relation between God and humanity in Christ, mediated by the Spirit – the gift 
of our being created and redeemed by God, in and through Christ – being subsumed into 
a narrative identity.  Vanhoozer quotes David Yeago, “Christianity came into the world 
not as an ‘experience’ only subsequently ‘expressed’ in textual monuments but 
precisely as a new textuality.”175  His critique of ‘experience simpliciter’ is important, 
however, the Pentecostal reality of God’s personal presence by his Spirit should lead us 
to question describing Christianity ‘coming into the world’ precisely as ‘textuality’.  
Vanhoozer’s characterisation of the Spirit’s creative ministry as “first and foremost” 
‘canonical’, using a ‘Spirit Christology’ framework, is my key concern.  Vanhoozer 
writes, 
[T]he Spirit is the literary executor, as it were, of the word of Jesus Christ.  [footnote:] This “of” 
is both objective and subjective: it is ultimately Jesus’ word, and it is also the word about Jesus.  
As such, the Spirit is the word’s empowering presence. 176 
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Holy Scripture is the means through which the Spirit creates and sustains a covenant community, 
the medium through which the Spirit impresses Christ upon us.…  
Hütter rightly reminds us that it is the Spirit’s poiesis, or creative work, that is primary; the 
church’s activity is passive or secondary by comparison.  Whereas Hütter locates the Spirit’s 
poiesis primarily in the church, however, the present proposal locates the Spirit’s creative work 
first and foremost in the communicative practices of the canon.177 
Vanhoozer’s critique of Hütter regarding normativity is good.  But he seems to imply 
we can identify the Spirit’s creative work in primarily linguistic (communicative 
practice) terms.  Surely, the “Spirit’s creative work” is “first and foremost” that of 
mediating the Father’s gift of life through the incarnate Son, Christ crucified and risen?  
Without attention to this prevenience, the “communicative practices of the canon” 
(which are indeed inspired by the Holy Spirit), construe the personal relation between 
God and humanity through Christ in primarily linguistic terms, and rationalise the 
personal presence of the Spirit.  The reality of God’s personal presence by his Spirit 
indwelling the church – the fully trinitarian reality of mediation – is vital not only to our 
description of God’s triunity, but also to our understanding of human identity.  It is 
because of this mediation of the Spirit that Paul can speak of his identity as one with 
Christ and yet still say ‘I’.  (The ‘I’ of Gal. 2:20 is not a self-positing subjectivity but 
neither is it simply a narrative self.)     
 
Vanhoozer’s engagement with Gadamer and Ricoeur is integral to these issues.  He 
recognises that Gadamer’s recovery to post-enlightenment philosophy of the importance 
of tradition could support the emergence of ecclesiology as ‘first theology’.  However, 
he sees Gadamer’s hermeneutics as uniquely true of the Bible (I shall discuss later how 
he argues this has implications for general hermeneutics).  
The Bible is not like other texts; it has been commissioned by Jesus and prompted by the Spirit.  
It is part and parcel of God’s communicative action that both summons and governs the 
church….To put it in terms of hermeneutical theory (and to paraphrase Gadamer), the church 
“suffers” the Spirit-enabled historical effects of the word.178 
Vanhoozer integrates Gadamer’s fusion of text and history, justified in pneumatological 
terms, with Ricoeur’s narrative concept of ipse-identity. 
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We are now in a position to identify the central character in the narrative of Christian tradition.  
It is, of course, the Holy Spirit, understood in terms of his ipse-identity: the Spirit is the one who 
keeps his, which is to say Christ’s word.  Better: the Spirit is the one who keeps the Word who is 
Christ, the one who keeps ministering that Word to us.  Who, then, is the Spirit?  Not some 
ambiguous Spirit in reception [a reference to John Thiel’s work] but rather the Spirit who 
enables the church’s reception of the word written.179 
The Spirit makes known Jesus Christ using the Scriptures, but is this to say with 
Vanhoozer that the church is therefore “a Spirit-induced ‘effect of the text’”?180  This 
seems to be saying something more than that Scripture is normative of the practice of 
the church in the power of the Spirit.    
The church in the power of the Spirit is nothing less than the efficacy of the canonical word, 
rightly understood and rightly appropriated.  The Spirit ministers the word that communicates 
Christ, the word that relates us to Christ, the word that enables communion with Christ.  But the 
Spirit is only the assistant professor.  The real teacher of the church is Jesus Christ: “[L]isten to 
him” (Matt. 17:5).181 
I am not persuaded that the identity of Scripture as God’s written Word, which I 
wholeheartedly affirm (and welcome the usefulness of speech-act theory in describing), 
requires identifying communion and communication.  Doing so results in ontological 
problems akin to those raised by Francesca Murphy in relation to describing a narrative 
identity of the Triune God.  Our relation to God is in Christ through whom we are 
created and redeemed, but without a fully trinitarian account, such that the Spirit is not 
simply the ‘effectiveness’ of the canonical word but the Lord the giver of life, the 
infinite qualitative distinction between Creator and creation is undermined.              
 
Describing the “turn to performance” as a “paradigm revolution,” Vanhoozer writes:  
Just as hermeneutics has displaced epistemology by calling attention to the importance of the 
knower’s finite situatedness, so ‘performance’ is said to supplant hermeneutics by calling 
attention to the ways in which written texts underdetermine interpretation/performance.182   
Whilst not allowing hermeneutics to be supplanted by ‘our’ performance in a 
‘Performance II’ manner, Vanhoozer accepts the progression in his ‘Performance I’ 
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model, because the canon is identified with the practice of Jesus, made present by the 
Spirit, the ‘Executor of the Word’.  A recognition of the Holy Spirit as God’s personal 
presence should make us cautious about the progression, even though the divine terms 
in which Vanhoozer expresses it avoid the anthropocentric problems of cultural-
linguistic theology.  If knowing, interpreting and acting coalesce in the way Vanhoozer 
allows, I think this risks a ‘communicative actualism’.  Relating to God seems more like 
being caught up in a process of communicative action than a personal relationship, 
which surely the Incarnation held out to us and Pentecost gives us a foretaste of, while 
we await the day when we will see and know God “face to face” (1 Cor. 13:12).  The 
Scriptures are our grammar for knowing, interpreting, and acting, but that should not 
mean the reality of our personal relation to God is circumscribed by communicative act 
potential.  The pure gift of being a creature and a son of God (justified by faith; the 
grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God and the fellowship of the Holy 
Spirit) is a personal divine-human relation that gifts rationality, rather than being 
identified with/by it.  Vanhoozer’s use of Spirit Christology and Ricoeur’s narrative 
identity appear to allow God’s ‘sheer being’ and the pure gift of our contingent being to 
be linguistically conditioned.   
 
For Vanhoozer, the presence of God by his Spirit is the efficacy of God’s 
communicative action through the Son, Jesus Christ.  He rightly centres theology upon 
the person and act of Jesus Christ for our salvation, the rationality of which is given by 
the canon of Scripture.  However, to recognise the Spirit as God’s personal presence in 
salvation and creation is to see the Spirit as the mediator of the relation to God in Christ 
upon which communication depends, as well as the one in whom we respond to that 
communication (perlocution).  This high pneumatology does not compete with a high 
Christology, or with the normative authority of Scripture as a Christological axiom.  It 
is consistent with the ministry of the Spirit in the life of Jesus.   Jesus is our Saviour; the 
Spirit also rests upon Jesus at his baptism.  It is Jesus who acts in the power of the 
Spirit.  The personal presence of God by his Spirit does not ‘supplement’ Jesus’ 
ministry and who He is from his conception in the power of the same Spirit.  But it is in 
the presence of the person of the Spirit resting upon the person of Jesus, the Son of God, 
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that the eschatological promise/hope for humanity is made manifest.183  This fulfilment 
is the action of Jesus in obedience to the Father.  The Spirit does not supplement this; 
the ‘performance’ and ‘rationality’ belong to Jesus (my agreement with Vanhoozer.)  
But the personal presence of God by his Spirit (Jesus is the ‘Anointed One’) is vital.  
The Holy Spirit is the Creator Spirit.  Creation is made and redeemed (“new creation”, 2 
Cor. 5:17) by the Father through the Son in the presence of the Spirit, “the Lord, the 
Giver of Life”.  Without the Spirit, creation would cease to be (Job 34:14-15).  By 
becoming incarnate God dwelt among us in the Person of the Son, made flesh in the 
power of the Spirit, and anointed by the Spirit.  Because of Jesus’ death and 
resurrection, we live in and through the Son in the personal presence of God by his 
Spirit.   
 
C.4.  The Holy Spirit as Person: Why the New Testament emphasis upon 
the Holy Spirit as God’s personal presence is so important to theology 
 
I have argued that fully trinitarian theology cannot be structured in an altogether 
linguistic manner, which stems in Vanhoozer’s account from describing divine-human 
communion and communication co-inherently.  We can now return to the point that this 
raised concerning the existence (not practice) of the church as ‘manifest public’ – the 
visible and particular people gathered by God through the gift of the Spirit indwelling 
them at Pentecost.  Lesslie Newbigin writes: 
The Church…first of all exists as a visible fact called into being by the Lord Himself, and our 
understanding of that fact is subsequent and secondary.  This actual visible community, a 
company of men and women with ascertainable names and addresses, is the Church of God. … 
It derives its character not from its membership but from its Head…It is God’s gathering.… 
It is God’s Church and its whole character derives from that fact. The moment you begin to think 
of it as a thing in itself, you go astray.  The God whose gathering it is may never, even for 
temporary purposes of thought or argument, be excluded from the picture.  But at the same time 
it is a real gathering.  God is really working.  Therefore there is a real congregation.  It is these 
people here whom He has gathered.184 
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In distinguishing canonical-linguistic from cultural-linguistic theology, Vanhoozer is 
making a very similar dogmatic point – our focus is God’s practice: the canonical-
linguistic is an account of divine performance (theo-drama) in which we participate in 
the action of Christ by his Spirit, and the divine communicative action of Scripture is 
essential to that participation.  However, Newbigin highlights an aspect that Vanhoozer 
is weak on: the significance of the visible, public, fact of the church; its existence, which 
is prevenient to its practice.  This existence is an act of God – it is God’s gathering 
through and in the person and action of Jesus Christ.  Vanhoozer’s thesis certainly 
accords with this.  But if this act is a creative and soteriological act that is of a prior 
order to our understanding – i.e. it is that which makes understanding possible – it 
cannot be structured by the rationality/practice of communicative action.  Considering 
Reinhard Hütter’s pneumatological description of the church as ‘public’, helps clarify 
my argument here.       
 
Hütter argues that the dynamics of advanced modernity (postmodernity) risk construing 
faith as private gnosis or experience made ‘relevant’ through subject-related activities, 
or, alternatively, increasingly objectified forms of faith such as fundamentalist biblicism 
or traditionalist ecclesiasticalism.  In both alternatives “the church as a genuine ‘public’ 
is eclipsed.”185  In seeking to move “Beyond Objectivism and Subjectivism,” Hütter  
refers to the Peterson-Barth exchange. 
While Peterson seems to look for a clearly identifiable ‘object’ of theology, Barth insists that this 
‘object’ is inexhaustibly present as subject, agent – as God the Holy Spirit.  Theology takes place 
in the presence of God and is shaped by and in God’s presence.186  
Whilst affirming “Barth’s constructive pneumatological response to Peterson,” Hütter 
argues that the questions Peterson posed Protestantism were left unanswered because 
“Barth failed…to interpret the concrete mediating forms in a way that showed their 
ecclesiological relevance.” 
Barth’s understanding of theology is pneumatologically sophisticated yet ecclesiologically 
deficient precisely because the relationship between Spirit and church is far from clear. 
[footnote] [T]his problem might lie in a pneumatological deficiency inherent in Barth’s 
Trinitarian theology, namely, that the Spirit is only the relationship between the Father and the 
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Son….One result would be that the Spiritus Creator’s work can never be fully spelled out in 
relation to the church.187 
For Hütter, the church as ‘public’ refers to concrete practices of the church that are the 
work of the Spirit (‘suffered’ by the church).  This overcomes, he argues, Barth’s 
‘transcendental ecclesiology’.188  Hütter understands these practices in terms of Luther’s 
marks of the church, noting that Luther saw them as ‘holy things’ (Heiltümer): “Instead 
of pointing as witnesses to the Holy Spirit’s activity, these practices rather embody the 
Holy Spirit’s work.”  Hütter argues that Luther’s ‘pneumatological ecclesiology’ points 
an “undialectical and concretely embodied catholicity”, and he speaks (with David 
Yeago and Joseph Mangina) of a “concrete pneumatology” in which “the Spirit has an 
economy in his own right, to which the church’s constitutive practices are central”.189  
The result is a proposal in which the Spirit creates church practice and is identified by 
those practices.   
[I]t is God the Holy Spirit at work bringing about God’s oikonomia who is both origin and 
objective of the church….The church as public is constituted by the Holy Spirit in and through 
the mediating forms, doctrine and the core practices.  It is through these that the church 
participates in the Holy Spirit’s publicity.190 
Hütter sees this as an affirmation of Lindbeck’s work,191 giving the pneumatology 
required to sustain it and rebutting the claim it is sectarian: 
[T]he Holy Spirit’s publicity goes beyond the church’s limits, in that the Spirit creates new 
things and can act as a critic of the church from both within and without.  At the same time, the 
Holy Spirit’s activity clearly becomes public in and through the church’s practices of 
proclamation and witness….The Spirit can do a “new thing,” guide the church into all truth 
(John 16:13), only if there is a binding set of doctrines and practices in the church.  Only in such 
a context can something new be discovered, minds and practices changed, and a new aspect of 
God’s oikonomia emerge as a newly binding practice or doctrinal formulation.192 
 
This is a powerful model, and might illumine what is lacking in Vanhoozer’s account.193  
But Vanhoozer rightly argues that Hütter’s epistemology remains circular without 
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Scripture as normative reference.194  Vanhoozer’s concern with normativity is properly 
built upon the need to ground practice in the person and work of Jesus Christ.  Our 
participation is ‘in Christ’ through the gift of the Holy Spirit, and the ‘new thing’ that 
the Spirit brings is not ‘supplemental’ to the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.  
The fact that Hütter speaks of the Spirit having “an economy in his own right,” is an 
issue.  Even though Hütter points to a very real pneumatological issue concerning Barth, 
his correction leads into Trinitarian difficulties of its own.  A quote from Joseph 
Mangina illustrates the point.  Mangina (like Hütter) believes the “critiques of Barth on 
temporality” are “better stated as a pneumatological worry…about the role played by 
the church in the economy of salvation.  In brief, is the church merely a human echo or 
analogy of Christ’s completed work, as in Barth?  Or is it also somehow the herald of a 
new activity in which God is engaged between now and the eschaton?”195  I think Hütter 
and Mangina make a vital point about Barth’s pneumatology but have not paid 
sufficient attention to the connection between Jesus’ baptism and Pentecost as they 
address this ‘pneumatological deficit’.  What is ‘new’ about Pentecost is that it is the 
beginning of the fulfilment of God’s eschatological promise to dwell with is people.  
God is personally present in a way that Barth’s ‘transcendental ecclesiology’ arguably 
did not convey.  Yet, the Spirit received by the church is the Spirit who rested upon 
Jesus at his baptism.  The church lives in and through Christ and we receive the Spirit of 
sonship that we may know God as Father (Romans 8).  Hütter argues that his 
understanding of “distinct economy” is supported by Eastern Orthodox understandings 
of the Spirit.196  I share Hütter’s enthusiasm for an ecumenical Trinitarian theology, 
however, I wonder if his identification of the core practices of the church as subsisting 
enhypostatically in the Spirit leads towards this.  
 
I think the basic problem is one of making ‘practice’ equivalent to ‘person’ in 
pneumatology and ecclesiology.  Hütter recovers the theological importance of the 
pneumatological reality of the church as ‘public’ and ‘new creation’ (which is arguably 
insufficiently conveyed by Vanhoozer because of his lack of reference to the Spirit as 
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God’s personal presence)197.  However, for Hütter, the ‘publicity of the Spirit’ (and thus 
the church) is entirely a reference to practice.198  This also (like Vanhoozer’s theology) 
involves a certain kind of ‘Spirit Christology’.           
[I]t is crucial to differentiate between the gospel (doctrina evangelii) and doctrine (doctrina 
definita).  The gospel, in its core, is nothing other than Christ’ own presence in the promise.  
Received in faith, Christ thus becomes faith’s ‘form.’  [In this he is following the reading of 
Luther by the ‘Helsinki School’.]199  Traditionally put, in Christ as the ‘form of faith’ both the 
content of faith (fides quae creditur) and the act of faith (fides qua creditur) are inseparably one.  
Faith’s form, Christ’s presence, realizes both together.  This is the fundamental pathos of 
Christian existence fully identical with the saving knowledge of God.  What is most crucial is 
that faith’s ‘form’ cannot be isolated from the church’s core practices or from doctrine, since 
such an attempt would mean to abstract Christ’s presence in the believer from the Spirit’s work, 
from the Spirit’s means of conveying and enacting this qualification that is the gospel 
proclaimed and taught.200   
Hütter’s proposal addresses key questions of divine-human agency in cultural-linguistic 
theology, doing so with a profound recognition of the importance of the Holy Spirit to 
these questions, but it is theologically problematic to identify the linguistic turn to 
practice with the triune economy in the way I think this entails.  The biblical witness to 
the personal presence of God by the Holy Spirit – confirming the centrality of the 
person and work of Jesus Christ as our Lord and Saviour to the glory of God the Father 
– requires theology that does not locate experience outside narrative, while offering a 
fully trinitarian ontology that cannot be contained by a linguistic framework.  This 
should renew our attention upon the ministry of the Holy Spirit in the life of Jesus, and 
the significance to Pentecost and the life of the church, within our witness of salvation 
and the triunity of God.   
 
                                                 
197 See section C.1. above. 
198 Hütter (Ibid., 235n23) speaks of the Spirit as a distinct Trinitarian hypostasis but, by locating his 
account in the core practices of the church, Hütter describes the personal presence of God by his Spirit in 
terms of the “Spirit’s work” as if that is not a reduction of what it means to speak of the Spirit as Person  
(Suffering Diving Things, 133). 
199 Hütter, Bound to be Free, 236n35&272n5 
200 Ibid., 51 
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D.  Trajectories 
 
The way the gift of the Spirit at Pentecost incorporates us into Jesus Christ through his 
death and resurrection calls for attention to the significant relation of Jesus’ baptism to 
Jesus’ incarnation.  Raniero Cantalamessa argues that the ‘anointing’ of Jesus by the 
Spirit at his baptism was deemphasised in the Patristic period due to the emphasis upon 
the ‘anointing’ of the incarnation (Matt. 1:18-20, Luke 1:35), and a proper concern for 
securing a high Christology. 201  Jesus is the Christ (the Anointed One), the Son of God, 
from the moment of his conception, and the anointing of Jesus at his baptism is not an 
ontological event.  But the result in Western theology has perhaps been to lose the full 
significance of Jesus’ anointing by the Spirit at his baptism.  This more than a revelation 
of God as Father, Son and Spirit.  It certainly is that, but because the Holy Spirit makes 
manifest, mediates, the eschatological reality of Jesus’ presence as mediator of salvation 
sent from the Father.  Jesus’ public ministry, which includes the proclamation and 
demonstration of the kingdom of God that comes with his presence, begins after his 
baptism.  Jesus’ anointing by the Spirit at his baptism calls for the recognition that the 
action of Jesus is a participation of fully human and fully divine agency that requires a 
trinitarian relationality and ontology to describe.  The action of Jesus is his (the person 
of Son of God incarnate fully assuming our humanity) and yet one with the Father, and 
made manifest by the Spirit.  
 
In The Father’s Spirit of Sonship Thomas Weinandy draws upon the gospel narratives 
and New Testament proclamation as a whole to describe a trinitarian ontology. 
[T]he Father is Father in that he begets the Son in the Spirit.  The Father spirates the Spirit in the 
same act by which he begets the Son, for the Spirit proceeds from the Father as the fatherly Love 
in whom or by whom the Son is begotten.  The very nature then of the Father’s paternity 
demands that he beget the Son in Love and so the Holy Spirit naturally and necessarily proceeds 
from him as the Love in whom the Son is begotten.202   
                                                 
201 R. Cantalamessa, Come, Creator Spirit: Meditations on the Veni Creator (Collegeville: Liturgical 
Press,2003) 152-8 
202 T. Weinandy, The Father’s Spirit of Sonship: Reconceiving the Trinity (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,1995) 
69-71 
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This liberates trinitarian ontology from Aristotelian epistemology in which something 
cannot be loved before it is first known.   
While in human beings something must first be known before it is loved, in God the knowing 
and loving are simultaneous – the begetting and spirating come forth from the Father as distinct, 
but concurrent, acts.  The Father does not, even logically, first beget the Son and then love the 
Son in the Spirit.203 
Weinandy’s thesis is hugely significant in an ecumenical sense, but also points us to the 
importance of the personhood of the Holy Spirit and the active nature of this 
personhood. 
Each person of the Trinity is active, including the Holy Spirit, and so constitutive of the 
subjectivity of the other two as they mutually subsist as distinct persons in relation to one 
another.  Moreover, it is this personalism that is the fundamental and constitutive basis of our 
own relationship, we who are persons, with the Trinity.204 
It is significant, then, whether ‘Spirit Christology’ can secure the active personhood of 
the Holy Spirit, given the importance of this aspect of trinitarian ontology to the relation 
between us, as persons, and the Trinity.205 
 
Conclusion 
 
Vanhoozer’s integration of authorial discourse interpretation and performance 
interpretation, secures the divine authority of Scripture within a hermeneutics of 
performance, but arguably describes our relationship to God within a narrative/semantic 
ontology.  Clearly, the actual words of Scripture are essential to the mediation of our 
personal relation to God in Jesus Christ.  But beginning with the biblical narrative does 
not require that we adopt a narrative ontology.  Vanhoozer’s Spirit Christology is vital 
to his use of Paul Ricoeur’s concepts of semantic potentiality and narrative identity of 
                                                 
203 Ibid., 71-72.  For Weinandy’s discussion of Aristotelian epistemology see 10,72-77,94. 
204 Ibid., 121(my italics) 
205 Ralph Del Colle argues for “an enhypostasis of human persons in the Spirit” and “also a double 
enhypostasis of Christ’s sacred humanity in the Son and in the Spirit”: “We share only in the second 
because of the mediation of that grace by the first, namely the incarnation of the divine Son as Jesus 
Christ.” (‘The Holy Spirit: Presence, Power, Person’ Theological Studies 62(2001) 337)  Notably, Del 
Colle concludes that in this fully trinitarian Spirit Christology “the Spirit is entirely passive” (339).  I 
wonder if this undermines the personhood of the Spirit.  Weinandy (whose thesis does not dismiss the 
filioque – a factor in Del Colle’s claim that the Spirit is passive – but offers an ecumenical reconception) 
argues that “[e]ach person of the Trinity is active” (The Father’s Spirit of Sonship 121, 79-80). 
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self within the description of our relationship to God in Christ (encompassed within 
triune communicative action).  This limits the work of the Spirit within a linguistic 
framework, and overly-identifies communion and communication.  I have argued that 
this undermines the biblical testimony and Christian witness to the Holy Spirit as the 
personal presence of God, and conveys the presence of the Spirit in a somewhat textual-
personal way.  The hermeneutical significance of the eschatological foretaste of union 
with Christ that the Holy Spirit brings is a reality in which communion exceeds 
communication.  This centres upon the ‘manifest public’ of the church, which is not an 
appeal to the practice of the church but God’s personal presence by the Holy Spirit, 
gathering a people though and in the person and work of Jesus Christ our Lord.   
 
Using pneumatology to address the theological issues of authority and identity that are 
raised by the linguistic turn to practice tends towards identifying the person and work of 
the Spirit with church practice: either directly (in the case of Hütter) or indirectly (in the 
case of Vanhoozer – for whom church practice is the perlocutionary aspect of the divine 
communicative action of Jesus Christ through Scripture).  This makes the person of the 
Spirit defined by practice rather than being God’s indwelling personal presence that 
inspires practice.  The trajectory of this argument is that these issues might be addressed 
by a trinitarian ontology given by Scripture, which would create a distinctively 
Christian account of epistemology, hermeneutics and the dynamics of human 
performance, counteracting the problems of structuring theology around prior 
epistemological assumptions.  I shall turn to the epistemological detail of Vanhoozer’s 
model, the pneumatological implications, and use of Spirit Christology. 
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Chapter 3: Pneumatology and Understanding 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter concerns the epistemology that Vanhoozer develops within his triune 
communicative action model.  I begin with the intentional ambiguity that Vanhoozer 
adopts in his integration of the ‘Scripture Principle’ and the triunity of God, using 
speech-act conceptuality.  In chapter 1, I outlined the importance of this integration for 
Vanhoozer’s canonical-linguistic approach.  Here, I consider how the illocution-
perlocution relation within it – corresponding in his triune model to the relation of 
Christ and the Spirit – shapes his epistemology, and specifically his characterisation of 
‘illumination’ and ‘understanding’.  This has implications for his description of faith, 
reason, and the relationship of divine and human agency in regard to sin and 
redemption.  The third section of this chapter considers Vanhoozer’s Christological 
correlation of hermeneutics and the action and presence of God – in particular, his 
description (that emerges in The Drama of Doctrine) of the canon as ‘Christotope’: “the 
‘place’ where Christ makes himself ‘present’”206; “reconceiving the theme of the 
contemporaneity of Christ”207.  My interest concerns the pneumatological implications 
of his use of Spirit Christology allied to speech-act dynamics and literary conceptuality.  
The final section of the chapter considers Vanhoozer’s recent essay on these issues in 
which he combines Barth’s personal description of Sache and Gadamer’s hermeneutical 
description of Sache, enabling the Christological ‘Matter’ of Scripture to generate a 
Christological conception of the gift of understanding in general.  This development of 
his thesis is fascinating regarding the ‘common grace’ of understanding, yet I think 
pneumatological issues remain.     
 
                                                 
206 DD 347 
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A.  The Epistemological Problem Carried Within Vanhoozer’s Model 
A.1. The introduction of an intentional ambiguity  
 
In his Triune communicative action model, Vanhoozer describes how Scripture both is, 
and may become, the Word of God.  His discontinuity and continuity with Karl Barth’s 
theology is focussed here.  Scripture is divine communicative action in an illocutionary 
sense (the Bible objectively is God’s written word regardless of our response), and it 
can become divine communicative action in a perlocutionary sense as we participate and 
are transformed, subjectively appropriating it through faith, by the Holy Spirit.  The 
way Vanhoozer employs the important speech-act distinction and relation between 
illocution and perlocution is key to his reconception of the ‘Scripture Principle’ within a 
Barthian Triune framework.  However, there are epistemological difficulties concerning 
Vanhoozer’s application of this illocution-perlocution relation to the doctrine of 
Scripture and doctrine of God, especially regarding pneumatology. 
 
A.2.  The pneumatological implications of the asymmetry of the illocution-
perlocution relation in speech act theory upon Vanhoozer’s conception of 
‘illumination’ and ‘understanding’ 
 
The nature of the illocution-perlocution relation in communication is debated by 
speech-act theorists.  Vanhoozer agrees with those who posit an asymmetric relation: 
whilst perlocution flows from illocution, illocution is a communicative act regardless of 
whether or not there is perlocution.208  This allows one to make the point that what one 
does in saying something does not depend upon the hearer’s response, and this is 
important to the stability of communicative agency.  Vanhoozer appropriates this 
speech-act relation within his triune communicative action model, and his theological 
                                                 
208 “For Alston the distinction is clear-cut.  It is the difference between having performed an action and 
being understood to have performed that action. … [C]ommunication theorists remind us [that we] do not 
know if we have communicated until we receive the appropriate feedback.  To this Alston replies yes and 
no: if you didn’t hear or understand my question, then yes, on one level my communicative purpose has 
been frustrated.  But – and this is all-important – it does not follow that I did not ask you.”(FT 185-186) 
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account of hearing the gospel, and the gift/response of coming to faith, through Word 
and Spirit.  As argued earlier, regarding Vanhoozer’s ‘is/becomes’ account of Scripture 
as God’s Word, the risk for Vanhoozer is that the asymmetric illocution-perlocution 
relation (albeit valid in speech-act terms), when placed within the economy of Triune 
communicative action, potentially posits a present reference to ‘divine discourse 
simpliciter’ (what God is doing in speaking) in which the Spirit seems absent.209  I shall 
now expand upon this.  Vanhoozer writes, 
The notion of a divine communication…is ambiguous; it could mean ‘act’ or ‘effect’.  For Barth, 
revelation always includes both components.  Yet, given the distinction between illocutions and 
perlocutions, there is no reason why one could not speak of divine discourse simpliciter to refer 
to what God is doing in speaking (illocutions), whether or not it is received and understood 
(perlocutions).  [Footnote]  To use the traditional terminology, one can affirm the inspiration of 
the Bible by emphasizing the Spirit’s ‘objective’ work in guiding the human authors.  
Illumination would then refer to the Spirit’s work in bringing about the intended perlocutionary 
effects.210 
The key terms are ‘understanding’ and ‘illumination’.  In the quote above these seem to 
be perlocutionary terms.  Yet, communication requires that discourse is understood 
(recognised), as illocution, prior to perlocution.  Indeed Vanhoozer considers 
understanding to be the one effect that belongs to illocutionary action: 
Authors often wish to accomplish something by their discourse.  The author of the Fourth 
Gospel, for instance, wants to elicit readers’ belief that Jesus is the Christ by telling Jesus’ story.  
The question is whether this extra effect – eliciting belief – should count as part of the author’s 
communicative action.  I think it should not.  Alston is right: an illocutionary act may well 
produce perlocutionary effects, but it does not consist in such effects.  The only effect that 
properly belongs to the author’s illocutionary act is understanding – the recognition of an 
illocutionary act for what it is.211  
Thus, ‘understanding’ seems to be used by Vanhoozer in two senses that we might 
distinguish as ‘recognition/comprehension’ (illocutionary understanding) and ‘personal 
understanding’ (perlocutionary understanding).212  The vital question concerns the 
                                                 
209 Chapter 1, Section B.2. 
210 DD 66&n31 
211 FT 179  
212 Hence, whilst writing that the “only effect that properly belongs to the author’s illocutionary act is 
understanding – the recognition of an illocutionary act for what it is”(FT 179), he also speaks of a deeper 
perlocutionary, personally appropriated, understanding: “The most profound kind of understanding…has 
to do with the cultivation of the ability to follow the Word of God, not just in our reading but in personal 
response to what we have read.”(FT 228).   
 66
nature of our recognition/comprehension of ‘divine illocution simpliciter’ (illocution 
with an integrity regardless of perlocution) in relation to the Holy Spirit.  Is this 
recognition/comprehension illumined and, if so, isn’t this problematic to Vanhoozer’s 
Triune communicative action account given this model describes the Spirit’s agency in 
perlocutionary terms?  If the self-illumining nature of ‘divine discourse simpliciter’ is a 
Christological reference (which it rightly is for Vanhoozer), the danger is that although 
he is appropriating Barth’s understanding of Christ and the Spirit as ‘object’ and 
‘subjectivity’ of the triune revelation, because of the integrity of divine illocution 
simpliciter (in the absence of perlocution), he allows a separation between Christ and 
the Spirit that Barth never did.213         
 
To sustain the integrity of ‘divine discourse simpliciter’ within the ‘Barthian’ triune 
model, Vanhoozer has to identify the content of an illocutionary act solely with its 
cognitive component.  In describing how illocutionary acts ‘supervene’214 on locutions, 
and have integrity apart from perlocutions, Vanhoozer writes: 
The attempt to say just what a communicative act is may be helped by reversing the polarities in 
order to think of action as a form of speech.  For actions have speech act attributes. In the first 
place, the doing of an action corresponds to the locution. Second, actions have propositional 
content (e.g., ‘S performs act y on the ball’) and illocutionary force (e.g., kicking).  Finally, 
actions too may have perlocutionary effects (‘S scores a goal’). [Footnote:] Alston’s analysis is 
slightly different.  For him the ‘content’ of an act includes object and performance: ‘kicking the 
ball’.  With regard to illocutionary acts, this means that for Alston the content of the act includes 
both its propositional component and its illocutionary force.  For Searle (and usually me) 
‘content’ refers primarily to the propositional component of the illocutionary act.215 
Vanhoozer regards the difference as “largely terminological” but I think it is more 
significant.  Using Alston’s asymmetric illocution-perlocution relation, yet departing 
from it by isolating the illocutionary content from the illocutionary force, Vanhoozer 
describes ‘divine discourse simpliciter’ in cognitive terms separable from the affective 
illocutionary force.  Thus, he can appropriate the illocution-perlocution relation within 
the Triune model, describing the Spirit in perlocutionary terms, with the effect that the 
                                                 
213 If Vanhoozer’s Spirit Christology conflates the presence of the risen Christ with the gift of the Spirit, 
this may potentially mitigate the problem but, as argued, this would be problematic exegetically and for 
Trinitarian doctrine.  
214 See footnote 124 above 
215 FT 177&n40 
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illocutionary force of the Spirit is directed towards perlocution but decoupled from the 
recognition of the cognitive content of the illocutionary act, so that it is comprehensible 
as a proposition separate from its force.   
 
The Filioque is Vanhoozer’s basis for limiting the Spirit’s ministry to perlocution in this 
way.   
The asymmetrical dependence of perlocutionary on illocutionary acts defended by Alston has a 
theological counterpart in the idea that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son – 
the celebrated Filioque.216   
[T]he Spirit of Understanding is the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of Christ.  The Spirit may blow 
where, but not what, he wills.  The Spirit is subordinate to the Word.  Perlocutions “proceed 
from” illocutions.217 
I would argue that Alston’s asymmetric illocution-perlocution relation, whilst proper in 
speech-act terms (and notably involving an integrity of the cognitive and affective 
aspects of illocutionary action), when modified by Vanhoozer and identified with the 
relation of Christ and the Spirit, leads to an account of Scripture as God’s written Word 
that helpfully prevents ‘perlocutionary interpretation’ (i.e. the author’s meaning being 
dependent upon the effect of the discourse upon the reader), but does so by positing 
divine illocution simpliciter as a Christological reference that is not also 
pneumatological.  This is problematic in trinitarian terms.  If Vanhoozer’s argument is 
that the ‘objective’ aspect of the Spirit’s ministry is in the inspiration of Scripture, I 
would agree but argue that his reference to ‘divine discourse simpliciter’ is to more than 
the locutions of the text, it is the illocutionary action towards and involving us here and 
now (whether we respond or not) and recognisable as such (whether we respond or not).  
This necessarily requires reference to the Spirit as the mediator of revelation, but this 
illocutionary role of the Spirit seems hard to locate within Vanhoozer’s triune model.  
We seem to be left with a choice between Christological illumination that is 
insufficiently mediated by the Spirit, or recognition/comprehension taking place without 
illumination (which would be idealistic and insufficiently attending to the problem of 
our fallenness).  I shall next discuss how Vanhoozer’s epistemology shows signs of 
these issues.     
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Thus, the difficulty of appropriating speech-act conceptuality within Barth’s Triune 
revelation model, such that Scripture both is and becomes God’s written Word (which is 
a sound point in itself), is this:  The integrity of ‘divine discourse simpliciter’ (the 
illocutionary action of Scripture) requires reference to presence of the Spirit, but 
Vanhoozer’s Triune model identifies the present agency of Spirit with perlocution.  As a 
result, to refer to the Spirit in relation to illocution risks identifying being and becoming 
(in a similar fashion to Barth) which is problematic to Vanhoozer’s triune 
communicative action model for two reasons.  Firstly, it would collapse the integrity of 
illocution (regardless of perlocution), which is important communicatively if we are to 
avoid ‘perlocutionary interpretation’ (such as ‘reader response’ methods).218  Secondly, 
Barth could identify being and becoming in his dialectic model, but Vanhoozer’s more 
semantically mediated model cannot.  Hence, Vanhoozer describes ‘divine discourse 
simpliciter’ as self-illumining in Christological terms that are insufficiently 
pneumatologically mediated.  Vanhoozer’s semantic concept of the ‘meaning potential’ 
of the text seems to take on this role, or is, at best, identified with the Spirit’s agency, 
rather than this potential being created by the eschatological presence of God by his 
Spirit.  
 
B.  The Pneumatological Issues in Vanhoozer’s Characterisation of Faith, 
Reason and the Relationship Between Divine and Human Agency 
 
I think the aforementioned pneumatological issue causes a degree of rationalisation of 
the fiduciary character of knowledge and of sin.  This relates to an overall concern 
regarding the relationship between divine freedom and contingent human agency in 
Vanhoozer’s divine communicative action framework. 
 
                                                 
218 Thus, I agree that the asymmetric illocution-perlocution relation is vital communicatively, but argue it 
should not determine the relation between the Son and the Spirit.  I think the Filioque should not be 
interpreted as underwriting this kind of asymmetry. 
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B.1.  Faith seeking understanding 
 
Vanhoozer describes the ‘postfoundational’ nature of canonical-linguistic theology in 
terms of ‘faith seeking understanding’. 
A fiduciary framework is the beginning of knowledge.  Lesslie Newbigin (and Augustine) are 
right: knowing always takes place within the context of prior belief.  To grow in knowledge, one 
must make at least provisional commitment to a framework of thought, to accept something as 
“given” on trust and then go on to test it.  Theology’s “given,” as Barth never tired of insisting, 
is the self-giving of the triune God: God in christocentric (and we might add, canonical) self-
presentation.  Only God can make God known; hence the “given” of God’s word-act in Christ 
“cannot form part of any worldview except one of which it is the basis” [Newbigin].  Knowledge 
of God begins with trust in what we have been told about God by God, and this means taking the 
canon as the beginning of theological knowledge, the interpretative framework for understanding 
God, the world, and ourselves.219 
The vital epistemological issue concerns the nature of this trust in relation to 
understanding.  What is the role of the Spirit in relation to “what we have been told 
about God by God” such that we can believe in order to understand?  I have argued that 
‘divine discourse simpliciter’ is Christological and mediated by the Spirit, but that 
Vanhoozer isolates the ‘content’ of divine discourse (Scripture) as an illocutionary act 
as such from this pneumatological dimension for fear of perlocutionary interpretation.  I 
believe that the Spirit’s sanctifying agency is indeed perlocutionary, but the Spirit is not 
limited to perlocution.  Divine illocution has an affective force that cannot be abstracted 
from its cognitive content, but this does not mean that perlocution necessarily follows.  
This is to say that divine illocution is towards us and involves us; therefore, it indeed 
has integrity to prior to perlocution, but we should be cautious about describing “what 
we have been told about God by God” in a cognitive way that is prior to our personal 
involvement.220  I shall argue this involvement requires us to distinguish our ‘a-critical’ 
commitment (personal dependence upon God) from our critical commitment (rationality 
in the context of this dependence).  For Vanhoozer, rationality seems to be co-inherent 
with, rather than contingent upon, belief. 
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Vanhoozer is concerned to avoid an irrational fideism, and so adopts Paul Helm’s 
account of ‘belief policy’ to argue that the evangelical truth claim – the message of 
Christ crucified – calls for a fideistic as well as ‘juridical’ epistemology.   
fideism is a matter of belief policy where one decides that accepting certain forms of evidence – 
apostolic testimony, to be exact – is a rational, intellectually virtuous knowledge-producing 
act.221 
To say “I know” is to say “I believe, rationally.”  Better: to say “I know” is to say “I believe in 
reason, and I reason in belief.”  I believe in reason.  As we have seen, reason is a God-designed 
cognitive process of forming and criticizing beliefs, a discipline that demands virtuous habits of 
the mind.  I reason in belief.  Reasoning – forming beliefs, giving warrants, making inferences, 
analysing critically – does not take place in a vacuum but in fiduciary frameworks, in canonical 
frameworks of belief.222 
Thus, for Vanhoozer, reason and belief seem to be co-inherent (of the same order): 
beliefs are formed rationally, in frameworks of belief.  However, Michael Polanyi (who, 
interestingly, is cited by Vanhoozer) argued that rationality takes place within fiduciary 
frameworks to which we commit a-critically.223  He saw the power of scientific 
discovery resting upon a Christian reality, summed up by Augustine’s dictum ‘nisi 
credideritis, non intelligitis.’224  For Polanyi, belief concerns personal relations of 
commitment upon which the practice of rationality is contingent.  In the act of knowing 
we are personally committing ourselves to the reality of that which we seek to know 
(personally identifying ourselves with its truth) and to the community of others who 
share this rationality (upon whom we depend to hand it on to us).  Rationality 
(criticality) is ‘second order’ to these personal relations (a-critical commitments).  This 
is subtly different to Vanhoozer’s position.  Rationality and personal relation appear to 
be co-inherent – our relationship to God in Christ is mediated by the canonical-
linguistic in a way that is identified with, rather than contingent upon, the presence of 
the Spirit.  Canonical practice is Spirited practice.  Our commitment to the reality of 
God communicated by Scripture, and our dependence upon the community who hand 
on this rationality, seems to be bound into this canonical-linguistic participation.  We 
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must believe and trust actively in the canonical Scriptures in order to know – the Bible 
provides our rationality – but this faith involves a prevenient dependence upon the 
mediation of the Spirit whose presence is a ‘real earnest’225 and made ‘public’ in God’s 
gathering of the church of Jesus Christ (i.e. a personal relation and so not a 
supplemental/extra-canonical rationality).226  Vanhoozer’s account seems to suggest that 
the illocutionary content of the canon can be recognised (and so trusted rationally) prior 
to this dependence upon the Holy Spirit.  The illocutionary action of Scripture is 
mediated by the words of Scripture in an ‘immediate’ sense (lacking the Spirit’s 
mediation) because the recognition of meaning of the words seems to be a 
Christological moment without present pneumatological reference.  The rationality of 
Scripture appears self-supporting rather than integral to the presence of the Holy Spirit. 
 
Vanhoozer suggests that a ‘map’ is “an apt metaphor for a postfoundationalist 
rationality that strives to hold on to the ideal of objective truth while acknowledging the 
provisional and perspectival nature of human subjectivity.”227  This way of expressing 
how the Bible is authoritative in the objective reality it communicates whilst also vitally 
subjective in its authoring (God’s word written by human beings) such that the 
subjective human reader can ‘follow’ it (in terms of comprehension and practice).   
Interestingly, Vanhoozer notes the necessity of a compass if a map is to become our 
means of finding our way in the reality it charts. 
To walk the Christian way is to employ the biblical maps so that they direct one to Christ.  Note 
that we need a compass because a map can be read and followed only if one is rightly oriented.  
Maps are of no use to those who are lost if they cannot determine the way north.  Similarly, 
biblical exegesis gets disorientated when it loses the ability to relate the text to its canonical 
compass, God’s speech-act in Christ.228  
The need for a compass refers to the way in which the map can indeed be the 
articulation of everything we need to know, our sole rationality, yet still require us to be 
in a relation (orientation to north) that places us in the same relation in which the map 
was written and upon which the rationality of the map depends if it is to communicate 
reality to us.  The compass does not provide a supplemental rationality but neither is the 
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relation to the north simply given to us ‘immediately’ in our reading and following the 
map.  Indeed we cannot truly relate to the reality it communicates and so read and 
follow it without being given a relation/orientation to the north.  In the above quote, 
Vanhoozer’s compass for the text is “God’s speech-act in Christ”.  This is a reference to 
the canon:  “The canon is a unique compass that points not to the north but to the 
church’s North Star: Jesus Christ.  Such was the thrust of Jesus’ conversation with the 
two disciples on the road to Emmaus in Luke 24.”  This would appear to suggest that 
the compass is internal to the rationality of the map.  However, because canon is “God’s 
speech-act in Christ”, Vanhoozer would perhaps also say he is referring to how divine 
illocutionary action (the practice of Christ borne by the Spirit) supervenes upon the 
locutions of Scripture.  But at best, he is claiming that the compass is an ‘emergent’ 
(supervenient) property of the map.  This brings us back to the difficulty of the 
‘meaning potential of the text’ somehow including the role of imparting for us the 
relation to God in Christ that the Spirit mediates.  The canon as Spirited practice seems 
to be a self-orienting rationality, a compass-map.  Vanhoozer’s divine communicative 
action concept of canon as Spirited practice seems to linguistically identify relation and 
rationality such that they are co-inherent, rather than rationality being contingent upon 
relation.  I believe that the personal presence of God by his Spirit does not supplement 
the rationality of the text, but does orientate us rightly and personally.  Vanhoozer’s 
‘extended cognition’ account brilliantly incorporates the depth of linguistic knowledge, 
and thus conveys this aspect of personal knowing, but it does not capture the fact that all 
personal knowing (which is always linguistic, rational, knowing-in-practice) depends 
upon a personal relation of commitment that is non-linguistic.  This relation cannot be 
linguistically imparted because it is that upon which linguistic rationality/practice 
depends. 
 
B.2.  Sin and human agency in relation to divine communicative action   
 
I will now explore the nature of freedom in relation to communicative understanding.  
For Vanhoozer, the “success of communicative action wholly depends on bringing 
 73
about this one effect: understanding.”229  Using Habermas’ theory of communicative 
action, Vanhoozer writes: 
Actions that aim to produce an effect on the reader other than understanding, or other than by 
means of understanding, count as strategic, not communicative, actions.  An emphasis on 
perlocutions can become pathological: (1) by aiming to produce effects on the reader 
independently of illocutions or (2) by defining illocutions in terms of the effect produced on the 
reader.230 
I agree with his rejection of (1) and (2).  But I think framing the discussion with 
Habermas’ communicative theory is problematic.  How is it pathological for 
communicative action to cause any effect, yet not the effect of understanding, unless we 
are working with a strong mind-body dualism?  Rather, we should say that the ‘content’ 
of an illocutionary act is necessarily cognitive and affective, and as such can either 
compel violently/coercively (denying freedom by using communicative agency/power 
to narrow or claim our hearer’s agency) or, by the grace of God, compel lovingly 
(gifting freedom by using communicative agency/power to serve our hearer’s agency).  
This requires a fully theological account of human agency and sin.231  Vanhoozer 
certainly does not overlook the impact of sin: 
Humans are…created with the capacity to understand discourse.  However…this cognitive 
equipment has been affected by sin.  It is often in the sinner’s interest wilfully to misunderstand, 
or at least not to respond to what has been understood.  If understanding involves a movement of 
personal appropriation, that is, if understanding includes the perlocutionary effect, then we can 
agree with Barth that the Spirit is the “Lord of the hearing.”232       
However, sin does not just affect our will to understand and/or respond to “what has 
been understood”, but hinders our understanding itself (making us ‘blind’ without 
grace).  Sin is the ultimate surd – disrupting the integrity of knowing, volition, will and 
action.  I think Vanhoozer’s proper concern with ‘reader response’ is being tackled 
wrongly due to a view that human agency ‘possesses’, to a degree, an autonomous and 
universal rationality, along Habermas’ pragmatic lines.  He uses Habermas’ theory to 
argue that in communicative acts we “modify cognitive environments” with the aim of 
                                                 
229 FT 184-185 
230 FT 185 
231 See Alistair McFadyen’s treatment of sin and human willing in Bound to Sin (Cambridge: CUP,2000), 
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modifying “the natural or social environment,”233 but that the former can occur without 
the latter (i.e. he separates cognitive and affective).    
Communication succeeds when the speaker’s communicative intention becomes mutually 
known.  The reader need not believe or obey what is said in order to understand it.  The reader’s 
role in the covenant of discourse is nothing less than to seek understanding.234 
I agree that the ‘covenant of discourse’ is nothing less than to seek understanding, but 
surely its more?  If the reader can enter into discourse, yet walk away without alteration 
other than his mind being informed, is that communication? Is it realistic?  Vanhoozer is 
right that illocution cannot be defined by perlocution; to collapse the distinction would 
undermine our personal responsibility in the event of hearing the gospel and God’s 
judgement upon unbelief would have no meaning.  But this should not be secured by 
making the affective aspect of illocutionary action simply serve its cognitive content.   
Rather, we should describe how the content of an illocutionary act is cognitive and 
affective, and how this either enables or constrains the freedom of the perlocutionary 
response, depending upon whether the act is a loving and self-giving, or sinful and self-
serving, one.  This is supremely true of divine communicative action in which the Spirit 
graciously mediates God’s communication through Scripture convicting us of, and 
incorporating us into the freedom of, the love of God in Christ.     
 
B.3.  Vanhoozer’s Three-fold Epistemology 
 
Vanhoozer’s epistemology – a ‘three-stranded cord’ of reliablism, falliblism and 
intellectual virtue – is undoubtedly careful and systematically coherent.235  My focus is 
upon the way cognitive competence relates to the mediation of the Spirit in Vanhoozer’s 
triune communicative action model.  Vanhoozer draws upon Romans 12:1-2 to argue: 
[T]he rational person must be a person of intellectual virtue….[V]irtue requires a renewing not 
only of the mind but of the whole being; it requires a work of transforming grace, a reorientation 
to the truth…According to [virtue epistemology], knowledge is less a matter of following correct 
procedures (e.g., the scientific method) than of becoming the right sort of person, a person of 
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intellectual virtue.  An intellectual virtue is a disposition of heart and mind that arises from the 
motivation for knowledge, a cognitive habit that is conducive to obtaining true beliefs.236 
Thus, Vanhoozer speaks of the necessity for a renewing of our whole being by grace.  
But, although he rules out secularist scientific rationalism, he describes true beliefs 
being obtained through conducive habits,237 rather than true beliefs – a relation of faith 
and the gift of the Spirit – being conducive for renewed cognitive habits.  If believing is 
the result of virtuous cognitive practice, this risks describing justification in linguistic 
terms.238  Vanhoozer may consider this acceptable in that the canonical-linguistic is 
divine practice in which we participate (i.e. he does not advocate ‘works 
righteousness’).  This brings us to Vanhoozer’s use of ‘form’ in describing canonical 
participation in Christ. 
 
C.  The Justification of Vanhoozer’s Canonical-Linguistic Approach Using 
the Concept of the Canon as ‘Christotope’ 
 
Vanhoozer’s canonical-linguistic approach accepts the linguistic turn to practice yet 
advocates the propositional content/nature of Scripture that Lindbeck’s ‘cultural-
linguistic’ approach underdetermined.  Vanhoozer’s defence of the propositional nature 
of Scripture is crucial.  His cognitive-poetic rehabilitation of propositions replaces the 
models of Charles Hodge and Carl Henry with an ‘aspectival realism’ that avoids 
‘pluralististic perspectivism’.239  But Vanhoozer’s canonical-linguistic approach 
combines Christology with literary conceptuality in a pneumatologically limited way.  
Vanhoozer speaks of the literary forms of Scripture merging into forms of life so that 
‘seeing as translates…at the limit, into being as” because the “the literary forms of 
Scripture mediate the ‘form’ of Jesus Christ”.240  
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Twentieth-century hermeneutics has shown us the historical nature of human 
understanding.  God’s truth is eternal, but theology is written by particular people in 
historical contexts.  Time and place affect the language spoken and the forms of 
conceptuality utilised.241  Vanhoozer develops this point with Bakhtin’s literary notion 
of ‘chronotope’: 
Bakhtin believes (1) that there are different kinds of chronotopes, different forms of 
spatiotemporal thinking and experience; (2) that these diverse forms can be inscribed in 
literature.242 
Vanhoozer describes the canon as ‘Christotopic’: the diverse sense of time and space in 
the canon and its Christological theo-dramatic wholeness brings together the universal 
significance of Christ to all time and space in a way that can be practised throughout 
history in every locality.  It is a “concrete universal”: 
The canon contains many different chronotopes.  [Vanhoozer mentions the space-time of the 
patriarchal narratives oriented toward the divine promise, the sense of kairos in the Gospels and 
the sense of utopian telos in Revelation].  [T]he canon reincorporates and connects these distinct 
times and spaces…and makes of them a Christotope: the “place” where Christ makes himself 
“present.” …[W]hat God is doing in the history of Jesus Christ is significant for all times and 
places.…What is of universal significance…is not a moral principle or system of propositional 
truths but a dramatope: just these words and acts, in just these times and places, embody the 
divine judgements that continue to be authoritative and helpful for every space-time situation.243 
Vanhoozer notes that to “think chronotopes and Christology together is to reconceive 
the theme of the contemporaneity of Christ.”244  But is this somehow subsuming God’s 
personal presence by the Holy Spirit into a linguistic/textual concept of ‘form’?  The 
‘Spirit Christology’ that I have critiqued seems to facilitate this literary and linguistic 
conceptuality. 
 
Vanhoozer is keen his conception of canonic universals is not seen as simply following 
Gadamer’s ‘fusion of horizons,’ which he argues is monologic.  However, his departure 
from Gadamer is not from his hermeneutic framework as such, but in the emphasis that 
the Holy Spirit rather than ‘historical consciousness’ transcends the horizons.245  
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Vanhoozer writes that it “is thanks to the ‘real presence’ of a text’s meaning potential 
that it enjoys transcultural significance.”246  What does this ‘real presence’ of a text’s 
meaning potential describe?  My concern is that this Christotopic point is based upon a 
convergence of the concepts of Ricoeur, Gadamer and Bakhtin that leads to a 
Christological canonical ‘immediacy’ – Christ is present in the illocutionary action of 
Scripture and the Spirit is the efficacy of this divine communicative action.   
 
I believe that , through the Holy Spirit, the unique and particular words of Scripture are 
essential to knowing God in Christ Jesus.  These words communicate the gospel to us 
no matter what our culture because of the Spirit’s mediation – the Spirit who is the 
Creator Spirit, the one by whom all of the diversity created by God through Christ 
becomes manifest and is sustained.247  Hence, the Spirit creates semantic ‘meaning 
potential’ – as mediator of revelation – and so the action of the Holy Spirit cannot be 
identified with the phenomenon as such, or worse, limited to perlocution.   
 
Vanhoozer’s recent development of his approach provides helpful clarification on these 
issues. 
 
D.  Vanhoozer’s Recent Development of His Model:  The ‘Miracle’ of 
Understanding and the ‘Matter’ of Scripture 
 
The focus of this chapter is the nature of understanding in relation to the divine-human 
relation, and in particular the nature of ‘illumination’ in recognising the illocutionary 
action of Scripture, which also concerns the nature of understanding in general (our 
noetic condition in relation to being creatures and being redeemed in Christ).  
Vanhoozer addresses this in a recent essay – ‘Discourse on Matter: Hermeneutics and 
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the ‘Miracle’ of Understanding.’248  He draws upon Philippe Eberhard’s ‘middle voice’ 
approach to agency. 
Understanding is a ‘middle voice’ phenomenon, neither wholly active nor wholly passive: ‘In 
the middle voice, as opposed to the active, the subject is within the action which happens to him 
or her and of which he or she is subject.’  The interpreter is…caught up in a larger process; 
understanding is both ‘happening’ and ‘doing.’… 
Whereas Gadamer views understanding as something that happens to us ‘over and above our 
willing and doing,’ Eberhard recalls Paul’s comment in Philippians 2:13 that ‘God is at work in 
you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure’.  Christian faith does not only seek 
understanding; it mediates it: ‘Faith as an object of our knowledge and faith as a gift from God 
are exclusive alternatives only as long as one keeps thinking in terms of subject and object 
instead of subject and verb.’  Faith, then, is not something one merely does or merely has but a 
Sache the subject gets involved in but never controls: ‘Interpreting faith as Sache allows one to 
understand it as something we do while it happens to us.’  One’s (ontological) location in the 
process is the key: ‘Hermeneutics says that we are conversation; from a Christian perspective we 
are in Christ.’249  
Does this description of faith as Sache (gift and object of our knowledge) answer my 
concern – that Vanhoozer’s reference to ‘divine discourse simpliciter’ is Christological 
but insufficiently pneumatological because his triune model limits the Spirit to 
perlocution (due to the asymmetric illocution-perlocution relation and abstraction of 
illocutionary cognitive content from its affective force)?   
 
Vanhoozer’s description of ‘Sache’ mediates Barth’s and Gadamer’s uses of term.  
Whereas Descartes treated reason as “a scope that contains the source of its own light” 
such that understanding is “a by-product of the active subject’s agency upon the 
matter,” Gadamer argued that it is “the matter that enlightens the subject.”250  
Vanhoozer argues that, although for Gadamer “the Sache appears in, and as, language, 
not as something extralinguistic,”251 his rendering of Sache is not sufficiently 
corporeal.252  Therefore, Vanhoozer seeks to combine Gadamer’s hermeneutical (but 
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impersonal) account of Sache with Barth’s personal account of Sache in his 
hermeneutics of Scripture.   
It is sheer mystification to say that the process itself…does something to bring about 
understanding…Neither ‘history’ nor ‘language’ nor ‘play’ or ‘conversation’ are subjects, and it 
is difficult to see how an impersonal process could have the ability to disclose truth.  The 
persuasiveness of Gadamer’s account would seem to depend on the extent to which the analogy 
is not simply notional but operational.  The Sache itself does not literally speak or show itself to 
us, except when the subject is the sovereign speaking God (so Barth).253   
Vanhoozer’s argument centres upon this combination of Barth’s account of Sache (the 
divine person of the Word) with Gadamer’s account of Sache (that which 
hermeneutically transcends historical-linguistic horizons).254  Vanhoozer’s description 
of Sache as the ‘sovereign speaking God’ is key: it unites Barth’s personal Sache and 
Gadamer’s hermeneutical Sache in Vanhoozer’s triune communicative action model.  
Hence, this argument uniquely applies to Scripture – God’s personal presence is 
identified with the Bible: “no other book has the self-communicating presence and 
action of God as its Sache.”255  The development upon Barth’s theology is that God’s 
presence has become identified with the Sache of Scripture in personal-semantic terms. 
The development upon Gadamer is that his secular ‘effective historical consciousness’ 
is replaced by “effective pneumatic consciousness.”256 Thus, the personal 
communicative presence of God is the Sache of the discourse of Scripture – Triune 
communicative action.  In bringing Christian ontology together with hermeneutics, 
Vanhoozer emphasises that “the miracle of understanding is not reduced to one’s 
mystical union with Christ”:  
No, a robust doctrine of incarnation demands that we reject the notion of disembodied discourse 
and give due attention and respect to corporeal discourse: what someone in a particular time and 
place and language says to someone about something.  While I agree with Barth and Gadamer 
that understanding is not to be identified with (or reduced to) coming to know the conditions 
behind authorial discourse – the reasons why an author said what he said – the question remains 
whether we can understand textual discourse without also understanding what the author 
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said/did with respect to the matter of the text.  No Sache, except the living Logos, is self-
presenting; on the contrary, what we understand in discourse is someone’s witness to the 
Sache.257 
In this reference to Sache, Vanhoozer secures greater purchase upon the significance of 
author behind the text as witness.  But does this essay mark a pneumatological 
development from The Drama of Doctrine?  The pneumatological implications in 
regard to mediation are apparent as Vanhoozer elucidates how his appropriation of 
Barth’s and Gadamer’s approaches allow them mutually amend each other.   
 
Vanhoozer notes how Barth considered the nature of biblical interpretation to be 
paradigmatic for general hermeneutics.  Vanhoozer argues that by bringing this together 
with the Gadamerian insight that “hermeneutics is a matter not merely of methods but 
of ontology, which is to say anthropology,” Barth’s insight can be appropriated and 
amended resulting in a general ontology.  By linking the ontology of understanding to 
the uniqueness of Scripture as the one text which is truly self-revealing (in that its Sache 
is the divine person of the Word), Vanhoozer creates a general hermeneutical principle: 
the ‘matter’ of general understanding is contingent upon Christ, who is the Sache of 
Scripture.   
We can follow Augustine and make the Christological categories to which philosophical 
hermeneutics appeals not merely notional but fully operational.…Christ is the light in, by, and 
through whom all intelligible things are illumined.  Illumination is the operative term.  Yet it 
need not imply that human subjects are merely passive recipients.  Augustine suggests that the 
human mind participates in the divine light. … 
‘I am illumined’ and ‘I understand’ are thus middle-voiced terms.  The miracle of understanding 
is not that the interpreter is either simply active or simply passive before the object of 
understanding, but rather that the interpreter is located in an all-encompassing process (or rather 
person?) in which he or she is nevertheless active.  Described in Christian categories, this 
process is conformity to Christ.258 
Vanhoozer’s argument is that Christ illumines: illumination concerns the “self-
presenting” Logos; faith in Christ is given through hearing and receiving the discourse 
of Scripture (triune communicative action). To participate in divine discourse involves 
an “effective pneumatic consciousness”.  The Spirit sanctifies us cultivating interpretive 
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virtues such as openness and humility, making us better able to hear the gospel.259  
Because the interpreter is thus “located in an all-encompassing process”, and Vanhoozer 
retains a Barthian sense of the objective and subjective aspects of revelation as relating 
to ministry of Christ and the Spirit respectively, the ‘being’ and ‘becoming’ of Scripture 
as triune communicative action come together.  But Vanhoozer maintains that the 
corporeality of discourse ensures that the miracle of understanding is not to be directly 
equated to our mystical union with Christ.   
 
However, does this ‘all-encompassing process’ include the Holy Spirit mediating the 
illocutions of Scripture as well as effecting perlocution?  It seems Vanhoozer thinks not.  
This creates a tension in his account because the gifted nature of understanding requires 
a description (in the light of the trinitarian mediation of salvation) of how general 
understanding is mediated.  Vanhoozer’s argues that 
hermeneutics after Gadamer has become ontology, and Christians have something distinctive to 
say about the human condition – including human noetic functions such as understanding – in 
light of creation, the fall, and redemption.  No description of the human hermeneutical condition 
is complete if it mentions only finitude and not fallenness besides.  Significantly enough, there is 
a special theological category to account for why those who lack Christian faith may 
nevertheless understand: common grace.  Because Christians are simul justus et peccator, they 
too need the Spirit’s sanctifying work in their lives in order better to cultivate the interpretative 
virtues such as openness and humility.  Nonetheless, those who lack faith will find it harder to 
understand those things that come closest to challenging their denials, both theoretical and 
practical, of God and the gospel.260 
Thus, the ‘common grace’ of general understanding seems to be a work of sanctification 
understood in terms of interpretive virtues gifted by the Spirit prior to Christian faith.  
My concern is not with the mediation of the Spirit in relation to creation, but the 
conceptualisation of this in terms of virtue and the Spirit’s work of sanctification.  On 
the one hand, I think Vanhoozer’s account may ambiguate finitude and fallenness.  We 
cannot abstract one from the other, but neither should we confuse the nature of our 
dependence upon God in each case.  The ‘common grace’ of human agency, continually 
gifted by God in creation, and the saving grace of redeemed (and being redeemed) 
human agency through and in Christ crucified, gifted by God in salvation, should not be 
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confused.261  There is a discontinuity as well as continuity between the divine-human 
relation in creation and redeemed creation in Christ (‘new creation’).  This is vital to my 
concern with the problem of linguistically structuring theology, even if described in 
directly Christological and pneumatological terms.  On the other hand, I wonder how 
pneumatological Vanhoozer’s ‘common grace’ reference is.  If illumination is 
Christological and the Spirit is perlocutionary – i.e. the efficacy of the Word received by 
faith – is general understanding Christological but not fully mediated by the Spirit?  
This is the concern regarding ‘divine discourse simpliciter’ being ‘immediate.’  The 
reference to faith as Sache which is both gift and object of our knowledge seems to 
address the concern of ‘immediacy’ in regard to the corporeality of discourse but not to 
the role of the Spirit in mediating that corporeality – i.e. the Creator Spirit who mediates 
creation and new creation through and in Christ, as in Gunton’s call for a fully 
Trinitarian theology.    
 
I think these tensions pull us towards subsuming justification into sanctification, not in 
terms of ‘works righteousness’ but in terms of a communicative ontology.  Conviction 
and conversion cannot be subsumed linguistically into sanctification without 
undermining our historical and personal subjectivity in the judgement and death of 
Jesus Christ.  I will argue in the next chapter that the ‘judgement of grace’ ensures we 
speak of the ontological distinction between God and creation whilst describing our 
relation to God in Christ.  This requires a continuity-discontinuity relation in our 
description of the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ and our cruciform participation 
in this reality – i.e. between our subjectivity in relation to the death of Christ (as one for 
whom He died while we were still sinners, Rom 5:8) and our subjectivity in the death of 
Christ (as one who dies with Him in our lives, Phil 3:10-11, 2 Cor 4:10f.) This is vital to 
the hope of our salvation in the resurrection of Christ.  The ‘middle voice’ interplay 
between passivity and activity may express exactly this reality of gift and participation, 
justification and sanctification.  But my concern is that the linguistic conceptuality ends 
up construing justification and sanctification co-inherently, with sanctification 
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becoming the basic dynamic.262  Whereas ‘post-critical’ theology maintains that we are 
‘ever beginning’ at the Cross, in the gift of the Spirit (Gal 2:20, 3:1-5).  
 
Conclusion 
 
Vanhoozer requires an ambiguity between Scripture ‘being’ and ‘becoming’ the Word 
of God in order to maintain the importance for speech act conceptuality of illocution 
being independent of perlocution.  I think a result of this is that the present 
recognition/comprehension of Scripture is a Christological but not pneumatological 
reference, which is not fully trinitarian.263 I have argued that this correlates with a 
potential rationalisation of the fiduciary character of knowledge and idealisation of 
human agency gifted by God (regard to our contingency in creation – the ‘grace’ of the 
Creator-creation relation – and our need for redemption from the bondage of sin – the 
grace of salvation in Christ.)264  In considering Vanhoozer’s emerging thinking,265 I 
have argued that his description of the canon as ‘Christotopic’ – and his recent account 
of epistemology founded upon a Christological identification of hermeneutics and 
ontology reflecting the presence of God in the communicative/transformative action of 
Scripture – remain pneumatologically limited.  Vanhoozer’s theological model is 
trinitarian from the perspective of a certain kind of Spirit Christology.  But I believe this 
Spirit Christology limits the personhood and agency of the Spirit, and I have argued that 
these limitations undermine a fully trinitarian description of human agency in relation to 
God.  This raised a question concerning how Vanhoozer’s model accounts for the 
pneumatological dimension of justification.  This is important to the next chapter, as I 
consider Vanhoozer’s pneumatology in relation to the life, death and resurrection of 
Jesus Christ and our participation in Christ by faith.  
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Chapter 4: Pneumatology and Life in Christ 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I consider Vanhoozer’s account of the Doctrine of Atonement and his 
ecclesiology in his account of our participation in Christ.  In this part of The Drama of 
Doctrine we see most clearly how his ‘theodramatic’ categories apply to his canonical-
linguistic approach.  The church participates in the divine performance (God’s 
covenantal action centred upon salvation in Christ) by following the script (the Bible) – 
a Christological participation, and script, inspired by the Holy Spirit.  The atonement 
made possible through and in Christ is thus both ‘gift and task’, Vanhoozer’s uses the 
concept of ‘mimesis’ to describe how the church is given this gift and task of 
‘performing atonement’ in Christ.  I shall consider whether there is a linguistic 
‘rationality’ of Christ crucified that can be imitated in this kind of way.  Specifically, 
I’ll argue that while the ‘cruciform’ nature of Christian identity is characterised by a 
‘narrative spirituality’ of the cross of Christ,266 this should not imply a narrative 
ontology.  This argument involves a pneumatological point regarding how justification, 
by grace through Christ’s death and resurrection, is received by faith and mediated to us 
by the Holy Spirit.  I shall consider this in relation to Paul’s understanding of life 
‘according to the Spirit’.  I shall suggest that the Christian life of prayer, arguably the 
paradigmatic example of Christian practice, exemplifies the divine-human relationship, 
and highlights the foregoing issues.      
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A.  Vanhoozer’s Canonical-Linguistic Description of the Atonement and 
Christian Identity 
A.1.  The Cross of Christ and Theo-dramatic Performance  
 
In the final part of Drama of Doctrine, Vanhoozer shows how a canonical-linguistic 
approach to the doctrine of atonement integrates the “canonically bounded Pentecostal 
plenitude of images of the saving significance of the Cross” to develop a mutually 
“creative understanding” – one enabling the contributions of ‘penal substitution’ and 
‘relational restoration’ theories to be equally important and ultimate.267   
“Jesus’ death saves because it is the necessary and sufficient condition for restoring ‘right 
covenantal relations’ between God and humanity.  ‘Right’ preserves the basic insight of the 
penal substitution view, ‘relations’ that of the relational restoration view.  And ‘covenantal’ 
qualifies them both.268 
Vanhoozer’s emphasis upon covenant and aim (as we shall see) to connect his account 
of theo-drama with Irenaeus’ profound description of ‘recapitulation’ are excellent.  But 
I think Vanhoozer’s performance conceptuality may develop an account of atonement 
that glosses the discontinuity of the Cross.  He uses improvisatory concepts of 
‘reincorporation’ (in which improvisation repeats a theme through a performance 
bringing it to bear on the whole) and ‘overacceptance’ (in which the improviser not only 
accepts the free involvement of other players but enables their performance to become 
part of the ultimate story) to describe the atonement in theo-dramatic perspective as a 
‘wondrous improvisatory exchange’: “The cross, then, is the historical outworking of an 
eternal improvising by which the triune God loves the ungodly creatively while 
remaining himself.”269  ‘Recapitulation’ becomes improvisatory ‘reincorporation’: “the 
cross was God’s creative response to a new situation (Israel’s rejection of the Messiah) 
that was at the same time entirely in keeping with what had gone on before (the 
covenant with Israel)”;  the “death of Jesus saves because it is the means by which God 
‘overaccepts’ sin, taking its guilt, shame, and power upon himself in order to overcome 
it”; and therefore we can say that Jesus’ willing obedience “is our salvation because 
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Jesus is ‘God keeping his word’.”270  Vanhoozer is right that the character of God does 
not change, but in using Ricoeur’s ipse-identity (narrative identity of ‘keeping one’s 
word’), he locates the Cross and Resurrection within a rationality rather than being 
creative of rationality.  Rowan Williams describes the divine judgement of the Cross of 
Christ and the faith that it creates as gift, ex nihilo, in the resurrection.   
Easter faith is what there is beyond that faith and hope that exists prior to or apart from the cross 
of Jesus; what there is left after the judgement implied by the cross upon human imagining of the 
work of God aside from the ex nihilo gift of the risen Christ.271 
The discontinuity that the death of Christ places within history, and the subsequent new 
beginning of the resurrection, is essential to the utter destruction of sin and death, and 
flows from the infinite love and sheer identity of God.  Vanhoozer is right to express the 
non-competitive relationship between true ways of understanding the atonement.  My 
concern is that his means of integration in the triune communicative action model uses 
an overarching theo-dramatic performance conceptuality.  It enables his description of 
the atonement in performative terms to linguistically integrate our participative 
performance.  But how well does this express the way human agency is related to and 
transformed by God, in Jesus Christ’s life, death and resurrection?  How well does it 
describe the mediation of salvation through Jesus’ death and resurrection in relation to 
Jesus’ humanity and the gift of the Spirit? 
 
A.2.  Human agency and identity in relation to the judgement and grace of 
the cross of Christ 
 
Christian identity in relation to the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ involves 
both judgement and gift.272  These cannot be merged (or separated) because the gift 
depends upon the finality of the judgement.  This is also to say that whilst there is no 
justification that does not lead to sanctification, we cannot confuse the two.  This is vital 
to the mediation of the Spirit, which relates to justification as well as sanctification.  
Oliver O’Donovan writes, 
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The Holy Spirit brings God’s act in Christ into critical opposition to the falsely structured reality 
in which we live.  At the same time and through the same act he calls into existence a new and 
truer structure for existence. He gives substance to the renewed creation in Christ, giving it a 
historical embodiment in present human decisions and actions, so that it becomes partially 
visible even before its final manifestation.  We speak of two aspects of the Spirit’s work, not of 
two works.  It is perilous to draw too sharp a line in particular items of experience between 
repentance and moral learning, between justification and sanctification, between conversion and 
instruction.…Yet the distinction is fundamental to our understanding.  When the opposition of 
death and resurrection is collapsed, neither death nor resurrection remains.273 
This distinction between the Spirit’s ministry of conversion and instruction is hard to 
secure in Vanhoozer’s triune communicative action model because the ministry of the 
Spirit is seen in perlocutionary terms – our response to the divine communicative action 
of the Word.  O’Donovan, like Vanhoozer, follows Barth in describing the Spirit as the 
‘subjective mode’ of divine action, but argues this involves complementary assertions: 
firstly, that the Spirit makes the reality of redemption present and authoritative and, 
secondly, that the Spirit evokes our free response to this reality as moral agents.274  
Vanhoozer lacks a sufficient account of the first emphasis because he does not want to 
involve the Spirit in making present the authoritative divine illocutions of Scripture.  
 
The importance of distinguishing the two aspects is that the reality of redemption is ‘in 
Christ’ – our participation in that reality is only in the gift of the Spirit, who makes the 
eschatological reality ‘then’ present ‘now’.275  Life ‘in Christ’ is in opposition to the 
sinful patterns of this world.  O’Donovan argues that the Spirit’s office of conviction 
(John 16:8-11), in ministering to the world the truth “which judges even as it 
enlightens,” is contrasted with the Spirit’s ministry in guiding the church.  He hastens to 
add that this contrast is within one reality, redemption ‘in Christ’.    
Are we to contrast this missiological service of the Spirit with the ecclesiological service, of 
which we read a few sentences later (again, with special reference to the apostle’s ministry), that 
‘he will guide you into all truth’(16:13)?  Only to the extent that the ministry to the world is 
typically critical, that to the church typically constructive.  But it is always understood that 
criticism leads to reconstruction, conviction opens to guidance.  Even at the moment of criticism, 
the moment of confrontation and illumination, it is not only sin, but also righteousness and 
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judgement that are given as ‘conviction’.  There is already present in that moment the call to live 
life in a continuing sequence of decisions which will embody Christ’s exalted life and anticipate 
his final triumph over this world’s ruler.276 
Vanhoozer’s performance I and II distinction arguably makes a similar point regarding 
the priority of the gospel to ecclesial interpretation.  But I think his triune 
communicative action model limits the Spirit’s role in the office of conviction.  The 
Spirit’s ministry is focussed upon the gift of the interpretative virtue to recognise and 
participate in divine communicative action of Scripture.  This risks either subsuming 
justification within sanctification or describing Scripture as self-illuminating (as 
discussed in chapter 3).  In turn, the doctrine of atonement is described in performative 
terms that translate to our participation in Christ as ‘performing atonement’ in a way 
that cannot fully attain the opposition of death and resurrection.  It is because the “Spirit 
brings God’s act in Christ into critical opposition to the falsely structured reality in 
which we live” as He “gives substance to the renewed creation in Christ” that we are 
free to respond and be conformed to the likeness of Christ.  Structuring theology too 
closely to the linguistic turn to practice, and defending against the anthropocentricity by 
identifying the Spirit’s mediation with (canonical or ecclesial) practice as such, may 
undermine this twofold reality of judgement and recreation.  It makes the distinction 
and relation of divine identity and human subjectivity in our participation in Christ is 
hard to maintain: our subjectivity and agency is either absorbed into divine performance 
or not sufficiently brought through death into new life.   
 
Through Christ’s death and resurrection, our subjectivity and agency is neither lost nor 
is it left as it was.  Paul writes, “I have been crucified with Christ and I no longer live, 
but Christ lives in me.  The life I live in the body, I live by faith in the Son of God who 
loved me and gave himself for me.”(Gal 2:20)  To convey this, we need a fully 
trinitarian  account of life ‘in Christ’ drawing upon the significance of the Spirit as 
God’s personal presence.  We see the strength of O’Donovan’s account in this regard as 
he turns to the second of his complementary assertions.  The Spirit “restores us as moral 
agents, which is to say, as the subjects of our actions, not as divorced subjectivity 
which subsists in its own self-awareness.” 
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In confirming us as subjects, he teaches us how, within this age of eschatological judgement, we 
may act.  To do this he does not take over our subjecthood; he enables us to realize it.… God is 
present to man-as-subject, God the Holy Spirit attesting God the Son and evoking human 
attestation of him in human will and deed.277     
Thus, O’Donovan cautions against the pneumatological and ecclesiological error of 
describing the Holy Spirit in terms of a “communal subjectivity”. 
It is no more acceptable to speak of the church as possessing a semi-divine subjectivity than it is 
to speak of an individual believer doing so.…[The Holy Spirit] is not ambiguously ‘I’ and 
‘Thou’ to the church, but always ‘Thou’ to it, as it is to him.  He addresses it, ‘Set aside for me 
Paul and Silas’, and it addresses him, ‘Come, Holy Ghost, our souls inspire!’278 
The strength of this account is that our subjectivity and agency (individual and 
communal) is wholly dependent upon the recreative work of the Holy Spirit without 
confusing or simply identifying the person of the Spirit with the subjectivity and agency 
of the church.  The indwelling presence of God’s Spirit is the gift of life ‘in Christ’, and 
this secures our identity as creatures as well as our identity as one with God in Christ.    
 
A.3.  Atonement and Mimesis: Vanhoozer’s ecclesiology and account of 
participation in Christ 
 
I have argued that Vanhoozer’s theodramatic approach to the atonement and 
ecclesiology involves a performance conceptuality that linguistically encompasses the 
death and resurrection of Jesus Christ and our contingent participation.  However, two 
clarifications are necessary.  Firstly, Vanhoozer does not confuse the indicative and 
imperative nature of the gospel.  Christian identity is “both gift and task.”  Doctrine 
helps us to know our identity in Christ (our vocation or ‘role’) so we may participate 
fittingly in the theodrama of redemption, becoming who we are through grace by faith 
in Christ.  Vanhoozer uses the doctrine of atonement as his example.  
Doctrine clarifies the nature of the gift (union with Christ) and prepares us for the task 
(becoming like Christ).  In this regard, the doctrine of atonement trains us to think, imagine, 
even feel that who we are is a matter of our having died and been raised with Christ.279  
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Vanhoozer compares how doctrine performs this function in relation to sanctification 
with the way Constantin Stanislavski’s conceived character formation in his ‘Method 
acting’.  Stanislavski spoke of a ‘magic if’: the actor dedicates her/himself to embody 
the role ‘as if’ s/he were the character.  For Vanhoozer, the same is true of the Christian 
except that we speak of an “eschatological ‘is’.”280  Doctrine helps us exegetically to 
play our part ‘as is’.  Having helped us understand the theo-dramatic action, doctrine 
helps us “learn our roles”, our calling/vocation.281  This “literal ‘character’ formation” is 
not ‘play-acting’ but “pneumatic”: we participate in the theo-dramatic missions through 
union with Christ, a union “wrought by the Spirit yet worked out in history by us.”282  
The Holy Spirit “uses doctrines to make disciples spiritually fit [for fitting theo-
dramatic participation] by inculcating virtuous intellectual and imaginative habits.”283  
Secondly, Vanhoozer does not confuse divine and human identity.  While doctrine 
“locates Christian identity ‘in Christ,’ it does not confuse the disciple with his or her 
Lord” – we are “imitators of Christ not because we need to complete his mission but in 
order to witness to its finality.”284  
 
Amidst my appreciation for Vanhoozer’s vital emphasis upon Scripture as God’s living 
Word, which we are called live out, my concern is that his conceptuality leads to 
describing the Spirit in terms of the ‘narrative character’ of Christ’s performance rather 
than God’s personal presence.   
What the Spirit communicates to those in Christ is not his essential nature but his character, that 
is, his characteristic mode of activity – his spirit.  Christians have not only their own human 
spirits but the indwelling “Spirit of Christ” (Rom. 8:9; 1 Pet. 1:11).  It is this ‘mystic is’…that 
finally clarifies the identity of the disciple: a person “in Christ.”285 
The Spirit of Christ seems to be less person and more narrative character: “The Spirit’s 
role is to personalize and contextualize Jesus’ life in us.”286  Our participation in Christ 
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seems to refer in a primary sense to a pattern of performance (the ‘drama of Christ’) that 
mediates the divine-human relation.         
It is the Spirit who prompts human actors to transform their lives into ‘legible patterns’ of Jesus 
Christ…This is how we follow the drama of Christ’s life…repeating it so as to continue the 
through line of the Word’s communicative action in order to incarnate the same basic ‘idea’ (i.e. 
the knowledge of God) and action (i.e. the love of God) under different conditions.287 
I have discussed how, in the triune communicative action model, this pattern of 
performance seems to be identified with (rather than contingent upon) the Spirit’s 
mediation of our relation to God in Christ.  My point here is that the ‘discontinuity’ of 
the Cross (the opposition of death and resurrection) presses against this description 
because the death and resurrection of Jesus is both judgement and grace, and this too 
concerns the Spirit’s mediation.  Human agency is redeemed as ‘new creation’ – 
participation in Jesus’ resurrected humanity, mediated to us eschatologically by the 
Spirit.  
 
The crucial issue concerns Vanhoozer’s ecclesiology – how he links the gift of the 
atonement and the task of ‘performing atonement’.  The operative conceptuality is 
‘mimesis’ drawing upon Paul’s words, “Be imitators of God” (Eph. 5:1):  
The form of the church’s fitting participation in the drama of redemption is precisely that of 
mimesis: of Paul, of God, of Christ.  To be sure the church does not literally replicate Christ’s 
work.…Jesus’ person and work are singular, unique, and thus unrepeatable.  The Christian 
vocation is rather that of creative imitation, a nonidentical participation in the missions of the 
Son and Spirit.288 
Central to Vanhoozer’s ‘mimetic’ ecclesiology is an excellent exposition of the 
cruciform nature of our participation in Christ.  “When the church…embodies the 
gospel, it exhibits the cross.”289  To be a disciple of Christ, bearing witness to him, is to 
share in his sufferings (e.g. Phil 3:10, Rom 8:17).  Paul sees his narrative so identified 
with that of Jesus’ that his own personal identity is inseparable from that of Christ.290  
The question is how this ‘cruciformity’ – our participation in Christ – is related to the 
uniqueness of Jesus’ death and the giftedness of our salvation.  It is a question of 
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mediation.  For Vanhoozer, to be a disciple of Christ is to act in a way that theo-
dramatically corresponds to the form of Christ.291   
There is nothing especially Christian about suffering as an individual; but suffering as ‘a Christ 
for others,’ suffering in order to participate in the sufferings of Christ and so to make the reality 
of Christ visible to others – that is distinctly Christian…A martyriological mimesis, then, must 
know when and how to imitate Christ.  [To] theo-dramatically correspond to the form of Christ, 
we need to exercise phronesis – perception and perspective – in order to determine “whether the 
conforming action is one of ‘incarnation’ (affirmation and co-operation), ‘crucifixion’ 
(judgement and rejection) or ‘resurrection’ (bold creativity and newness)”292 
To speak of conformity to Christ in terms of deciding whether to adopt the action of 
‘incarnation’, ‘crucifixion’ or ‘resurrection’ seems to imply a transcendent conceptuality 
categorising these events in such a way that we can rationalise ‘how they work’ and 
adopt them as paradigmatic ‘ways of being’ in relation to the world.  This centres upon 
Vanhoozer’s use (within his understanding of mimesis and phronesis) of theodramatic 
‘form’ in the mediation of the canonical rationality of Christian practice through faith 
by the Spirit.  Jesus said that those who would come after him must deny themselves 
take up their cross and follow him (Mark 8:34 and parallels).  Imitation is profoundly 
central to discipleship, and real participation in Christ.  To know Jesus as Lord is to 
follow his way, and this requires that we hear his words and put them into practice.  
Vanhoozer’s canonical-linguistic brilliantly shows how Scripture is divine 
communicative action through which we know God and through which God directs our 
practice.  My point is simply that this practice is gifted by God through and in Christ in 
a way that means we cannot assume an overarching linguistic framework – Jesus is both 
God for me as well as one with me.  The point is one of mediation.  Jesus’ death is 
unique: he created the way for us to follow.  Jesus is the mediator of a new covenant 
(Hebrews 9:15), the author and perfecter of our faith (12:2), and the Spirit bears witness 
to this reality (10:12-25), making it manifest in our lives.  I can only imitate God 
because Jesus has gone before me, creating the way, and God now continually makes 
that way through and in Christ manifest by the Spirit.  The Spirit is more than the 
efficacy of divine communicative action. 
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Vanhoozer writes, “The church participates in and performs the doctrine of atonement 
when it indicates what God was doing for the world in Christ and thus what we must 
now be doing if the world is what the gospel declares it to be.”293  He gives central 
examples – reconciliation, practicing forgiveness, love of neighbour – and they are 
profoundly described.294  My questions concern the role of the Spirit in gifting and 
enabling us to adopt these practices and discern their specific shape in particular lives 
and communities.  Regarding the practice of forgiveness, Vanhoozer is clear it is gifted 
by God, and that the Spirit helps us understand our new roles as forgiven and forgiving 
people.  To be forgiven by God, is know the reality of forgiveness in a participative 
sense, not just intellectually apprend it – ‘Whoever does not love does not know God’ 
(1 John 4:8)”295  Vanhoozer, referring to Gregory Jones’ excellent book Embodying 
Forgiveness,296 describes how the church embodies forgiveness through habits and 
practices that give a distinct and specific form to the church’s historical witness to the 
present and eternal reality of God’s forgiveness.297  Discerning this specificity involves 
an “exercise of the theo-dramatic imagination”: forgiving others is a theo-dramatic 
“canonically scripted, doctrinally mandated, and Spirit-enabled practice.”298  What this 
account arguably lacks is the way the Spirit is more than the enabler of practice.   
 
The presence of the Spirit brings, through the message of the gospel, ‘God’s act in 
Christ into critical opposition with the falsely structured reality of our world’ (to repeat 
O’Donovan’s words).  Gregory Jones’ work highlights this point.  The Spirit ministers 
the reality of God’s forgiveness as a “judgement of grace....enabling our repentance, by 
shaping in us new habits and practices of forgiven-ness and repentance as we seek to be 
transfigured into holy people.”299   
[T]he Spirit of Christ is at work in human life, bringing people to judgement and forgiveness so 
that our lives can once again be marked by communion.  As John Zizioulas has described it, 
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‘The Spirit as ‘power’ or ‘giver of life’ opens up our existence to become relational, so that he 
may at the same time be ‘communion’ (koinonia, cf. 2 Corinthians 13:13).’  Indeed, the Spirit is 
at work throughout God’s Creation, seeking to open up spaces where forgiveness can interrupt 
our tendencies toward self-destructive judgement and thereby create space for communion.300  
This mediation of the Spirit – which is described by Lesslie Newbigin’s phrase, the 
‘prevenience of the Kingdom of God’301 – is vital to Christian practice. The Spirit not 
only enables canonical practice but eschatologically mediates the present reality of that 
practice, making manifest its rationality.  The Spirit is the personal presence of God 
who preveniently affects the reality and communication of the gospel, ‘publicly’ 
gathering and recreating the people of God through and in Jesus Christ crucified and 
risen.  Jones quotes Rowan Williams: “the bridge connecting our forgiven-ness with the 
commission to forgive…is to be found in the presence with believers of the Spirit.”302  
It follows that we are dependent upon the Spirit in discerning what the word of God 
means for our practice of forgiveness in a particular situation.   
[W]hile recognizing the priority of God’s forgiveness to our repentance, we also need to be 
guided, judged, and consoled by the Spirit as we seek to discern what that forgiveness means, 
and what repentance is called for, in relation to the narratives of our own and each others’ 
lives.303 
The gospel of Jesus Christ crucified and risen is the rationality for every act of 
faithfulness to God – entrusting our lives to the faithfulness of God who raised Christ 
from the dead, bearing witness to his infinite love.  We depend upon the Spirit to make 
this reality and rationality manifest to us through the apostolic words of Scripture.  We 
cannot refer to the content of the divine illocutions of Scripture in the absence of the 
Spirit whose presence is vital to the rationality of the gospel.  While the gospel is 
always communicated in human words and actions, the message of the cross is opposed 
to any kind of self-referential human wisdom (1 Cor. 1:18-2:16).   
 
I’ve argued earlier that Vanhoozer’s triune communicative action model limits the 
Spirit’s ministry in the mediation of revelation.  My point here is that Paul’s description 
of the wisdom of the cross, as a reality only comprehensible in the proclamation of the 
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gospel by the empowering presence of the Spirit, perhaps represents the locus of the 
debate exegetically.  This does not undermine Vanhoozer vital point that Scripture alone 
normalises the church’s communication of the gospel.  But this can be said without 
identifying the triune economy of salvation with semantic dynamics.  We should speak 
of ‘cruciformity’ in narrative terms, highlighting Paul’s self-understanding in terms of 
the narrative of the cross, and in thus describe the Christian life in terms of 
‘nonidentical repetition’, a “living exegesis of the story”.304  But should this mean that 
our participation in Christ by the Spirit is linguistically defined?       
 
B.  The Holy Spirit and the Christian Life 
 
Central to the foregoing discussion was the eschatological nature of the Christian life 
mediated by the Spirit.  Our dependence upon the Spirit raises issues concerning the 
Christian life in relation to the commandments of God (ethical imperatives) and how the 
Cross and the gift of the Spirit characterise divine and human agency.  Gordon Fee 
grounds these concerns in Paul’s eschatology, and specifically, the way the cross of 
Christ and the gift of God’s presence by his Spirit shaped Paul’s understanding of the 
Torah, life ‘in the flesh,’ and prayer.    
 
B.1.  Life ‘according to the Spirit’ in the New Testament letters of Paul 
 
Paul’s ethical teaching in relation to Torah-observance is obviously a complex topic.  
My hope is to highlight some key issues surrounding Paul’s description of life ‘kata 
pneuma’.  The Spirit does not invalidate the importance of the commandments of God.  
Paul’s words “Neither circumcision nor uncircumcision counts for anything; what 
counts is keeping the commandments of God” (1 Cor 7:19) highlight that he did not 
consider righteous living as optional in terms of believers’ relation to God’s character.  
Fee argues that a discontinuity and continuity exists with respect to Torah is because the 
“gift of the eschatological Spirit” has “rendered Torah observance obsolete, but…at the 
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same time made possible the ‘fulfilment of the righteous requirement of Torah’.”305 (c.f. 
Romans 8:4)  The Spirit is thus vital to Pauline ethics. 
[F]or Paul there is no such thing as ‘salvation in Christ’ that does not also include 
righteousness on the part of God’s people.  They are not saved by ‘doing righteousness’ – indeed 
that is unthinkable in Paul, since righteousness in the form of behaviour is the product of the 
Spirit’s empowering, and thus there can only be the working out of salvation by the same Spirit 
who has appropriated to their lives Christ’s saving work in the first place.306   
This does not undermine the indispensable role of the words of Scripture in the 
mediation of salvation.307  The issue is one of agency and living in the eschatological 
reality of the cross and resurrection of Jesus.  Fee’s point regarding righteousness and 
the Spirit is not that we do not need the written Word of God (‘keeping the 
commandments of God’ clearly refers to the articulated commands of the Lord), but that 
we are dependent upon the Spirit to hear, believe, know, love, and obey.  The 
eschatological reality of our relation to God in Christ, into which we come through 
hearing the written Word of God, is mediated at every point by the Spirit of God.  Thus,   
the ethics of eschatological salvation in Christ starts with a renewed mind (Rom 12:1-2; cf. Col 
1:9; Eph 1:17), because…only by such a renewed mind may one determine how best to 
love….Only dependence upon the Spirit can enable us to know what is pleasing to God.308 
 
Fee’s exegesis supports much of Vanhoozer’s approach in which canonical practice is 
Spirited practice.  The distinction is that the Spirit is not only the source of canonical 
efficacy, empowering our living out God’s will, but vital to understanding God’s ways 
in the first place, and this matters because the mind renewed by the Spirit is in a crucial 
sense opposed to ‘human wisdom’.  This raises an issue for theology structured by the 
linguistic turn.  However, making these points requires great care.  We must not confuse 
finitude (sustained by the Spirit) and falleness (opposed by the Spirit).  Such a 
confusion risks irrationalism and dualism, and a danger that we react against these by 
diminishing the eschatological novum of life in the Spirit, which we are seeking to 
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describe.  This requires engagement with the controverted Pauline topic of the 
Spirit/flesh dichotomy. 
 
For Fee, Paul intends in πνευµατικός (Col. 1:9) a contrast to ‘fleshly’ wisdom – 
“wisdom and insight that is merely of this present world, ‘earthly’ in this pejorative, 
fallen sense” (as in Col. 2:8,23) and not ‘earthly’ as in belonging to the earth in a 
material sense – which is opposed to “knowing God’s ways by means of the wisdom the 
Spirit gives.”309    Fee translates Gal. 5:16: ‘But I say, walk by the Spirit and you will 
not carry out the desire of the flesh.’  This is “Paul’s basic ethical imperative.”310  What 
‘walk by the Spirit’ means is vital to how we relate the gift of the Spirit to Christian 
practice.  Fee argues that the combination of the imperative ‘walk’ with the dative ‘by 
the Spirit’ means that “[e]thical life is still a matter of ‘walking in the ways of God,’ but 
for Paul this is empowered for God’s new covenant people by God’s empowering 
presence in the person of the Spirit.”311  The nuance of the dative is not obvious – it 
could be ‘instrumental’ or ‘locative of sphere’.  Fee accepts this formula (in the light of 
v.18) is probably primarily instrumental, but he argues that “even though one is to walk 
by means of the Spirit, one does so because one is also to walk in the sphere of the 
Spirit, that is, in the arena of the Spirit’s present life and activity.”312  Thus, Gal. 5:16 is 
promise – the Spirit is sufficient for our righteousness in a world in which the 
perspective of the flesh is still dominant.313  Gal. 5:16 is both promise and imperative 
because the Spirit is in opposition to the flesh (v17).  We are not simply powerless 
against the flesh, as underlined by the imperative – ‘so that you may not do whatever 
you wish’.  But in this imperative our agency is ever-always gift and never possession – 
the Spirit is “God’s enabling power over against the flesh.”314 This must not lead to an 
over-realised eschatology or body/Spirit dualism. The framework is Paul’s already / not 
yet eschatology.  Fee emphasises this, expounding three Pauline metaphors for the gift 
of the Spirit: down payment, first-fruits and seal.315     
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B.2.  Application to the concerns of this study 
 
Paul’s pneumatology concerning being ‘led by the Spirit’ (Gal. 5:18) does not 
undermine Vanhoozer’s emphasis upon Christ-centred canonical practice and proper 
rejection of ‘perlocutionary interpretation’ under the auspices of a Spirit-led 
hermeneutic.  As Fee writes: 
Although at the popular level ‘being led by the Spirit’ is sometimes understood to refer to direct 
guidance by the Spirit, Paul’s concern lies elsewhere. In context it functions as the other side of 
the coin to the imperative ‘walk by the Spirit’. That is, believers who walk by the Spirit do so 
because they are following where the Spirit leads; and the Spirit leads in the ‘law of Christ’[Gal 
6:3], in ways that both reflect and pattern after Christ himself – whom Paul has earlier described 
as ‘the one who loved me and gave himself for me’(2:20).316  
However, Fee’s exegesis presses against Vanhoozer’s conceptuality concerning how the 
way of Christ, as eschatological ‘new creation’, subverts the continuities in the nature of 
human agency implied by linguistically structured theology (even though Vanhoozer’s 
canonical-linguistic approach differs radically from the cultural-linguistic approach).  In 
a recent essay on divine and human agency in Paul,  J. Louis Martyn writes that in the 
gospel of Christ (for Paul, an event), God does not leave the human agent “alone at the 
road fork” but “meets both the incompetent, enslaved agent and the powers that enslave 
him in their own orb.”317  He argues that this meeting involves much more than God’s 
holding out to the ‘Adamic agent’ a new possibility/option, because the meeting is 
centred in God’s active, new-creative power.  God meets us  
in the logos tou staurou, the totally strange word-event that shatters ‘the wisdom of the wise and 
the discernment of the discerning’, thus destroying prior images of the human agent as well as 
old-age images of God (1 Cor. 1.18-19).  And in that meeting the divine agent does something 
unheard of.  Destroying old-age images of the human agent, God changes human agency itself!  
That is to say, meeting the incompetent and enslaved human agent in the gospel of his Son, God 
creates the corporate, newly competent and newly addressable agent, forming this new human 
agent in the image of the crucified Son Christos estaurômenos, by sending the Spirit of the Son 
into its heart (Gal 4.6; Rom. 8.29).318  
                                                 
316 GEP 438 
317 J. Louis Martyn, ‘Epilogue: An Essay in Pauline Meta-Ethics’, in J. Barclay and S. Gathercole eds., 
Divine and Human Agency in Paul and his Cultural Environment (New York: T&T Clark,2008) 180 
318 Ibid. 
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I do not take this newly created ‘corporate agent’ to imply what O’Donovan critiqued as 
a semi-divine subjectivity of the church, but rather new humanity in Christ.  Martyn is 
clear that the church is still made up of individuals, and there is no suggestion that the 
Spirit is anything other than ‘Thou’ to the church.  His point is that our created agency 
enslaved by sin is crucified with Christ.  By the Spirit we (as individuals) become one in 
Christ crucified, and participate in the corporate eschatological agency of the Spirit.  
(From this perspective, we see our old individuality as, actually, a participation in an 
opposing corporate agency, sarx.)319     
 
The contrast/opposition between kata pneuma and kata sarka is therefore pivotal, and 
we must be clear what this means in order not to confuse finitude and fallenness. Fee 
argues for a distinction between Paul’s neutral references to life ‘in the flesh’ (“simply 
humanity in its creatureliness vis-à-vis God”) and morally pejorative references to life 
‘according to the flesh’ (kata sarka), which denotes fallen creatureliness opposed to life 
in the Spirit.  He argues that translating kata sarka as ‘sinful nature’ can imply that it is 
“anthropological without adequately recognizing that for Paul it functions in a 
principally eschatological way.”320  The importance of this is that “[n]owhere does Paul 
describe life in the Spirit as one of constant struggle with the flesh.”  Since kata sarka is 
an eschatological distinction from kata pneuma, and not an anthropological term as 
such, the terminology “does not reflect some kind of internal struggle in the believer 
between these two kinds of existence.”321   
 
I would support Fee in this significant exegetical and theological debate, but with a 
qualification that centres upon the pneumatology at stake.  Fee is opposing J.D.G. 
Dunn’s reading that, in Gal. 5:16-17, ‘flesh’ and ‘Spirit’ refer to two dimensions of the 
believer’s present existence.  Dunn believes that Rom 7:14-25 and 8:1-9 represent the 
two sides of the eschatological tension; the believer is “involved on both sides of the 
cosmic struggle…‘I’ in Adam and ‘I’ in Christ.”322  While I favour Fee’s exegesis, I 
                                                 
319 C.f. Ibid., 180n26 and 183n30 
320 GEP 819 
321 GEP 817,820.  See PSPG 132-136 for Fee’s justification of this argument in relation to Rom. 7:13-25 
and Gal. 5:17. 
322 J.D.G.Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,1998) 481 
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think Dunn’s critique of Fee raises an important issue.  Dunn argues that Fee’s reading 
of Rom 8:4-6 suggests that the flesh is “passé as a factor in the life of the believer”, and 
thus asks how Fee can also accept that believers can and do succumb to the flesh.323  He 
also argues that Fee seems to forget Romans 8:12-13 when Fee argues that the flesh-
Spirit contrast in Paul never appears in a context concerned with ‘how to live the 
Christian life’.324  I don’t think Fee’s believes the flesh is passé,325 but rather that 
because of the Spirit the believer can live according to a reality totally opposed to the 
flesh, which is not a life set apart from the body, and thus still involves suffering as a 
consequence of sin.  Tom Weinandy’s work supports Fee’s exegesis, but helpfully 
addresses this issue of suffering because of sin in a way that gives us a means of 
engaging with Dunn’s point.  Weinandy’s incarnational theology emphasises that while 
Jesus never sinned personally nor had an inner propensity to sin, “yet his humanity was 
that of fallen Adam.”326  Jesus’ death and resurrection transformed this humanity 
establishing “a whole new salvific order…The Son of God is still incarnate, though now 
incarnate as a risen and glorious man.” This new salvific order arises from Jesus’ 
redemptive work and “is founded upon and discovered within the eschatological 
presence of the Holy Spirit.”327  To enter into it is to become a new creation in Christ 
through the indwelling Spirit.328  Weinandy gives an overview of the biblical texts,329 
and argues that “the new life in the Spirit brings about changes in kind and not simply 
degree”330: “Christians are still men and women, but now they have been radically 
transformed…their sinful nature has died [through Jesus’ death (c.f. Rom 6:2-11)], and 
they have become, through the Holy Spirit, new men and women in Christ.”331  
However, whereas Fee’s account leaves us slightly perplexed by the ongoing struggle 
Christians face with regard to sin, Weinandy speaks of the “ardent act of the will” 
required to “oppose the sin that lies deep within one’s heart so as to put it to death – to 
                                                 
323 GEP 817; Dunn, Theology of Paul the Apostle, 480n86 
324 GEP 821; Dunn, Theology of Paul the Apostle, 480n86 
325 ‘kata sarka’ and ‘kata pneuma’ describe “the essential characteristics of the two ages, which exist side 
by side in unrelieved opposition in our present already but not yet existence.” One is “condemned and on 
its way out” the other is “the real life of the Spirit.”(PSPG 130) 
326 T. Weinandy, Does God Suffer? (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,2000) 212 
327 Ibid., 234 
328 Ibid., 236 
329 Ibid., 236-241 
330 Ibid., 241&n32 
331 Ibid., 238 
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crucify it in Christ”332 (c.f. 1 Cor. 9:26-27, Heb. 12:1).  Rather than undermining the 
reality of our being ‘new creation’ in Christ,333 this is part of Weinandy’s account of 
suffering in relation to redemption in Christ.334  Crucially, Weinandy shares Fee’s 
concern that human weakness should not be confused with sin, lest life kata pneuma be 
confused with life kata sarka.335  Life in Christ is true freedom not to sin – fully human 
agency, not immune from the fallen nature of our world, yet truly free as we fully 
depend upon God in Christ through the indwelling Spirit. 
 
These points from Dunn and Weinandy help us build upon Fee’s account of the nature 
of agency in Paul’s eschatological perspective – not so as to depart from his basic thesis 
but to deepen our understanding of the transformation wrought by God in the human 
condition.  For Fee, the flesh-Spirit contrast is not to do with ‘how to live the Christian 
life’, because Paul is using it in the context of appealing to those “who have entered into 
the new eschatological life in the Spirit” to not “return to the old aeon, to live on the 
basis of Torah observance, which for Paul is finally another form of life ‘according to 
the flesh’.”336  Hence, life according to the Spirit, a total dependence upon what God has 
done in and through Christ crucified, is a way of being that places no weight upon what 
we can do, as we yet do what previously we could not –  follow God’s commandments 
(‘walk by the Spirit’).  Life kata pneuma does not overlap with life kata sarka.337  Fee 
focuses upon Paul’s theological perspective in context, but we can consider how this 
engages modern questions of agency.  God’s saving action in Christ creates a new 
humanity, through the indwelling of the Spirit.  Since this pneumatology avoids the 
                                                 
332 Ibid., 267 
333 Ibid., 268 
334 Ibid., Chapter 10, ‘Suffering in the light of Christ’, especially the section ‘A Radical Departure’ 261-
262.  Weinandy’s argument, centred upon the cross and resurrection, is that God suffers impassibly in 
Christ, and this includes that the Risen Christ shares in present human suffering. 
335 Ibid., 268 (c.f. GEP 818n35,822-826).  
336 GEP 821.  This does not mean that “God’s people cannot be ‘overtaken in a fault’ (Gal 6:1).  The 
resolution of such between-the-times trespassing of God’s righteous requirement is for the rest of God’s 
Spirit people to restore such a one through the Spirit’s gentleness.”(PSPG 136)  
337 Karl Barth secures this pneumatological point in speaking of the subjective aspect of Christ’s objective 
work, but my aim is to do so with a stronger pneumatology that avoids the ‘immediacy’ Gunton finds in 
Barth’s model.  
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confusion of finitude and falleness,338 the cognitive and affective nature of our finite 
existence is not bypassed but renewed eschatologically.  We are freed to be bound to 
love instead of bound to sin.  The way Paul applies the flesh-Spirit dichotomy in his 
arguments over Torah-observance cannot simply be transferred to debates concerning 
the linguistic turn to practice in contemporary theology.  However, the theology is 
relevant because the flesh-Spirit dichotomy is vital to Paul’s understanding of the 
recreation of human agency by the cross of Christ and the gift of the Spirit.  Clearly, we 
must not overstep into an over-realised eschatology – that would be foreign to Paul’s 
whole discourse.  Paul’s understanding of ‘power in weakness’ and the nature of ‘prayer 
in the Spirit’ brings these issues of agency and the linguistic turn into clearest relief. 
 
B.3.  The Spirit and power in weakness: Prayer as a paradigmatic 
‘practice’ of life in the Spirit, and how it exceeds a linguistic framework 
 
Central to Fee’s emphasis upon the eschatological nature of the Spirit/flesh dichotomy 
is his concern that to read Paul differently can lead to confusing “the term ‘weakness’ 
i.e., life in the flesh, with life ‘according to the flesh’”.  Such a confusion causes us to 
misunderstand Paul’s description of how the Spirit assists us in our weakness (Rom 
8:26), and his consequent rejoicing in weakness, in either ‘defeatist’ terms (in which 
‘weakness’ includes the flesh-Spirit struggle) or ‘triumphalist’ terms (in which 
weakness is rejected as inherently evil).  Fee emphasises that, for Paul, the Spirit is 
experienced in the life of the church, including visible manifestations of the Spirit’s 
power,339 but that in this manifest indwelling presence of God Paul closely correlates 
the Spirit’s power with present weakness. 
Rom 8:17 and 2 Cor 12:9 indicate that the Spirit is seen as the source of empowering in the 
midst of affliction and weakness.  In Paul’s view, ‘knowing Christ’ means to know both the 
power of his resurrection and the fellowship of sharing in his sufferings (Phil 3:9-10)…The 
future had truly broken into the present, as verified by the gift of the Spirit…Thus present 
                                                 
338 The eschatological Spirit sustains us in God’s creation and indwells us in salvation through Jesus 
Christ, giving us a foretaste and guarantee of our resurrection in Christ crucified, thus opposing the sin 
that binds fallen humanity. 
339 GEP 824-825; see also Dunn, Theology of Paul the Apostle, 426-434 
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suffering is a mark of discipleship, whose paradigm is our crucified Lord.  But the same power 
that raised the crucified One from the dead is also already at work in our mortal bodies.340 
This eschatological reality – God’s power in our weakness – leads to a paradox that Fee 
suggests creates “difficulties for moderns”, but is established by the cross and 
resurrection of Christ and given by the presence of the Spirit as evidence of the 
‘already’ and guarantee of the ‘not yet’.  We do not oscillate between experiences of the 
old and the new order; by the Spirit we live in the reality of the new order in the midst 
of the old.  This life in the Spirit is a life of faith, entrusting our suffering to God (c.f. 
Hebrews 11:32-38) and trusting in what we do not yet see, but experiencing the ‘real 
earnest’ of God’s personal presence – new birth into a sure and living hope (Heb. 11:1, 
1 Pet. 1:3).  Prayer exemplifies this present reality of human agency in Christ.    
 
Personal prayer is at the heart of Paul’s eschatology and understanding of the nature of 
the Christian life.  Paul clearly prayed before his conversion to Christ, but Fee argues 
that, for Paul, prayer has been transformed by the coming of the Spirit.341 
The beginning of Christian life is marked by the indwelling Spirit’s crying out “Abba” to God 
(Gal 4:6; Rom 8:15).  ‘On all occasions,’ Paul urges everywhere, ‘pray in/by the Spirit’…With 
prayer in particular the Spirit helps us in our ‘already/not yet’ existence.342 
Romans 8:26-27 describes how the Spirit empowers us in our weakness.  Although we 
don’t know what to pray for, God, who searches our hearts, knows the mind of the 
Spirit who indwells us and makes intercession for us according to God’s will.  This 
profoundly expresses the way the indwelling presence of the Holy Spirit transforms the 
relation of divine and human agency, as we participate in the life of God through and in 
Christ.  Praying in the Spirit is also vital to Paul’s account of the ongoing struggle 
against the authorities and powers of this world and the spiritual forces of evil in the 
heavenly realms (Eph 6:10-20).  The word of God is the ‘sword of the Spirit’ – the only 
offensive weapon mentioned alongside the armour of God.  The proclamation and 
application of God’s written word is our sole sufficient weapon for our struggle, and 
prayer in the Spirit is essential to this task.   
                                                 
340 GEP 825 
341 GEP 866(my emphasis); see also Gordon Fee, ‘Some reflections on Pauline Spirituality’, J.Packer and 
L.Wilkinson, Alive to God (Downers Grove: IVP,1992) 96-107 
342 GEP 866-867 
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It is God siding with his people and, by his own empowering presence, the Spirit of God himself 
bringing forth prayer that is in keeping with his will and his ways.…It is evidence of our utterly 
dependent status; as it is also evidence of our continuing in the present in recognized 
weakness.343 
This emphasises the eschatological relation of divine and human agency that prayer in 
the Spirit characterises.  For Paul, prayer ‘in the Spirit’ is not so much about ‘ecstatic’ 
experience as about the greater reality as whole – how prayer had been transformed by 
Christ crucified and the gift of the Spirit into a relation of sonship to God in Christ.  
Paul experienced ecstatic moments, presumably in the context of prayer, but as Fee 
points out they are not his public focus lest they detract from the reality that God’s 
power is made perfect in weakness (2 Cor 12:1-10).  Life in the present involves being 
conformed to Christ’s death through the power of the resurrection.   
 
Vanhoozer speaks of the profound importance of prayer as a canonical practice.   
While each canonical practice requires its own specific response, the appropriate global response 
to the Scriptures is to pray…Prayer is that canonical practice whereby we do not merely envision 
the theo-drama but indwell it and assume a speaking part.344 
As a canonical practice, prayer links us to the practice of Jesus.  Jesus teaches his 
disciples to pray to God as Abba, and Paul takes this up, regularly writing of “our God 
and Father” and employing the term Abba in Rom. 8:15 and Gal. 4:6.  Vanhoozer 
emphasises that calling God ‘Father’ identifies God as “a communicative agent who 
speaks and acts, a personal being with a name and an identity.”345  Prayer is a canonical 
practice called forth and enabled by Scripture: Jesus’ life death and resurrection 
communicates to us a relation to God as Abba; the canon is “our logic of justification” 
for this and “the norm of Christian prayer.”346 It is in this discussion of prayer that 
Vanhoozer cites David Yeago, “‘Christianity came into the world not as an ‘experience’ 
only subsequently ‘expressed’ in textual monuments but precisely as a new 
textuality.’”347 Whilst agreeing with the critique of ‘experience simpliciter,’ I think this 
                                                 
343 PSPG 147 
344 DD 224 
345 DD 225.  Vanhoozer recognises that prayer bears witness to our contingency and our life in the Spirit: 
“To pray is to acknowledge God as Lord, oneself as contingent, and the filial relationship made possible 
by the Son of God and the Spirit of adoption.”(Ibid.) 
346 DD 225 
347 DD 226 
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makes ontology and hermeneutics co-inherent and overly-textualises the ‘experience’ of 
prayer, which exemplifies Paul’s understanding of eschatological agency (a corporate 
and personal relation to God in Christ mediated by the Spirit), and which is limited by 
thinking the gift of the Spirit and textual dynamics too closely together.  
 
Prayer in the Spirit is not a parallel, supplemental or prior rationality to the canon; 
Scripture norms liturgical, corporate, and personal prayer.  But prayer depends upon 
God’s personal presence by his Spirit, who creates a personal relation to God our Father 
in Christ Jesus.  Our practice is contingent upon this presence, this relation to God in 
Christ by his Spirit.  In 1 Cor 6:19-20 and 2 Cor 2:14-4:6, Fee argues we find the key to 
Paul’s personal piety – the presence of the Spirit as a personal and corporate reality.  By 
the Spirit’s presence we behold God’s glory in Christ and are being transformed into 
God’s likeness:   
the personal dimension cannot be set aside.  Indeed the first location of God’s presence in the 
new covenant is within his people…We now bear his image in our present ‘already but not yet’ 
existence.  This is not the only thing Paul believes the Spirit to be doing in our present world, but 
it is very significant, and we miss Paul by a wide margin if we do not pay close attention to it.348   
My argument is that Christian prayer and worship reveal the eschatological nature of 
Christian practice and theology.  What Paul describes is experienced – not the 
‘experience simpliciter’ rightly rejected by postliberalism, but the experience of God’s 
personal presence by his Spirit.  This requires a ‘yes and no’ to Lindbeck’s critique of 
experiential-expressivism.  Vanhoozer’s ‘yes and no’ to Lindbeck’s critique of 
cognitive-propositionalism enables him to ‘rehabilitate propositions’.  I think we also 
need to ‘rehabilitate experience’ post-liberalism and indeed post-postliberalism.349   
 
Paul’s description of prayer in the Spirit supports the importance of understanding what 
God is doing in our world (given by Scripture) and knowing what to pray for, yet places 
our prayerful relationship to God in Christ, mediated by the Spirit, as a reality upon 
                                                 
348 PSPG 21-22 
349 Fee notes that ‘Spirit Christology’ became dominant in the 20th century in the wake of “Gunkel’s 
seminal work on the Spirit in Paul”, by which “he ‘felled the giant’ of nineteenth-century liberalism, 
wherein the Spirit had been identified with consciousness.”(GEP 832&n9).  Arguably, it’s because of the 
prevalence of this ‘Spirit Christology’ that Lindbeck’s critique of experiential-expressivism has not met 
the same scrutiny as his critique of propositions.  Vanhoozer’s Spirit Christology allows him to follow 
Lindbeck on this point regarding experience without the scrutiny it also requires. 
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which epistemic and hermeneutical capacity is founded rather than co-inherent – i.e. the 
gift of a new rationality (the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, life in the Spirit).  Further, 
the ‘agency’ of Christian prayer is radically new, whilst not setting aside temporal 
human agency.  Prayer in the Spirit is ‘God siding with his people and, by his own 
empowering presence, the Spirit of God himself bring forth prayer that is in keeping 
with his will and his ways.’  This utter dependence upon God in no way bypasses our 
mind and will but rather renews us by the Holy Spirit through the life, death and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ as both judgement and grace.  Our freedom and subjectivity 
are newly created, by the communication of the gospel of Jesus Christ and the gift of the 
Spirit, such that there is a continuity-discontinuity relation with regard to linguistic 
practice and identity – the ‘I, yet not I’ of Gal 2:20.   
 
Vanhoozer’s canonical-linguistic theology describes practice in an utterly theocentric 
way.  It is a vital contribution and I am excited about the project.  My aim has been to 
show how a stronger pneumatology is required, which would offer more of a corrective 
to the important linguistic turn in theology.  The reality of God’s personal presence by 
his Spirit creates an eschatological reality that is under-realised by identifying the Spirit 
in perlocutionary terms.  In terms of divine communicative action, perlocution should 
be contingent upon illocution.  The problem is of making ‘divine communicative action’ 
an overarching framework for theology and identifying the Triunity of God with the 
dynamics of temporal communication.  In this chapter, I have sought to centre this 
argument upon the cross and resurrection, and show its applicability to one of the most 
central canonical practices – prayer.   Prayer is indicative of the new agency.  Prayer in 
the Spirit is no mere ‘experience’ (as defined by modern epistemology), but the 
experienced gift of new life in the Spirit – God’s empowering personal presence; the life 
in Christ that is the foretaste of ‘new creation’ (2 Cor. 5:17). 
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C.  Trajectories 
 
Based upon the concerns of this chapter, I think we can say that a fully trinitarian 
ontology, centred upon the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, involves a 
distinctively Christian account of freedom, rationality, and relationship to God and 
creation, in and through Christ crucified in the empowering presence of the Spirit – 
God’s power made perfect in weakness. 
         
Conclusion 
 
I have drawn upon the work of Oliver O’Donovan to emphasise the work of the Spirit in 
the vital distinction (and equally vital integrity) of justification and sanctification in 
Christ.  This is centred upon the way the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ 
establishes a twofold reality of judgement and recreation – a discontinuity and 
continuity with respect to the Creator-creature relation through and in Jesus Christ.  
Through Christ’s death and resurrection, our subjectivity and agency is neither lost nor 
left as it was (Gal 2:20).  To convey this, we need an account of our life ‘in Christ’ that 
is fully trinitarian, reflecting the way that “God changes human agency itself”350 and 
drawing upon the significance of the Spirit as God’s personal presence.   
 
I’ve asked whether the performance conceptuality in Vanhoozer’s canonical-linguistic 
description of the atonement as ‘gift and task’ involves a rationality that problematically 
assumes an overarching continuity in the nature of human agency.  His description of 
“literal ‘character’ formation” as “pneumatic” – an “eschatological is” in place of 
Stanislavski’s ‘magic if’ – establishes the agency of the Spirit within his canonical 
identification of the linguistic turn to practice.  However, I think this pneumatology is 
limited – it does not fully convey that the indwelling personal presence of God in the 
Holy Spirit changes the ‘rationality’ of human subjectivity and agency, and therefore 
the dynamics of Christian practice.  I share Vanhoozer’s commitment to the ‘cruciform’ 
                                                 
350 J. Louis Martyn, ‘Epilogue’, 180 
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nature of Christian practice, but think he allows that rationality transcends the cross by 
locating our participation in the cross of Christ within a performative conceptuality, via 
an overarching linguistic framework.   
 
Vanhoozer is certainly not advocating any kind of eclipse of the importance of the 
presence of the Holy Spirit by the vitality of the written Word of God, and I am 
absolutely not interested in the reverse of that eclipse.  The issue is the way we describe 
the integrity of the personal presence of God by his Spirit with the transformative 
communication of the gospel of Jesus Christ in and through his written Word.   My 
concern is that Vanhoozer’s use of literary ‘form’ tends towards a transcendent 
reference that does the work theologically that I believe the New Testament attributes to 
the personal presence of the Holy Spirit.   
 
The personal presence of God by the Holy Spirit is vital to the theological concerns that 
Vanhoozer’s canonical-linguistic approach addresses.  I have considered the importance 
of Paul’s antithesis between life ‘kata pneuma’ and life ‘kata sarka’ to our theological 
description of the relation between divine and human agency.  Further, Paul’s 
understanding is that life according to the Spirit is an experience of divine power made 
perfect in human weakness.  This provided a means of exploring whether the Christian 
life can be fully described within a linguistic framework.  Paul’s description of prayer in 
the Spirit – most notably in Romans 8 – exemplifies the point and is paradigmatic of 
Christian practice.  This calls for a fully trinitarian ontology built from the biblical 
witness.   
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Concluding Summary 
 
Kevin Vanhoozer uses speech-act conceptuality to describe the authority and identity of 
Scripture as the written Word of God (divine communicative action), and brilliantly 
applies this to the issue of normativity in theology structured by the linguistic turn to 
practice.  There are difficulties, however, insofar as Vanhoozer’s canonical-linguistic 
theology is founded upon identifying locution, illocution and perlocution with the 
Triunity of God.  Addressing the semantic deficiency in Barth’s doctrine of revelation, 
yet retaining Barth’s triune model of divine self-revelation, leads to epistemological 
problems centred upon an insufficiently pneumatological account of mediation.  The 
integration of authorial discourse and the linguistic turn to practice establishes a 
theodramatic account of triune communicative action (incarnate and inscripturate) that 
addresses the semantic nature of the mediation of salvation through and in Jesus Christ, 
and profoundly locates the hermeneutical task as flowing from, rather than a challenge 
to, the normativity of Scripture.  However, the ‘triune communicative action’ model 
exacerbates the pneumatological limitation in Barth’s account of divine self-revelation.  
I have argued that this emerges in the ‘Spirit Christology’ Vanhoozer’s model uses, and 
sought to show this with Gordon Fee’s exposition of Paul’s witness to the Spirit as 
God’s personal presence, eschatologically indwelling and empowering his people.   
 
The personal presence of God by his Spirit is vital to the authority, identity and 
normativity of Scripture, and to the nature of the Church as ‘manifest public’.  The 
Spirit as ‘person’ is significant because the presence of the Spirit is creative of, but can 
not be defined by, communicative and ecclesial practice.  (My argument involved 
questioning the use of Ricoeur’s narrative concept of self to describe identity and 
participation in Christ.)  Underwriting the linguistic turn to practice with pneumatology 
may address (post)modern issues of epistemological, hermeneutical and performative 
agency in relation to the divine grace of participation in Christ.  But my concern regards 
how the ontological distinction between God and creation, and the relation of God’s 
being to the economy of salvation, is conceived in such linguistic approaches.  I have 
sought to show that participation in Christ is ‘cruciform’ (the narrative of the Cross 
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shapes our self-understanding as we seek to obey Jesus’ call to take up our cross and 
follow him), yet argue that the gospel reality of Jesus Christ crucified and risen cannot 
be fully identified in linguistic terms without collapsing justification into sanctification.  
The New Testament witness to life according to the Spirit is essential to this point, and 
especially evident in Paul’s understanding of the Christian life of prayer in the Spirit.  
This points towards a fully Trinitarian theology that sustains a ‘high Christology’ and 
‘high pneumatology’ and supports the profound insights of the linguistic turn in 
theology, yet defends against the sheer identity of the Triune God being defined by it.  
Such an approach, based upon a fully trinitarian ontology, would I believe be creative of 
an understanding of the relation of divine and human agency centred upon our Lord 
Jesus Christ to the glory of God the Father. 
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